

DT  
1896  
.A675  
1899

DUKE  
UNIVERSITY




LIBRARY









Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2017 with funding from  
Duke University Libraries

J. G. Kotze





# BRITAIN AND THE BOERS.

## WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA?

BY

LEWIS APPLETON, F.R.H.S

*Author of Reminiscences of the Franco-German War; Memoirs of Henry Richard, M.P.; Foreign Policy of Europe, &c., &c.*

---

PRICE TWO SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE

---

LONDON:

SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT AND CO., LIMITED,

---

1899.

LONDON :  
HARRISON AND SONS, PRINTERS,  
ST. MARTIN'S LANE, W.C.



968.2  
A621 F

# INDEX

OF THE

## DESPATCHES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER,

FROM AUGUST 3RD, 1881, TO OCTOBER 10TH, 1899.

	PAGE
The Pretoria Convention, 1881 .. .. .	5
The London Convention, 1884 .. .. .	6
* Lord Derby's Declaration, 1884 .. .. .	7
* Sir Hercules Robinson's Declaration, 1884 .. .. .	8
* The Uitlanders' Petitions, 1894 and 1899 .. .. .	9
Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch, May 10th, 1899 .. .. .	9
Marquis of Ripon's Despatch, November 19th, 1894 .. .. .	17
Sir Alfred Milner's Despatch, June 14th, 1899 .. .. .	18
Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch, July 27, 1899 .. .. .	20
Mr. Conyngham Greene's Despatch, August 2nd, 1899 .. .. .	23
Sir Alfred Milner's Despatch, August 15th, 1899 .. .. .	25
* F. W. Reitz's Despatch, August 19th, 1899 .. .. .	26
Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch, August 28th, 1899 .. .. .	28
F. W. Reitz's Despatch, September 2nd, 1899 .. .. .	30
Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch, September 8th, 1899 .. .. .	33
F. W. Reitz's Despatch, September 16, 1899 .. .. .	37
Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch, September 22nd, 1899 .. .. .	39
F. W. Reitz's (Ultimatum) Despatch, October 9, 1899 .. .. .	42
Sir Alfred Milner's Despatch, October 7th, 1899 .. .. .	45
Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch, October 10th, 1899 .. .. .	46

\* State Secretary of the South African Republic.



## SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS.

	PAGES-
Introduction .. .. .	vi, vii

### CHAPTER I.

The Great Issue at Stake. The Insurrection in the Transvaal in 1881. Parliament summoned. Declarations of Policy by Ministers and ex-Ministers. The Pretoria Convention of 1881 compared with the Convention of London of 1884. The Uitlanders' Petition of 1894 and 1899 for Political Enfranchisement. Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch, 10th May, 1899 .. .. .	1-10
---	------

### CHAPTER II.

Origin of the Conference at Bloemfontein, June, 1899. Declaration of Policy by Sir Alfred Milner at the Conference. The Memorandum of President Krüger. Arbitration discussed. Conference closed. Deputation to, and Speech of Sir Alfred Milner at Cape Town. Causes of the Failure of the Conference .. .. .	10-18
--	-------

### CHAPTER III.

Despatch of Sir Alfred Milner, June 14th, 1899, upon the Question of Arbitration. Despatch of Mr. Chamberlain of July 27th, in response thereto. Proposals for Settlement of the Seven Years' Retrospective Franchise by Joint Commission of Inquiry .. .. .	18-24
--	-------

### CHAPTER IV.

The Fatal Despatch of August 19th of the Government at Pretoria refusing Commission of Inquiry, but proposing Five Years' Retrospective Franchise, subject to the Renunciation of the Suzerainty and future Intervention of Great Britain. The Despatch of Mr. Chamberlain of 28th August accepting Five Years' Franchise terms, without conditions, and approving of Tribunal of Arbitration on other questions in dispute .. .. .	25-29
---	-------

## CHAPTER V.

PAGES

Comprehensive Statement from Sir Alfred Milner of the Political Position, and the Despatch of September 2nd from Pretoria withdrawing Five Years' Franchise Scheme. Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch of September 8th reviews the Negotiations, and submits Final Proposals. The Critical Situation examined .. .. .	30-36
--	-------

## CHAPTER VI.

The Proposals of Great Britain rejected by the Despatch of 16th September from Pretoria. The Door closed against further Negotiations. The final Despatch of Mr. Chamberlain of the 22nd September. The breakdown of the Negotiations. The Duke of Devonshire's pacific Declarations. The Rumours of War ..	36-41
---	-------

## CHAPTER VII.

The Government at Pretoria send, on the 10th October, their Ultimatum. Its serious consequences reviewed. Mr. Chamberlain's laconic reply thereto. The Declaration of War, and the Policy of the South African Republic condemned .. .. .	42-47
---	-------

## CHAPTER VIII.

Examination into the Causes that led to the Diplomatic rupture. The Suzerainty and Arbitration. First proposal of a Tribunal of Arbitration in May, 1897, by the Government at Pretoria. History of the various stages of the Question of Arbitration in the order of date, to the 16th September, 1899. Review of the Correspondence between the two Governments .. .. .	48-62
---	-------

## CHAPTER IX.

The History of the Question of the Suzerainty. The Government at Pretoria first raised the Controversy. The Despatches of the two Governments in Chronological order referring to the Question. Position taken up by Great Britain. The chief cause of the breakdown of the Negotiations and the outbreak of War .. .. .	63-78
--	-------

## CHAPTER X.

Declarations of eminent Public Men on the Responsibility of the War in South Africa from October 11, to December 1, 1899 .. .. .	79-107
--	--------



## INTRODUCTION.

---

*Innovation*  
*Convention*  
*Sovereignty*  
THE Author of this book during the years 1879, 1880, and 1881 was one of a small, but resolute band of men who vigorously protested against the annexation of the Transvaal to the British Crown, by the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, and this protest was followed up by a series of public demonstrations at Birmingham, Bristol, Bradford, Manchester, and other great centres in England. The result of these public-spirited efforts was the revocation of the ~~Convention~~ of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and the negotiation of the ~~Treaty~~ of Pretoria of 1881, by which freedom and independence were given to the Transvaal, subject to the ~~Sovereignty~~ of Great Britain, and by which political, civil, and religious freedom, with its attendant privileges of free trade, free commerce, and free travel were guaranteed to the Colonists of Great Britain, and to the Colonists of every nation in the world.

Eighteen years have now rolled by since this great Charter of Liberty, on the one hand to the Government of the Transvaal, and on the other hand to the people of the Transvaal, was guaranteed by the Treaty of Pretoria, and subsequently this freedom and independence, and those liberties and privileges were emphasised and consolidated by the Treaty of London of 1884. But, alas! owing to the dogged obstinacy of the responsible Government at Pretoria, these political, civil, and religious liberties have not been granted; but, on the contrary, a determination has been shown to repudiate absolutely the Protectorate of Great Britain, and to refuse to the Foreigner of whatever nationality, political enfranchisement, and consequently of those rights and privileges which would result therefrom.

The successive Governments of Great Britain, from 1884 to 1899, both Liberal and Conservative, firstly under the Administrations of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Rosebery, and lastly of the Marquis of Salisbury, have manfully striven, by Conference, Negotiation, and Diplomacy, to obtain the fulfilment of the promises and obligations of the ~~Treaties~~ *Conventions* of Pretoria and London; and, although the declarations of Her Majesty's Ministers have been emphatic and clear in favour of maintaining the Independence and Self-Government of the South African Republic, provided the civil and political rights of the Uitlanders were granted; and although the Friends of Peace throughout the Kingdom have urged upon the British Government to exercise moderation and conciliation, and also have unceasingly pressed upon the Government at Pretoria to yield to these just demands, nevertheless, from some sinister motive, or from some strange infatuation, President Krüger and his Government have refused all concession, conciliation, and negotiation, and have rushed madly into war, and plunged the South African Continent into a whirlpool of disaster, a war of races, of passion, ambition, and revenge, that oceans of blood will be unable to quench.

// This disastrous policy has alienated the sympathy and arrayed the hostility not only of the people of Great Britain, but also of every nation in the world whose fellow-subjects compose the Uitlander population of the South African Republic; and the result must inevitably be, after many sanguinary conflicts—"of the carnage of the warrior of the battlefield, of confused noise and garments rolled in blood"—the abolition of the oligarchy at Pretoria, and the effacement, as self-governing States, of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, for which President Krüger and President Steyn, with their Ministers, and obsequious followers, will be entirely responsible, and for which history will adjudge them guilty. //

LEWIS APPLETON.

*December 20th, 1899.*

---

## ERRATA.

---

On page 35, line 32, for "last position" read "*lost* position."

On page 35, last line, after "Sovereign International" omitted "*State*."

On page 71, line 36, after "Government could" read "*not* admit."



# THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR

BETWEEN

## GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FROM 1881 TO 1899.

---

### CHAPTER I.

#### THE GREAT ISSUE AT STAKE.

THE serious crisis in South Africa arising out of the persistent refusal of the Government at Pretoria to grant, in fulfilment of Treaty obligations, and in accordance with constitutional freedom, political and civil rights to the loyal population, commonly called the Uitlanders, who compose the great majority of the South African Republic, is, it will be admitted, one of supreme importance, not only to the great principles of justice, and of political, civil, and religious liberty at stake, but also for the security, prosperity, and peace of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain in South Africa.

In order to estimate fairly the just demands of the Uitlanders, and of the demands of Great Britain for the settlement of the Franchise Question, and also of the many vexed questions of difference and dispute between Great Britain and the South African Republic, and to arrive, if possible, at a sound judgment as to the justice of those demands, and upon whom rests the heavy responsibility of this deplorable war, it will be necessary to place in order of date, from 1881 to 1899, the political and diplomatic records of the declarations made by Ministers of the respective Governments, the Clauses in the Conventions of 1881 and 1884, and the Despatches of the Governments of Great Britain and the South African Republic respectively

#### DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

When the Government of Mr. Gladstone called Parliament together in January, 1881, the Boers of the Transvaal were in full

revolt against the annexation policy of the late Government of Mr. Disraeli. and in consequence of the Speech from the Throne, that measures be taken for the vindication of the authority of the British Crown over the Transvaal, Mr. Rylands submitted a resolution to the House of Commons, 21st January, 1881, condemning the annexation of the Transvaal as impolitic and unjustifiable, and in the debate which took place, Mr. Gladstone, in defence of the policy of the Government, laid great stress on the necessity of securing political justice to the English and other Settlers in the Transvaal, and the following was the language he used :—

I must look at the obligations entailed by the annexation; and if, in my opinion, and in the opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by the annexation itself, that would not warrant us in doing fresh, distinct, and separate wrong, by a disregard of the obligations which that annexation entailed. Those obligations have been referred to in this debate, and have been mentioned in the compass of a single sentence. First, there was the obligation entailed towards the English and other Settlers in the Transvaal, perhaps including a minority, though a very small minority of the Dutch Boers themselves; secondly, there was the obligation towards the native races, an obligation which I may call an obligation of humanity and justice; and, thirdly, there was the political obligation we entailed upon ourselves in respect of the responsibility which was already incumbent on us, and which we, by the annexation, largely extended for the future peace and tranquillity of South Africa. *Contains a hint of the existence of the Paramount*

At this period an agitation was raised in this country in favour of the independence of the Transvaal, conditional on a guarantee for the securing of the obligations referred to by Mr. Gladstone, and in proof of this may be given the full text of one of the resolutions that was moved by Sir Wilfred Lawson at a Town Hall meeting in Birmingham on the 8th of March, 1881, which ran as follows :—

That this Meeting entertains the strongest confidence that, in any settlement of the Transvaal dispute, the Government may rely upon the hearty support of the Nation in their efforts to satisfy the just claims of the Boers, *while securing the rights of the native races and English Settlers.*

Again, in the debate which took place in the House of Commons on the 25th of July, 1881, when Sir Michael Hicks-Beach moved the following Resolution :—

“That, in the opinion of this House, the course pursued by Her Majesty’s Government with respect to the rising in the Transvaal, so far as it has yet been explained to Parliament, has resulted in the loss of valuable lives without vindicating the authority of the Crown, is fraught with danger to the future

tranquillity and safety of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa, and fails to provide for the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by this country towards the European Settlers and native population of the Transvaal,"

the question of the political rights of *the loyal settlers* in the Transvaal was brought prominently forward and strongly emphasised, and was thus referred to by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach:—

But there are other persons in the Transvaal besides the Boers and the natives. There are those who are known as loyalists. What is their position? They are not so few in number as has been hitherto supposed. We know that there have been 3,700 of them in Pretoria, that there are others in different garrisons which have been besieged by the Boers. We know that Mr. Krüger recognised their numbers when he admitted that he had some fear of their action, and of the claims which might be made by them for property of theirs taken by him and his friends to fight against their Sovereign. What is to be their future? You say you will take securities for the protection of life and property, and that they will be entitled to all the rights of settled government.

\* \* \* 1775 \* \* \*

What have these people done? Why, in the first place, they have made large investments in the Transvaal on the faith of the promises of the British Government. That fact alone induced the Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) last June, to attach great importance to the obligations which we had incurred. But, since then, what more have they done? Why, they have adhered, in spite of threats and dangers to the Government in which they trusted. They have fought and bled by the side of our soldiers in defence of the authority of the Queen. History will record in the future deeds of courage and skill on the part of the Boers; but history will also record equal deeds of heroism and self-sacrificing gallantry on the part of those who have remained loyal to the British Crown.

\* \* \* \* \*

An amendment to this Resolution was moved by Mr. William Rathbone, who, whilst condemning the war against the Transvaal to enforce annexation, yet strongly advocated the granting of equal political rights to *the entire white population* in the Transvaal:—

That this House, believing that the continuance of the war with the Transvaal Boers would not have advanced the honour or the interest of this country, approves the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about a peaceful settlement, and feels confident that every care will be taken to guard the interests of the natives, to provide for the full liberty and equal treatment of *the entire white population*, and to promote harmony and goodwill among the various races in South Africa.

In replying on behalf of the Government, Mr. Chamberlain recognised the duty of England to enforce the just demands *in favour of the loyalist settlers* in the following declaration :—

Mention had been made in the Motion of the Right Hon. Baronet of the obligations which they had contracted towards the loyal inhabitants. He admitted those obligations, and that they ought to be respected.

\* \* \* \* \*

It would be found (by the Convention) that *the loyal settlers would be protected* in their rights, in their legal position, in their lives, and in their properties. *(as existing at the time)*.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, who at the close of this debate, strongly supported Mr. Chamberlain in this view of the question, used these remarkable words :—

I do not doubt that we have sacred and solemn duties imposed on us in this matter, both towards the English party, whom we call "loyalists," and likewise towards the native tribes of South Africa. This has never for a moment been disguised, but I do not for one moment admit that the course we have taken has involved neglect or disparagement of the interests of the populations of the Transvaal. Our duty towards the loyalists is plain. It is to obtain for them, in the first place, compensation for the losses they have sustained, according to well-understood rules, losses in consequence of the war, for example, in fines levied upon them for not taking up arms against us. Besides that, it is our duty to secure for them that they shall remain in the country *on terms of perfect equality with the other inhabitants*. Those are our duties to the loyalists, and we have put these people in such a position that they will no longer have reason to find fault.

The practical conclusions to be drawn from the declarations of the Ministers and ex-Ministers of the Crown, who took part in these two debates in the House of Commons on the 21st of January and the 25th of July, 1881, are clear; namely, that whilst the claim of the Boers for independence meant not only the restoration of their control over local affairs, but the power to conduct their policy towards the native population and the loyalist Settlers according to their own views; on the other hand, the obligations of England, as the Paramount Power, were, as Mr. Gladstone declared, manifold, not confined simply to the redress of a possible wrong done to the Boers in 1877, but to consider in an especial manner the views and interests of the British and other European inhabitants of the Transvaal and the interests of the native population. If the Boers had been the sole inhabitants of the Transvaal, the question would have been a very simple one, but inasmuch as they were not, the



Government of Great Britain could not limit its attention to their rights and claims.

## THE PRETORIA CONVENTION, 1881.

The next chapter in the history of the relations of Great Britain and the Transvaal refers to the Convention which was negotiated at Pretoria, under the Presidency of ~~Sir Evelyn Wood~~, and which was eventually signed on the 3rd of August, 1881; and in reference to this it is only necessary to state the provisions arrived at on the subject of British Suzerainty and the policy to be adopted towards the alien population of the Transvaal. The following are the Articles in the Treaty dealing with these subjects:—

*Sir Hercules  
Robinson*

## ✓ PREAMBLE.

Her Majesty's Commissioners for the Settlement of the Transvaal Territory, duly appointed as such by a Commission passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, bearing date the 5th of April, 1881, do hereby undertake and guarantee, on behalf of Her Majesty, that from and after the 8th day of August, 1881, complete self-government, subject to the Suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal Territory.

## ARTICLE II.

Her Majesty reserves to herself, her heirs and successors, (a) the right from time to time to appoint a British Resident in and for the said State, with such duties and functions as are hereinafter defined; (b) the right to move troops through the said State in time of war, or in case of the apprehension of immediate war between the Suzerain Power and any Foreign State or Native Tribe in South Africa; and (c) the control of the external relations of the said State, including the conclusion of Treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with Foreign Powers, such intercourse to be carried on through Her Majesty's diplomatic and consular Officers abroad.

## ARTICLE XII.

All persons holding property in the said State on the 8th day of August 1881, will continue to enjoy the rights of property which they have enjoyed since the Annexation. No person who has remained loyal to Her Majesty during the recent hostilities shall suffer any molestation by reason of his loyalty, or be liable to any criminal prosecution or civil action for any part taken in connection with such hostilities; and all such persons will have full liberty to reside in the country, *with enjoyment of all civil rights, and protection for their persons and property.* *This refers to civil rights of the loyalists. Case of attorney & advocate Ford.*

## ARTICLE XXVI.

All persons, other than Natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the Transvaal State (a) will have full liberty with their families to enter, travel, or

reside in any part of the Transvaal State; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess, houses, manufactures, warehouses, shops and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents whom they may think to employ; (d) they will not be subject in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry to any taxes, whether general or local other than those which are or may be imposed upon Transvaal citizens.

This Convention, therefore, conceded to the Boer inhabitants of the Transvaal the full independent right they claimed of managing their own internal affairs, subject only to such general rules as were intended to prevent them abusing their power to the injury of the native tribes, or of the alien white population who are dwellers in their midst.

If the Boers had made a reasonably good use of the liberty which the Convention guaranteed to them, England would have left them to themselves; but, on the other hand, an unjust oppressive treatment of the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal would be a direct violation of the terms of the Convention, and, unfortunately would force the hand of England, and compel her to induce the Government of the Transvaal to carry out in its entirety the Convention.

### THE CONVENTION OF LONDON, 1884. —

We now come to the Convention of 1884, which was the result of the negotiations of the Transvaal Delegation to London consisting of Messrs. Krüger, Du Toit, and Smit, with the Earl of Derby, then Colonial Minister in the Government of Mr. Gladstone.

*Amended*  
This Convention of 1884 did not supervene or cancel the Convention of 1881. but was supplemental to, and confirmatory of, that Convention, and the following are the Clauses which refer to the Suzerainty of England and the rights of the loyal population of the Transvaal:—

#### ✓ ARTICLE IV.

The South African Republic will conclude no Treaty or engagement with any State or Nation, other than the Orange Free State, nor with any Native Tribe, to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen.

Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if Her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving a copy of such Treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately upon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of such Treaty is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain or of any of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa,

## ARTICLE VII.

"All persons who held property in the Transvaal on the 8th day of August, 1881, and still hold the same," will continue to enjoy the rights of property which they have enjoyed since the 12th April, 1877. No person who has remained loyal to Her Majesty during the late hostilities shall suffer any molestation by reason of his loyalty; or be liable to any criminal prosecution or civil action for any part taken in connection with such hostilities; and "all such" persons will have full liberty to reside in the Country *with enjoyment of all civil rights, and protection for their persons and property. This does not include the franchise, which only burghers or citizens (p.s.) enjoy.*

## ✓ ARTICLE XIV.

All persons, other than Natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic (a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the South African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents whom they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be subject, in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said Republic.

In accordance with Article IV of this Convention, and upon the day of the signing thereof, 27th of February, 1884, Messrs. Krüger, Du Toit, and Smit, who were the signatories to the Convention, invited permission of the British Government to avail themselves of its provisions, viz., to proceed to the Netherlands and Portugal, to settle financial and railway matters; and Lord Derby, as Colonial Minister, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, granted this permission. Again, on May 19th, 1884, the Government of Belgium addressed a communication to the British Government, as to the right of the Government of the South African Republic to negotiate Treaties with Foreign Powers, for instance, in reference to a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, concluded between Belgium and the South African Republic, and on the 26th May, 1884, Lord Granville, Foreign Minister, with the approval of Lord Derby, Colonial Minister, declared—

Treaties can only be concluded by Her Majesty's Government in the name and on behalf of the Transvaal, as provided in Article 2 of the Pretoria Convention, and that on the ratification of the Convention of London, the South African Republic will be at liberty, under Article 4, to enter into Treaties with Foreign Powers, *subject to the approval of Her Majesty, as therein provided.* *International Law recognizes the principle that a State may be sovereign*

On the 17th March, 1884, the Earl of Cadogan raised this question in the House of Lords, and queried whether, by the Con- *although supposed to be restrictive condition as in 84 & the London*

*This is quite untenable.*

vention, the Suzerainty of the Queen was abolished. The Earl of Derby in his reply stated that the Power of Suzerainty remained, viz., the right of Great Britain to veto any negotiations into which the Transvaal might enter with any Foreign Power.

On the subject of civil and political rights of the loyalist Settlers in the Transvaal, considerable emphasis was given by the Earl of Derby, in a Despatch dated 14th March, 1884, which he addressed to Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner for South Africa, in which he declared—

Her Majesty's Government have felt themselves able, after full and friendly discussion with the Delegates, to agree with them in the adoption of provisions which meet their views to a very considerable extent, and which involved substantial concessions, on points to which they attach special importance, while on the other hand *the interests of Her Majesty's subjects*, and the independence of the Native Tribes adjacent to the South African Republic have been duly considered.

*interests are not synonymous with all rights.*

\* \* \* \* \*

Her Majesty's Government are justified in confidently anticipating that the Volksraad and the people of the South African Republic, *will honourably carry out the undertaking solemnly entered into on their behalf.*

*certainly not, in spirit.*

Fifteen years have now passed away since this Convention was signed, and the question naturally arises, whether the Government and the Volksraad of the South African Republic have, in the words of the Earl of Derby, who negotiated this Convention, "honourably carried out the undertaking so solemnly entered into" on behalf of the loyal Settlers in their midst?

The answer to that question must be a clear and emphatic "NO!"

The position taken up by successive Governments of Her Majesty from 1884, and courageously sustained by the Government of the Marquis of Salisbury at the present time, every one, who carefully studies the declaration on both sides, whether in the Conventions of 1881 and 1884, or the Despatches in the Blue Book, must admit it was a strong and unassailable one.

## THE UITLANDERS' PETITIONS, 1894 AND 1899.

What is that position? The best answer to that question is to be found in the two Petitions which were presented, firstly, on the 4th of June, 1894, by 14,800 British subjects resident in the South African Republic, to Sir Henry B. Loch, at that time Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, on the occasion of his second visit to Pretoria; and, secondly, on the 28th of March, 1899, the



Petition from 21,684 British subjects resident in the South African Republic, addressed to Her Majesty Queen Victoria; and, finally, in the answer thereto, contained in the famous Despatch of the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, Her Majesty's Minister for the Colonies, addressed on the 10th of May, 1899, to Sir Alfred Milner, High Commissioner for South Africa.

The Petition of the 4th of June, 1894, may be quoted as fully setting forth the prayer of the 41,208 Uitlanders resident in the Transvaal, and which is forcibly voiced in the Petition of the 28th of March, 1899. The former declared as follows:—

6. Denied the franchise, and having recently been subjected to the indignity of seeing a Petition presented by 13,000 residents, mainly subjects of the Queen, praying for some relaxation of the unjust franchise laws, greeted with laughter and scorn by the Legislatures; having further been informed by the Authorities, that not only we, but our children, born in the Country, can never hope to participate in the more precious privileges of citizenship; our wrongs have lately been accentuated by the circumstance that the Courts and the Governments of this State have declared our liability to be called out at any time, without pay or compensation, for compulsory military service, for the carrying out of the laws, in the making of which we can never have any voice, and in the enforcement of which we have no interest.

*[not quite accurate. The fact decided as to the true principle of instruction - much later]*

#### MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S DESPATCH, 10 MAY, 1899.

In the famous Despatch of Mr. Chamberlain, dated the 10th of May, 1899, addressed to Sir Alfred Milner, Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, after reviewing with great fairness, moderation, and ability the various important matters referred to in the remarkable Memorial of the 21,684 signatories, he thus sums up the decision of Her Majesty's Government with these pregnant words:—

It results from this review of the facts and conditions on which the Petition is founded, as well as from the information derived from your Despatches and from other official sources, that British subjects, and the Uitlanders generally in the South African Republic, have *substantial grounds for their complaint* of the treatment to which they are subjected.

\* \* \* \* \*

Her Majesty's Government, however, attach much less importance to financial grievances than to those which affect the personal rights of the Uitlander Community, and which place them in a condition of *political, educational, and social inferiority to the Boer inhabitants of the Transvaal*, and even endanger the security of their lives and property.

\* \* \* \* \*

Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire the prosperity of the South African Republic. They have been anxious to avoid any intervention in its internal concerns, and they may point out in this connection, that if they really entertained the design of destroying its independence, which has been attributed to them, no policy could be better calculated to defeat their object than that which, in all friendship and sincerity, they now urge upon the Government of the South African Republic, and which would remove any pretext for interference by relieving British subjects of all just cause of complaint.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE CONFERENCE AT BLOEMFONTEIN.

// The origin of the Conference at Bloemfontein between Sir Alfred Milner and President Krüger may be traced, and was due, to the initiative of Mr. Chamberlain, who, in the closing words of his Despatch of May 10th, 1899, said :—

// With the earnest hope of arriving at a satisfactory settlement, and as a proof of their desire to maintain cordial relations with the South African Republic, Her Majesty's Government now suggest, for the consideration of President Kruger, that a meeting should be arranged between His Honour and yourself for the purpose of discussing the situation in a conciliatory spirit, and in the hope that you may arrive, in concert with the President, at such an arrangement as Her Majesty's Government could accept and recommend to the Uitlander population as a reasonable concession to their just demands, and the settlement of the difficulties which have threatened the good relations, which Her Majesty's Government desire should constantly exist between themselves and the Government of the South African Republic.

// This proposal to help forward a satisfactory settlement of the Franchise and other questions in controversy, was supported by the President of the Orange Free State, by the Honourable W. P. Schreiner, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, and by Mr. Hofmeyr, the leader of the Afrikaner Bond, and this proposal being accepted by President Krüger, an invitation was given by President Steyn to hold the Conference at Bloemfontein.

// On May 31st, 1899, the Conference at Bloemfontein met, which consisted on the part of Great Britain, Sir Alfred Milner, Her Majesty's High Commissioner, and on the part of the South

African Republic, President Krüger, and its deliberations continued *de die in diem* to June 5th, but it resulted in no decision being arrived at, in fact, the divergence of the views of the two Governments was so great, that on the question of the Franchise to the Uitlanders, an agreement was practically impossible.

The declaration of Sir Alfred Milner at the opening of the Conference was clear and emphatic :—

That the chief cause of difference lies in the policy adopted by the South African Republic with regard to that portion of the inhabitants known as the Uitlanders, among whom there are many British subjects. That policy has caused the bitterness which exists between the Government and a certain portion of the Uitlanders, and has created a feeling of sympathy throughout Great Britain and the entire British Empire in general, and aroused strong opinion on both sides ; and as both Governments wish to settle their differences in a peaceful manner, I am strongly convinced that if the Government of the South African Republic could voluntarily see an opportunity of altering its policy before matters become worse, by taking measures, whereby the moderate people among them would be satisfied, then not only would the independence of the South African Republic be strengthened, but there would also be created a better feeling, whereby it would be much easier to regulate the still open questions existing between both Governments.

President Krüger carefully avoided discussing the Franchise Question, but raised other questions of dispute, for instance :— (1) The Swaziland Question, which he wished annexed to the South African Republic ; (2) The mobilisation of the Army ; (3) The Jameson Raid, and the payment of the indemnity ; (4) The Uitlander Memorials ; (5) The Gold Law ; (6) The Mining Laws ; (7) The Liquor Law ; (8) The Tariff Laws ; (9) The independence of the Republic ; (10) The Dynamite Monopoly ; (11) Arbitration for the settlement of all disputes ; (12) Our interference in the internal affairs of the South African Republic. And he urged concessions on these questions, in order that he might make a concession to Great Britain on the Franchise Question.

Sir Alfred Milner considered that the settlement of these questions could be secured after the Franchise to the Uitlanders had been settled, and said : “ That I cannot agree to the basis which appears to have been laid down that I should buy with something else the just settlement of the Franchise Question ” ; and he recalled to President Krüger’s mind the urgency of the Franchise Question being settled first.

On the second day of the Conference, at the invitation of Presi-

dent Krüger, Sir Alfred Milner formulated his suggestions for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders as follows :—

He had to bear in mind, on the one hand, prejudices of old burghers and necessity of convincing them that they would not be swamped by new comers, and on the other hand, uselessness of proposing anything which would be rejected by Uitlanders as totally insufficient, and would not bring them on to the side of the State, throwing in their lot with it and working in the future with the old burghers as one people; bearing both these points in mind he proposed that the full franchise should be given to every foreigner who (a) had been resident for five years in the Republic; (b) declared his intention to reside permanently; (c) took an oath to obey the laws, undertake all obligations of citizenship, and defend independence of country; franchise to be confined to persons of good character possessing a certain amount of property or income; finally, some increase of seats in districts where the Uitlanders principally reside, the number of these was a matter for discussion, but it was essential that they should not be so few as to leave the representatives of the new constituencies in a contemptible minority.

Sir Alfred Milner in presenting his Memorandum on the Franchise Question from the Uitlander point of view, supported it as follows :—

The people complain that the Government of the Republic does not pay sufficient attention to their interests, and they appeal continually to the British Government to assist in improving their position in some respects, and my position is that the British Government sympathise with them. Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that the best manner to place those people in a position to see their reasonable desire satisfied would be to accept the burghership of the State in which they reside; and, therefore, I say for the British subjects who want to make the country their home, it would be best that they should become heart and soul burghers of the Republic.

President Krüger met this proposal with a strong opposition, on the ground that it would hand over the Transvaal to the rule of the Foreigner, and that he wished, first to come to terms for the settlement of the various other questions in dispute by Arbitration, before deciding upon the Franchise Question; and on Sir Alfred Milner pressing for the proposals of the South African Republic on the Franchise Question first, President Krüger on the 2nd of June handed in his counter-proposals on this subject, which were as follows :—

As his object in the Conference was to remove existing grounds of difference and to provide for friendly settlement of future difficulties by arbitration, following franchise proposals were made conditionally upon satisfactory settlement of first-named points, and on President's request for incorporation of Swaziland being submitted to Her Majesty's Government;



subject to this President undertook to submit to the approval of Volksraad and people detailed proposals to following effect (a) new comers registering themselves within 14 days after arrival to obtain naturalisation after two years on complying with following conditions :—(1) Six months' notice of intention to apply for naturalisation; (2) two years' continuous registration; (3) residence in the South African Republic during that period; (4) no dishonouring sentence; (5) proof of obedience to the laws, no act against Government or independence; (6) proof of full State citizenship and franchise or title to it in former country; (7) possession of fixed property to value of £150, occupation of house to annual rental of £50, or yearly income of at least £200, Government to have the power of granting naturalisation to persons not satisfying this condition; (8) oath similar to Orange Free State. Persons so naturalised five years after naturalisation to obtain full franchise on following conditions :—(1) Continuous registration for five years after naturalisation; (2) continuous residence during that period; (3) no dishonouring sentence; (4) proof of obedience to law, &c.; (5) property qualification as above; (6) residents in the South African Republic before 1890 getting naturalised within six months from promulgation of this proposed law and giving six months' notice of intention to apply for naturalisation to obtain full franchise two years after naturalisation on complying with conditions for full franchise mentioned above, substituting two for five years, those not getting naturalised within six months to fall under already mentioned conditions for new comers; (7) those already resident for two years or more to be allowed immediate naturalisation on above-mentioned naturalisation conditions for new comers and to obtain full franchise five years after naturalisation on compliance with above-mentioned full franchise conditions; (8) those already naturalised to obtain full franchise five years after naturalisation on last-mentioned conditions.

Sir Alfred Milner said: "This scheme differs entirely from my proposal in so far that it does not provide for the immediate or even speedy entertainment for the Franchise by persons who have been for a long time in the Republic." President Krüger objected to give the Franchise to the non-burghers, because they constituted the great majority of the population, and said, "because a great majority flocks in, you want me to give away my rights, and then indeed my Country would be lost, and that would be unfair."

Sir Alfred Milner then declared:—

The result of your Memorandum is, that you and I have failed to come to an agreement on the most important points of the subjects discussed by us, and we are at present in the same position as we were previous to the Conference, therefore this Conference is altogether at an end, and there is no obligation on either side as an outcome thereof.

On the subject of Arbitration he said: "This matter has been mentioned during this discussion, but there is no definite pro-

posal with respect thereto. There are subjects about which Her Majesty's Government most clearly cannot arbitrate. At the same time there is a class of questions regarding which Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to arbitrate, if an appropriate method can be found, and if a proposal regarding that subject shall be at any time made then this can be taken into consideration, independently of any proceeding of this Conference."

President Krüger said, "Regarding disputes with reference to the manner of interpreting documents, such as the Convention, there can be Arbitration in such a manner that it is not necessary that another Government should be called in. We can find impartial lawyers enough."

Sir Alfred Milner rejoined: "There are some cases in which Her Majesty's Government will not arbitrate and some on which it will. I have no authority to speak on this matter; but if any definite proposal should be made by you it could be submitted to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government."

This closed the proceedings of the Conference.

## DEPUTATION TO SIR ALFRED MILNER.

A week after the closing of the Conference at Bloemfontein, viz., on the 12th of June, an influential deputation of the citizens at Cape Town, headed by the Mayor, waited upon the High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, and congratulated him upon the firm stand that he had taken at Bloemfontein, and assured him of their earnest support in pressing for such Reforms as would secure just representation. In reply His Excellency spoke as follows:—

As you are all aware, the recent Conference led to no result. It led to no result because the whole discussion turned on the question of the franchise, and on that no agreement was possible. It may be asked, why was so much weight attached to this one question? Well, I fully admit the franchise is only a means to an end, and the end is to obtain fair play for the Uitlander population in the South African Republic. (Loud cheers.) That is the main concern which Her Majesty's Government has in the matter—the protection of the Uitlander population, of which so large a proportion are British subjects. My view was, and is, that the best way to help those people—the best for them, the best for the Republic, and the best for the good relations between the Republic and Her Majesty's Government is to put them in a position to help themselves. (Cheers.) It may be that I conceded too much. It may be that I went too far in giving other questions the go-by for the moment and directing all my efforts

to secure for the Uitlanders a position within the State ("No, no"); but my view was this: It was a unique opportunity. To have pressed for the redress of the Uitlander grievances one by one, to say nothing of the other subjects of difference, would have been to engage in an irritating controversy and to spoil the chance of an amicable compromise on broad lines going to the root of the differences.

That controversy which I was so anxious to avoid may have to come yet; but my object at the Conference was to avert it. It seemed best to strike straight at the root of the evil by giving the people whose interests Her Majesty's Government is bound to defend (cheers) such a share of political power as would enable them gradually to redress their grievances themselves, and to strengthen, not to weaken, the country of their adoption in the process. But just because I was relying on a single remedy it was absolutely essential that that remedy should be a radical one. It was useless, indeed, worse than useless, and would only have led to worse trouble later on, to have accepted a scheme so framed—I do not say so designed—as not to bring people in but to keep them out (laughter), a scheme hedged in with restrictions of the most elaborate kind, and hampered with conditions which I knew that numbers of the people would never accept, and which one could not reasonably urge them to accept. If this Reform Bill was not going to bring a considerable number of Uitlanders into the State, if an enormous majority, including all the leaders, were still to remain outside, how was it possible to feel any confidence in such a solution or to accept it as a comprehensive settlement?

As against this it is urged that my simpler plan would have deluged the State with new citizens. I am convinced that this is not so. ("Hear.") Having regard to the obligations of burghership, and to other reasons which will in any case deter many Uitlanders from applying for it, and to the conditions as to length of residence and property qualification which I was prepared to make, I feel sure that the number of new citizens would not have been anything like so great as was supposed, and, however numerous they might have been, the old citizens would have controlled for a long time the bulk of the constituencies. (Cheers.) They, too, are increasing rapidly in number, and long before they could have been outnumbered, if they ever were outnumbered, the process of fusion would have begun to set in. (Cheers.) Moreover, it is not as if the Uitlanders were all of one kind or of one mind. They are of various nationalities, and represent different interests and opinions. The President tells me—he was very strong on the point—that he had a petition from Uitlanders, in favour of the Government, signed by an even greater number of people than signed the petition to Her Majesty. Well, then, what was there to fear? Half the newcomers, on his own showing, would have been on his side, and many, I am sure, who are now opposed to him—opposed, you may say, to the State, because they are excluded from it—would be loyal citizens if once they were let in.

No doubt it is a bit of a business to get different races to pull together inside one body politic. That is the problem over all South Africa, but it is solved in other parts of South Africa more or less. It would be solved altogether and for ever if the principle of equality could be established all round. (Loud cheers.) It is the one State where inequality is the rule which

keeps the rest in a fever; and that is found to be universally recognised in time.

// Meanwhile, for the moment, the attempt to get things put on their true basis has not succeeded, and we have to face the resulting situation. Some remedy has still to be found to remove, at least in some measure, the grievances of the Uitlanders and to allay their discontent. I am absolutely convinced that those grievances, though sometimes stated in exaggerated language, are very real. It has over and over again been my duty to call attention to them. And there is another aspect of the case which has been forced upon me as High Commissioner having to bear in mind the interests of South Africa as a whole. Is it consistent with the position of Great Britain in regard to this country, nay, is it consistent with the dignity of the white race, that a large, wealthy, industrious, and intelligent community of white men should continue in that state of subjection which is the lot of the immigrant white population of the Transvaal? (Loud cheers.)

That is the position which we have by some means or other, however gradual, however pacific, to get them out of. (Cheers.) I see it is suggested in some quarters that the policy of Her Majesty's Government is one of aggression. ("No, no.") I know better than any man that their policy, so far from being one of aggression, has been one of singular patience, and such, I doubt not, it will continue. (Cheers.) But it cannot relapse into indifference. (Renewed cheers.) Can any one desire that it should? It would be disastrous that the present period of stress and strain should not result in some settlement to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future.

// Of that I am still hopeful. It may be that the Government of the South African Republic will yet see its way to adopt a measure of reform more liberal than that proposed at Bloemfontein. If not, there may be other means of achieving the desired result. In any case, it is a source of strength to those who are fighting the battle of reform, and will, I believe, contribute more than anything else to a peaceful victory, to feel that they have behind them, as they perhaps never had before, the unanimous sympathy of the British people throughout the world. (Loud cheers.) //

The policy which His Excellency adopted at the Conference was straightforward; he fixed upon the Franchise Question as *the only* solution for the unrest in the Transvaal, and as he declared, for this reason it failed, as, in consequence of the wide divergence of views, agreement upon this question was impossible.

The Scheme put forward by His Excellency was a just one, and was in harmony with the policy, not only of the Orange Free State and of Cape Colony, but also of all nations enjoying a representative Constitution.

This demand of His Excellency was the same that had been adopted by the Marquis of Ripon, 19th November, 1894, in his famous Despatch to the South African Republic, in which he said:—



“The period of residence which constitutes the most important condition of naturalisation differs in different countries, but there is a very general consensus of opinion among civilised States that five years is a sufficiently long period of probation, and Her Majesty’s Government would wish you to press upon the Government of the Republic the view that the period in this case should not exceed that limit as regards the right to vote in the first Volksraad, which is the dominant body, and in Presidential elections.”

The position taken up by President Krüger was unpatriotic and unstatesmanlike, since it would have failed to satisfy the just aspirations of the Uitlander, and would consequently have compelled Great Britain to interfere on their behalf; and, thus by his obstinate resistance to a moderate measure of reform, he lost a golden opportunity for preventing in the future the intervention of Great Britain, and for settling permanently a great question that, unsettled, was full of peril to the safety and integrity of the South African Republic.

The Scheme of the High Commissioner was wide and liberal, to give the Franchise to every Uitlander who had resided five years in the Transvaal, subject to these conditions: (1) That he was a permanent resident; (2) that he was a loyal citizen, obedient to the laws; (3) prepared to defend the independence of his adopted country; and lastly, of good character, and possessing some property qualification.

The Scheme of President Krüger was both cumbrous, and exclusive, and may be summarised as follows:—

1. Nine years retrospective Franchise, subject to 6 months Naturalisation and 6 months notice for Naturalisation, and 2 years after Naturalisation. The result would be 12 years retrospective Franchise after the promulgation of the Act.

2. All Uitlanders resident in the Transvaal after 1899, and who wish the Franchise, might obtain Naturalisation after 2 years residence; and after a period of 5 years constant residence, enfranchisement; provided they proved themselves to be throughout that period loyal citizens, and that, at the end of the  $7\frac{1}{2}$  years from date of residence in the Transvaal they possessed a property qualification of £150 value, or a yearly income of £200 or upwards, and paid an annual rental of £50.

In reference to Representation, the Scheme proposed to raise the number of the Representatives of the Goldfields from 2 to 5. This illusory Scheme, with its Clauses of disfranchisement and not enfranchisement, was absolutely worthless; and as it was conditional

upon the reference of all questions of dispute between Great Britain and the South African Republic to a Court of Arbitration, and so subject to Foreign influence, it is obvious that the Scheme was impracticable, and that it revealed a foregone conclusion, never to grant a wide and liberal extension of political enfranchisement.

The failure of the Conference was much to be regretted, and the responsibility of that failure was owing to the unrelenting opposition of President Krüger to the just and moderate demands of Great Britain on behalf of her fellow subjects, and of the subjects of every civilised Power, a demand of undoubted moderation, made for the purpose of securing the tranquility and internal independence of the South African Republic.

---

### CHAPTER III.

#### THE FIRST DESPATCHES

AFTER THE BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE,  
FROM JUNE 14<sup>TH</sup> TO AUGUST 1<sup>ST</sup>, 1899.

Subsequently to the proceedings of the Conference at Bloemfontein, a Despatch was sent on June 14th by Sir Alfred Milner, with regard to the question of Arbitration, addressed to Her Majesty's Government, and referring to a proposal of the South African Republic for Arbitration "on differences arising out of the varying interpretation, approved by the parties, of the terms of the London Convention of 1884."

#### DESPATCH OF SIR ALFRED MILNER.

The following is the full text of this Despatch of June 14th:—

I have the honour to transmit a Despatch from Her Majesty's Agent, enclosing a note from the State Secretary, in which he puts forward, on behalf of the South African Republic, a proposal "for Arbitration on differences arising out of the varying interpretation, approved by the parties, of the terms of the London Convention."

In introducing this proposal the State Secretary remarks that "it was

apparent at the recent Conference at Bloemfontein that His Excellency the High Commissioner was personally in favour of removing differences between this Government and Her Majesty's Government by Arbitration."

This statement is far too absolute, though it is certainly less wholly incorrect than President Krüger's remark at the close of the Conference, that I "had acknowledged the President's request for Arbitration by other than Foreign Powers on all points of future difference under the Convention to be reasonable." As a matter of fact, when the President said this, he had made no request for "Arbitration by other than Foreign Powers." The principle of excluding Foreign Powers was for the first time admitted by him in that remark. In the next place, in the very general observations which I had made about Arbitration, I never spoke of "all differences under the Convention," or of the Convention at all.

As regards Mr. Reitz's present observation, I can only say that, whatever personal opinion I may have expressed favourable to the principle of Arbitration—and I adhere to all that I said—in no way constrains me to look with favour on the present proposal. On the contrary, if I were to advocate its acceptance now I should be acting in a manner entirely inconsistent with the position which I took up at Bloemfontein. The whole point and gist of my contention there, was that if there were ever to be better relations, and an amicable settlement of present and future differences between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic, redress of Uitlander grievances must come first, that I could not consent to bargain for the adoption of an adequate enfranchisement by Arbitration or any other concession that President Krüger wanted to get out of us. On the other hand, I repeatedly expressed the belief that if the Franchise question, involving, as it did, the gradual removal of Uitlander grievances, could be satisfactorily settled, I thought it would be much easier to arrive at an understanding on all other matters, that I was most anxious to have no more controversies, and that, personally, I was quite prepared to advocate the settlement of differences between the two Governments—or some of them—by an impartial Tribunal, if such could be devised, involving no Foreign interference whatever, between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic.

My proposals for a settlement of Uitlander grievances on the basis of a moderate measure of enfranchisement having been rejected by the President, and a totally inadequate scheme put forward in their place, he now comes forward with an Arbitration proposal. My contention is that the atmosphere in which that or any other concession to the Government of the South African Republic can be considered has yet to be created. Redress of the grievances of Her Majesty's subjects in the South African Republic stands at the head of the programme, and nothing else can be considered till that matter is out of the way.

Apart from that, I consider the particular scheme an absolutely unacceptable one on its merits. It is a mere skeleton of a scheme, and leaves so much undefined, that I believe it would raise more questions than it solved. Thus it is provided that "no matters or differences of trifling importance shall be referred to Arbitration." Who is to say what is trifling and what is important? According to President Krüger, no doubt all our complaints are

trifling—like “the little Coolie matter” to which he referred at the Conference meaning thereby the grievances of Her Majesty’s Indian subjects, which has been a burning controversy for ten years. Again, Section 3 provides that “each Government shall have the right to preserve and exclude points which appear to it too important to be submitted to Arbitration, provided that thereby the principle itself of Arbitration be not frustrated.” I find it difficult to attach a precise meaning to these words, but it is easy to see that they must be fruitful of endless disagreement.

I cannot see the smallest reason why Her Majesty’s Government should not at once reject this particular proposal, and I advise that this course should be adopted. The scheme is, as I have shown, unworkable, but, more than this, it does not exclude that “Foreign interference between Her Majesty’s Government and the South African Republic,” which Her Majesty’s Government have always declared, and which I repeatedly declared at Bloemfontein, that they would never admit.

By Clause 2, the two Arbitrators, who are vaguely defined, apparently, to be South African Judges, nominated by the two Governments respectively, “shall agree respecting a third person, who shall act as president of the Arbitration Tribunal,” which is to decide in every case by a majority of votes.

It is evident that this person will virtually decide everything, and it is provided that he shall “not be a subject of one of the arbitrating parties,” *i.e.*, a Foreigner.

On this ground alone I feel sure that Her Majesty’s Government will not accept the proposal. For every reason I think it is desirable that it should promptly intimate its total inability to entertain it.

## DESPATCH OF MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

On July 27th, Mr. Chamberlain set forth in an exhaustive Despatch the views of Her Majesty’s Government with regard to the political representation of the Uitlanders, and suggested the appointment of Delegates to inquire into and report upon the question, and at the same time replied to Sir Alfred Milner’s Despatch, June the 14th, on the subject of Arbitration.

The following is the text of this Despatch in regard to the principal subjects:—

The successive modifications which have been made by the Government of the South African Republic since the Conference at Bloemfontein in the proposals for admitting the Uitlanders to some share of representation in the Government of the country have followed each other with so much rapidity, and have been so difficult to understand as reported by telegraph, that Her Majesty’s Government have been unable to communicate with you fully on the different phases of this question as they have been in turn presented. Happily, each new scheme seems to have been an advance and improvement upon that which preceded it, and Her Majesty’s Government hope that the



latest proposals passed by the Volksraad may prove to be a basis for a settlement on the lines which you have laid down at the Conference, and which Her Majesty's Government have approved.

\* \* \* \*

It is, however, a matter of satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to learn, from your telegram of the 19th of July, that the Government of the South African Republic have still further amended their proposals, and that the Volksraad has now agreed to a Measure intended to give the franchise immediately to those who have been resident in the country for seven years, as well as to those who may in future complete this period of residence. This proposal is an advance on previous concessions, and leaves only a difference of two years between yourself and President Krüger so far as the franchise is concerned.

\* \* \* \*

Her Majesty's Government assume that the concessions now made to the Uitlanders are intended in good faith to secure for them some approach to the equality which was promised in 1881; but the points they have still to urge for the consideration of the Government of the South African Republic are of great importance, and require a further interchange of views between the two Governments. These points involve complicated details and questions of a technical nature, and Her Majesty's Government are inclined to think that the most convenient way of dealing with them would be, that they should in the first instance be discussed by Delegates appointed by you and by the Government of the South African Republic, who should report the result of their consultation, and submit their recommendation to you and to that Government.

If a satisfactory agreement on these points can be reached in this way and placed on record, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it should be accepted by the Uitlanders, who in this case will be entitled to expect that it will not be nullified or reduced in value by any subsequent alteration of the law or acts of administration.

The settlement of this most important subject will greatly facilitate an understanding in other matters which have been the source of continuous and ever-increasing correspondence between your predecessors and yourself and Her Majesty's Government. There have been, during the last few years, a number of instances in which Her Majesty's Government contend that the Conventions between this country and the South African Republic have been broken by the latter in the letter, as well as in the spirit. There are other cases again in which there may have been no actual infraction of the letter of the Conventions, but in which injury has been inflicted on British subjects for which redress is required on their behalf.

With a view to the settlement of some, at least, of these questions the Government of the South African Republic has met the representations of Her Majesty's Government with an offer to submit them to the Arbitration of some Foreign Power. In view of the relations established by the Conventions of Pretoria and London, Her Majesty's Government have felt themselves compelled to declare emphatically that under no circumstances whatever will they

admit the intervention of any Foreign Power in regard to their interpretation of the Conventions.

Her Majesty's Government note, however, with satisfaction that, in the course of the discussion at Bloemfontein, President Krüger withdrew the proposal for the intervention of a Foreign Power. In the memorandum put in by him at the afternoon meeting on June 5th he spoke of his request for Arbitration by other than Foreign Powers, and the Government of the South African Republic, in a communication addressed to the British Agent on June 9th, to which I have already referred, has modified its former proposal as to the formation of a Tribunal of Arbitration, so as to substitute for a Foreign Power a Foreigner as President, and, therefore, as supreme arbiter, in a Court to be otherwise composed of two members nominated respectively by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of the South African Republic. This proposal, although in a different form to those previously made, is equally objectionable, inasmuch as it involves the admission of a Foreign element in the settlement of controversies between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African Republic; and for this reason it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to accept it.

Her Majesty's Government recognise, however, that the interpretation of the Conventions in matters of detail is not free from difficulty. While on the one hand there can be no question of the interpretation of the preamble of the Convention of 1881, which governs the Articles substituted in the Convention of 1884, on the other hand there may be fair differences of opinion as to the interpretation of the details of those Articles, and it is unsatisfactory that in cases of divergence of opinion between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African Republic there should be no authority to which to refer the points at issue for final decision.

If, therefore, the President is prepared to agree to the exclusion of any Foreign element in the settlement of such disputes, Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider how far and by what methods such questions of interpretation as have been above alluded to could be decided by some Judicial Authority whose independence, impartiality, and capacity would be beyond and above all suspicion.

After the discussion by Delegates, as already proposed, of the details and the technical matters involved in the points which Her Majesty's Government desire to urge for the consideration of the Government of the South African Republic in relation to the political representation of the Uitlanders, it may be desirable that you should endeavour to come to an agreement with President Krüger as to the action to be taken upon their reports by means of another personal Conference.

In this case, the occasion would be a suitable one for you to discuss with His Honour the matter of the proposed Tribunal of Arbitration and those other questions which were not brought forward at the Bloemfontein Conference, because of the failure to arrive at an understanding on the question of the political representation of the Uitlanders, but which, in the event of agreement upon that question, it is most desirable to settle at an early date.

Following up this Despatch, Mr. Chamberlain, on July the 31st, telegraphed to Sir Alfred Milner the following instructions:—

31st July.—I now authorise you to invite President Krüger to appoint Delegates to discuss with ours, question, whether reforms, which Volksraad has passed, will give immediate and substantial representation of Uitlanders, and if not, what additions and alterations will be necessary in order to secure this result. If invitation is accepted, our Delegates would not be precluded from raising any point calculated to improve Measure; and you will instruct them to press for early report, which, on the points mentioned, ought not to be difficult.

On August the 1st, Mr. Chamberlain again urged by telegram to Sir Alfred Milner, the necessity of confining the proposed Joint Enquiry to the question of the political representation of the Uitlanders, and stated, that, after the conclusion of that Enquiry he would be prepared to discuss with President Krüger the settlement of the other questions in dispute by Arbitration, without, however, the introduction of any foreign element.

On August 2nd, the British Agent at Pretoria, Mr. Conyngham Greene, on receiving instructions from the High Commissioner, immediately communicated to the Transvaal Government the following Despatch in support of this proposal;—

I have the honour to state to you by desire of the High Commissioner, that His Excellency has been authorised by Her Majesty's Government to invite the President of the Republic to nominate Delegates, to discuss with Delegates to be appointed by His Excellency, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government whether the Franchise law recently passed by the Volksraad, together with other measures connected with it, such as an increase of Seats, will give substantial and immediate representation to the Uitlanders, and, if not, what alterations or additions may be necessary to secure that result.

It should be understood that in this discussion the Delegates of Her Majesty's Government should be free to make any suggestions calculated to improve the Measure in question, and to secure their attaining the desired end.

It must be further understood that the Enquiry must only deal with the representation of the Uitlanders, but when that point is settled His Excellency the High Commissioner is prepared to discuss anything which the Government of the South African Republic wishes to bring forward, including Arbitration without the interference of the Foreign Powers.

Sir Alfred Milner desires me to add the personal expression of his earnest hope that the Government of the Republic may accept the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, and that both parties may proceed at once to discuss the composition of the proposed Commission, its place of meeting, and the method of procedure.

His Excellency feels sure that the Government of the Republic will agree with him that if the proposal of Her Majesty's Government is accepted, the Enquiry should be held as soon as possible.

The Despatch of Sir Alfred Milner of June 14th to Her Majesty's Government is clear upon these two points, first,

that when the subject of Arbitration was mentioned by President Krüger at the Bloemfontein Conference, he stated that, whilst admitting the principle of Amicable Reference, he objected to its application to all questions of dispute between the South African Republic and Great Britain, and that the constitution of the Court of Arbitration must be exclusive of "any Foreign elements," and limited to representatives of the two Governments only; and second, that the settlement of the grievances of the Uitlanders, especially their claim to secure a substantial and immediate concession of political power, must take precedence of the reference to Arbitration and of any and every other outstanding question in dispute.

It is satisfactory to observe that the reply of Her Majesty's Government of July 27th did not unconditionally reject, as Sir Alfred Milner advised, the proposal of the Government at Pretoria for Arbitration, but declared that, subject to the exclusion of any Foreign element in the settlement of such disputes, Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider how they could be decided by some Judicial Authority, whose independence, impartiality, and capacity, would be beyond and above all suspicion, but Her Majesty's Government emphasised the fact, that the political representation of the Uitlanders must be a condition precedent of the proposed Tribunal of Arbitration.

The importance of the proposals of Her Majesty's Government, in the Despatches of July 27th and 31st, and August 1st, consists in the courteous demand that the seven years' Franchise proposals, adopted by the Volksraad, should be tested by an impartial and independent investigation, in order to ascertain that the scheme presented to the Volksraad was a reality and not a sham. If it was a reality, then the Treaty obligations of Great Britain on behalf of the Uitlanders would have been fulfilled, but if, unhappily, on the contrary, these electoral reforms should on enquiry prove to be a sham, and the demand of the Uitlanders for a proper share of political power rejected, then the Uitlanders would be justified in calling upon Great Britain, as the Paramount Power, to fulfil her obligations under the Conventions of 1881 and 1884, for the granting of their rights as being under the British Crown, rights which equally apply to the subjects of every Foreign Power resident in the Transvaal.



## CHAPTER IV.

THE SECOND DESPATCHES  
AFTER THE BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE,  
FROM 15TH AUGUST TO 28TH AUGUST, 1899

## DESPATCH OF SIR ALFRED MILNER.

On the 15th August Sir Alfred Milner telegraphed to Her Majesty's Government a Despatch embodying two telegrams which he had received from the British Agent at Pretoria, as follows:—

On Saturday, State Attorney sent to me a simplified draft franchise law, and sounded me whether Her Majesty's Government would be likely to consent to waive their demand for the Joint Enquiry if the South African Republic Government offered a seven years' retrospective franchise on these, lines with a further increase of Seats.

I suggested, that I should have a personal interview with the State Attorney. He came later in the day, and I spoke to him very seriously. I explained that I had no idea whether Her Majesty's Government would consent not to press their demand; but that the situation was most critical, and that Her Majesty's Government, who had given pledges to the Uitlanders, would be bound to assert their demands, and, if necessary, to press them by force.

I said, that the only chance for the South African Republic Government was an immediate surrender to the Bloemfontein *minimum*. The State Attorney held out for a franchise of seven years, but I refused to make any suggestion on that basis, and he went away. We came together again last night, and the State Attorney then practically offered me the scheme conveyed in my preceding telegram, which I promised to recommend to you for acceptance by Her Majesty's Government, in return for waiving the proposal of a Joint Enquiry.

I have not in any way committed Her Majesty's Government to acceptance or refusal of proposal; but I have said that I feel sure that if, as I am solemnly assured, the present is a *bonâ fide* attempt to settle the political rights of our people once for all, the Government of the South African Republic need not fear that we shall in the future either wish or have cause to interfere in their internal affairs. I have said as regards Suzerainty that I feel sure Her Majesty's Government will not, and cannot, abandon the right which the preamble to the Convention of 1881 gives them, but that they will have no desire to hurt Boer susceptibilities by publicly reasserting it, so long as no reason to do so is given them by the Government of the South African Republic. X X

As regards Arbitration, they are willing that we should have any of our own Judges or lawyers, English or Colonial, to represent us, and that the President or Umpire should be equally English, Colonial, or Boer.

As regards representation of goldfields in future, State Attorney contends that future extension of franchise to the new population will not, under the proposed scheme, be restricted to the Rand, but will be extended to such other goldfields as are fairly entitled thereto.

As regards guarantee of Her Majesty's Government, this would be covered by exchange of the Note of South African Republic Government and the Note of Her Majesty's Government, in reply.

As regards election of President and Commandant-General, should there be any change from the manner of election existing at present, it would have to be discussed between us. Meanwhile, new population would be on all fours with old burghers under existing conditions. As regards new law, it has been simplified immensely. As regards suggested possibility of further Conference, State Attorney anticipates that this may now be allowed to lapse. As regards language, the new members of the Volksraad would use their own.

It will be observed by this Despatch that the Government at Pretoria, before replying to the Despatches of Mr. Chamberlain of the 27th and 31st July, which proposed a Joint Commission of Enquiry into the Franchise scheme submitted to the Volksraad, desired to know if Her Majesty's Government would waive their demand for a Joint Commission of Enquiry, provided the South African Republic offered a 7 years retrospective Franchise, with a further increase of Seats in the Volksraad.

### DESPATCH FROM PRETORIA.

On the 22nd August, Her Majesty's Government received from the Secretary of State for the South African Republic a reply to the proposal for a Joint Enquiry into the Franchise Law hurriedly passed by the Volksraad. This reply, dated 19th August, proved this, that instead of accepting Her Majesty's Government's proposal, the Government at Pretoria offered to recommend a new revision of the Electoral Law, starting with Sir Alfred Milner's plan of a 5 years' retrospective Franchise, but conditional upon the cessation by Great Britain of intervention in the future in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, and the renunciation of its Suzerainty under the Conventions of 1881 and 1884.

The following are the terms of the Despatch containing these new proposals:—

With reference to your proposal for a Joint Enquiry contained in your Despatches of August 2 and 3, Government of South African Republic have the honour to suggest the following alternative proposal for consideration of Her Majesty's Government, which this Government trusts may lead to a final settlement:—(1) The Government are willing to recommend to the Volksraad and the people a five years' retrospective franchise, as proposed by His Excellency the High Commissioner on June 1, 1899. (2) The Government are further willing to recommend to the Volksraad that eight new Seats in the First Volksraad, and, if necessary, also in the Second Volksraad, be given to

the population of the Witwatersrand; thus, with the two sitting Members for the goldfields, giving to the population thereof ten representatives in a Raad of 36; and in future the representation of the goldfields of this Republic shall not fall below the proportion of one-fourth of the total. (3) The new burghers shall, equally with the old burghers, be entitled to vote at the election for State President and Commandant-General. (4) This Government will always be prepared to take into consideration such friendly suggestions regarding the details of the Franchise Law as Her Majesty's Government, through the British Agent, may wish to convey to it. (5) In putting forward the above proposals Government of South African Republic assumes:—(a) That Her Majesty's Government will agree that the present intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar action, and that in the future no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic will take place. (b) That Her Majesty's Government will not further insist on the assertion of the Suzerainty, the controversy on the subject being allowed tacitly to drop. (c) That Arbitration (from which Foreign element, other than Orange Free State, is to be excluded) will be conceded as soon as the franchise scheme has become law. (6) Immediately on Her Majesty's Government accepting this proposal for a settlement, the Government will ask the Volksraad to adjourn for the purpose of consulting the people about it, and the whole scheme might become law, say, within a few weeks. (7) In the meantime, the form and scope of the proposed Tribunal are also to be discussed and provisionally agreed upon, while the franchise scheme is being referred to the people, so that no time may be lost in putting an end to the present state of affairs. The Government trust that Her Majesty's Government will clearly understand that, in the opinion of this Government, the existing Franchise Law of this Republic is both fair and liberal to the new population, and that the consideration that induces them to go further, as they do in the above proposal, is their strong desire to get the controversies between the two Governments settled, and, further, to put an end to the present strained relations between the two Governments, and the incalculable harm and loss it has already occasioned in South Africa, and to prevent a racial war, from the effects of which South Africa may not recover for many generations—perhaps never at all—and, therefore, this Government, having regard to all these circumstances, would highly appreciate it if Her Majesty's Government, seeing the necessity of preventing the present crisis from developing still further, and the urgency of an early termination of the present state of affairs, would expedite the acceptance or refusal of the settlement here offered.—F. W. REITZ.

#### DESPATCH OF MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

On the 28th of August, Mr. Chamberlain replied to these proposals in a despatch addressed to Sir Alfred Milner, and his language is clear and emphatic. After referring to the objections taken by the Government of the South African Republic to a Joint Commission of Enquiry into the complicated details of the 7 years Franchise Scheme, proposed in his Despatch of the 27th of July,

and still urging its acceptance, by cogent reasons in its favour, he declared as follows:—

Her Majesty's Government are unable to appreciate the objections entertained by the Government of the South African Republic to a Joint Commission of Enquiry into the complicated details and technical questions upon which the practical effect of the proposals depends. Her Majesty's Government, however, will be ready to agree that the British Agent, assisted by such other persons as you may appoint, shall make the investigation necessary to satisfy them that the result desired will be achieved, and, failing this, to enable them to make those suggestions which the Government of the South African Republic state that they will be prepared to take into consideration. Her Majesty's Government assume that every facility will be given to the British Agent by the Government of the South African Republic, and they would point out that the Enquiry will be both easier and shorter if the Government of the South African Republic will omit in any future law the complicated conditions of registration, qualification, and behaviour which accompanied previous proposals, and would have entirely nullified their beneficial effect.

Her Majesty's Government hope that the Government of the South African Republic will wait to receive their suggestions founded on the report of the British Agent's investigation before submitting a new franchise.

\* \* \* \* \*

With regard to the conditions of the Government of the South African Republic—first, as regards intervention, Her Majesty's Government hope that the fulfilment of the promises made, and the just treatment of the Uitlanders in future will render unnecessary any further intervention on their behalf, but Her Majesty's Government cannot of course debar themselves from their rights under the Conventions nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations of a civilised Power to protect its subjects in a foreign country from injustice. Secondly, with regard to Suzerainty, Her Majesty's Government would refer the Government of the South African Republic to the second paragraph of my Despatch of July 13. Thirdly, Her Majesty's Government agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a Tribunal of Arbitration from which Foreigners and Foreign influence are excluded. Such a discussion, which will be of the highest importance to the future relations of the two countries, should be carried on between the President and yourself, and for this purpose it appears to be necessary that a further Conference, which Her Majesty's Government suggest should be held at Cape Town, should be at once arranged.

\* \* \* \* \*

Her Majesty's Government also desire to remind the Government of the South African Republic that there are other matters of difference between the two Governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to Arbitration. It is necessary that these should be settled concurrently with the questions now under discussion, and they will form, with the question of Arbitration, proper subjects for consideration at the proposed Conference.



The hope that was cherished, based on a telegram, that the Government at Pretoria had advanced a step by substituting a 5 years' for a 7 years', as the qualifying term for the Franchise, unfortunately proved to be illusory, for when it was found that the further concessions were coupled with a demand for the renunciation of the Suzerainty by the Imperial Government and other exacting conditions, it was felt that the prospect was dark and gloomy for a pacific settlement.

It appears that the Government of the South African Republic, for reasons best known to itself, shrank from the acceptance of a Joint Commission of Enquiry, that it practically withdrew its own proposal of the 7 years' retrospective Franchise Scheme, when it found it was to be tested by an investigation into its merits, as to whether it would be a substantial and immediate representation for the Uitlanders, and as a substitute thereof, that if Great Britain would renounce its Suzerainty and consent to an Arbitration on all other questions of dispute with the Transvaal on the basis of a Sovereign International State, they would be prepared to propose for the acceptance of the Volksraad a 5 years' Scheme, purchased by such humiliating conditions.

Such a proposal it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to entertain for one moment, however much they may have desired to enfranchise the Uitlanders, to meet their grievances, or to secure a satisfactory settlement of all questions in dispute, whereby peace and prosperity in South Africa alone could be safeguarded.

It is clear that the policy of Her Majesty's Governments to put an end, once and for all, to the prolonged suspense and uneasiness in South Africa, by urgent requests and practical schemes to secure for our fellow subjects in the Transvaal, immediate and substantial political rights, were received by the Government of the South African Republic with practically a refusal, as they must have known that such a scheme, hampered with humiliating conditions, no Government, whether Liberal or Conservative, could under any circumstances, whatever, be able to accept.

## CHAPTER V.

THE THIRD DESPATCHES  
AFTER THE BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE,  
FROM AUGUST 23RD TO SEPTEMBER 8TH, 1899.

## DESPATCH OF SIR ALFRED MILNER.

On August 23rd, a written Despatch was sent to Her Majesty's Government from Sir Alfred Milner, containing a full survey of the situation, which explained more in detail the telegraphic Despatches of August 15th and 19th, and which dealt chiefly with the numerous Franchise schemes, successively adopted by the Government of the South African Republic, and with the settlement by Arbitration on other questions of difference, when the Franchise Question is settled. This Despatch was followed a few days afterwards by a telegraphic communication to Mr. Chamberlain, dated August 31st, emphasising the fact that the Crisis is seriously affecting the trading centres in the Colony, as well as the necessity of terminating the suspense, in order to relieve the distress and suffering amongst the Uitlander population at Johannesburg.

## DESPATCH FROM PRETORIA.

On September the 2nd, a reply to the Despatch of Mr. Chamberlain of the 28th of August was received by Sir Alfred Milner from the Government of the South African Republic, which he immediately telegraphed to Her Majesty's Government, and the following is the full text :—

I have the honour to acknowledge your Honour's Despatch of August 30, with the emendation thereof of September 1. This Government has observed with the deepest regret that Her Majesty's Government have not been able to decide on accepting the proposal for a five years' franchise and extension of the representation of the Witwatersrand, with the conditions attached thereto, set forth in its Notes of August 19 and August 21, the more so that from semi-official discussions, which have been brought to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, they had thought that they might infer that their proposal would have been acceptable to Her Majesty's Government. As a consequence of that communication this Government considers that its proposal has lapsed, whereby also lapses the necessity for laying it before the representatives of the people and the people.

(2.) This Government wishes to remark, with reference to observation of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that Her Majesty's Government is



unable to perceive the objections entertained by Government of South African Republic against a Joint Commission of Enquiry as proposed, that the objections to the invitation as given in the telegraphic Despatch of August 2 have already been set forth in a communication dated August 12 (sent to your Honour yesterday).

(3.) As regards a unilateral (in place of a Joint) Enquiry as now proposed by Her Majesty's Government, this Government wishes to make known its readiness, whenever it may appear that the existing Franchise Law can be made still more effective, to lay before the Volksraad proposals for altering or making it clearer. If they can be of any assistance to Her Majesty's Government with any information or explanation they are always ready to furnish this, though it appears to it that the findings of a unilateral Commission, especially when arrived at before the working of the law has been duly tested, would be premature and thus probably of little value.

(4.) Passing now to the discussion of the observations of Her Majesty's Government on the conditions attached by this Government to the proposal, which has now lapsed in consequence of the non-acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of these stipulations, the Government wishes to observe—(a) That with reference to the question of intervention, this Government has neither asked nor intended that Her Majesty's Government should abandon any right which it really might have, on the ground either of the Convention of London, 1884, or of international law, to intervene for the protection of British subjects in this country. (b) That as regards the assertion of Suzerainty, its non-existence has, as this Government venture to think, already been so clearly stated in its Despatch of April 16, 1898, that it would be superfluous to repeat here the facts, arguments, and deductions stated therein; it simply wishes to remark here that it abides by its views expressed in that Despatch.

(5.) With reference to a Court of Arbitration, this Government is pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government is ready to enter on negotiations touching the scope and form of such, though it is not clear to it (a) whether Her Majesty's Government is willing that burghers of Orange Free State should be eligible for appointment as members of such a Court. (b) What subjects should be referred for the decision of such Court. (c) What subjects Her Majesty's Government consider should not be submitted to such Court—Her Majesty's Government state that there are such points without specifying them. The object aimed at by this Government—namely, the assurance of a final settlement of all points, whether now in dispute or arising hereafter—might, it considers, be altogether frustrated by these limitations.

(6.) With reference to the suggestion for holding another Conference, this Government will await further information from Her Majesty's Government before it can go further into the matter.

(7.) Moreover, this Government begs to remark that the proposal made by it with reference to the franchise and the representation of the Uitlanders was extremely liberal, and, in fact, as regards the representation went further than the High Commissioner contemplated at the Bloemfontein Conference. The stipulations attached by this Government to that proposal were most reasonable and demand on the side of Her Majesty's Government no abandonment of

existing rights, but solely the obtaining of the assurance that Her Majesty's Government would in future as regards this Republic simply abide by the Convention of London, 1884, and the generally recognised rules of international law; moreover, that on points of difference a principle should be brought into practice whose reasonableness and justice are recognised by all civilised States, and of which this Government understand that Her Majesty's Government is a strong advocate.

(8.) This Government could never have anticipated that the answer of Her Majesty's Government to their proposal would be unfavourable, and they can only continue to cherish this hope that the terms of both this and former communications will give an opening for a way through which a good understanding and a solution of existing differences may be arrived at.

(9.) Though it can in no wise abandon any of its rights, this Government would nevertheless be glad to convince and satisfy Her Majesty's Government that the Franchise Law now passed and the extension of the representation with four new Seats will immediately, if taken advantage of, give a substantial representation to the Uitlander population, and that for the rest it is its intention to continue working with Her Majesty's Government on a friendly footing.

(10.) This Government, having regard to the difference that in their opinion exists between the invitation as put forward in the telegraphic Despatch of August 2 and that conveyed in the Despatch of July 27 from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and further, to the fact that in the last named it is stated that the most suitable way of dealing with points involving complicated details and questions of a technical nature would be to discuss them, in the first place, by Delegates appointed by both Governments, who should report the result of their deliberations and submit their recommendations to the two Governments respectively, and assuming that it is not intended thereby to interfere in the internal affairs of this Republic, or to establish precedent, but simply to gain information and elucidations, whether the measures already taken are effectual or not, and, if not, to show this Government where such is the case, this Government would be glad to learn from Her Majesty's Government how they propose that the Commission should be constituted, and what place and time for meeting is suggested. While this Government wishes to confine itself for the present to the above point as regards the answer to the Despatch of July 27, it proposes to send on shortly the further reply as intimated yesterday.

## DESPATCH OF MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

On the 8th September, immediately after the meeting of the Cabinet Council, Mr. Chamberlain addressed to Sir Alfred Milner a Despatch embodying the decision of Her Majesty's Government in reply to the Despatch of the former dated September 2nd. This Despatch, whilst firm and dignified in tone, was marked by great moderation, and the following is the full text:—

Her Majesty's Government understand the Note of the South African Republic Government of the 2nd September to mean, that their proposals made in their Note of the 19th August are now withdrawn, because the reply of Her Majesty's Government contained in their Note of the 30th August with regard to future intervention and Suzerainty is not acceptable.

Her Majesty's Government have absolutely repudiated the view of the political *status* of the South African Republic taken by the Government of the South African Republic, in their Note of the 16th April, 1898, and also in their Note of the 9th May, 1899, in which they claim the *status* of a Sovereign International State, and they are, therefore, unable to consider any proposal which is made conditional on the acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of these views.

It is on this ground that Her Majesty's Government have been compelled to regard the last proposal of the Government of the South African Republic as unacceptable in the form in which it has been presented.

Her Majesty's Government cannot now consent to go back to the proposals for which those in the Note of 19th August are intended as a substitute, especially as they are satisfied that the law of 1899, in which these proposals were finally embodied, is insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial representation which Her Majesty's Government have always had in view, and which they gather from the reply of the Government of the South African Republic that the latter admit to be reasonable. Moreover, the presentation of the proposals of the Note of the 19th of August indicates, that the Government of the South African Republic have themselves recognised that their previous offer might be with advantage enlarged, and that the Independence of the South African Republic would be thereby in no way impaired.

Her Majesty's Government are still prepared to accept the offer made in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Note of the 19th August, taken by themselves, provided, that the Enquiry which Her Majesty's Government have proposed, whether Joint—as Her Majesty's Government originally suggested—or unilateral, shows that the new scheme of representation will not be encumbered by conditions which will nullify the intention to give substantial and immediate representation to the Uitlanders. In this connection, Her Majesty's Government assume that, as stated to the British Agent, the new members of the Raad will be permitted to use their own language.

The acceptance of these terms by the Government of the South African Republic would at once remove the tension between the two Governments, and would in all probability render unnecessary any further intervention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to secure the redress of grievances, which the Uitlanders would themselves be able to bring to the notice of the Executive and the Raad.

Her Majesty's Government are increasingly impressed with the danger of further delay in relieving the strain which has already caused so much injury to the interests of South Africa, and they earnestly press for an immediate and definite reply to their present proposal.

If it is acceded to, they will be ready to make immediate arrangements for a further Conference between the President of the South African Republic and the High Commissioner, to settle all the details of the proposed Tribunal of

Arbitration, and the questions referred to in the Note of the 30th August (see No. 43), which are neither Uitlander grievances, nor questions of interpretation, but which might be readily settled by friendly communications between the representatives of the two Governments.

If, however, as they most anxiously hope will not be the case, the reply of the South African Republic Government is negative or inconclusive, Her Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the situation *de novo*, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement.

## REFUSAL OF BRITISH PROPOSALS.

The Despatch of Sir Alfred Milner of 23rd of August above referred to, is an historic document of great importance, as it is not only a review of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government since the Conference at Bloemfontein, but is a full explanation and defence of its action, and of the demands it had made upon the Government of the South African Republic. That policy he clearly indicates to be, to terminate an intolerable position, by not only the settlement of the Franchise Question and the grievances of the Uitlanders consequent upon their political isolation, but also the settlement of many other questions in dispute between Great Britain and the Transvaal, such for instance, as the Swaziland Convention, the Dynamite Monopoly, the Press Law, the Right of Public Assembly, the Illicit Liquor Traffic, the Education Question, Police Reform, and other questions which the Conference at Bloemfontein proved itself powerless to grapple with, or to settle.

The South African Republic in its Despatch of September 2nd, requested that Her Majesty's Government should fall back on the proposal of the 7 years' Franchise, contained in the Despatch of July 27th, and also profess its willingness to accept the Joint Commission of Enquiry upon this scheme of 7 years, although Her Majesty's Government had informed it that it could not accept less than a 5 years' Franchise Scheme, which was the minimum of the proposals of Sir Alfred Milner at the Bloemfontein Conference.

This reply, therefore, of the Government of the South African Republic was, in effect, a refusal of the proposals contained in the Despatch of Her Majesty's Government of August 28th, and for this reason, that it would not submit them to the Volksraad for approval.

On the subject of Arbitration as to the right interpretation of the



Conventions of 1881 and 1884, the South African Republic declared that it welcomed the proposal, as it was their firm intention to adhere to the terms of the London Convention of 1884, but as their interpretation of this Convention constituted the South African Republic a Sovereign International State, this proposal must be looked upon as a denial of the contention of Her Majesty's Government, that Great Britain is the Paramount Power, and that, therefore, the South African Republic is not a Sovereign State.

The South African Republic was determined to stand by the position taken up by President Krüger at the Bloemfontein Conference. that to concede the 5 years' Franchise Scheme would be to surrender the Transvaal to the Uitlanders, and that if this concession was granted, Great Britain must make a *per contra* concession by surrendering her Protectorate ~~or Sovereignty~~ over the South African Republic, as guaranteed by the Conventions of ~~1881 and~~ 1884.

The Despatch of Her Majesty's Government of September 8th, clearly indicated to the Government of the South African Republic, that its proposals for a 5 years' retrospective Franchise to the Uitlanders being based on conditions that struck a fatal blow to the Sovereignty of England over the Transvaal State, it was impossible to accept them, and that it was equally impossible for Her Majesty's Government to fall back upon the proposals contained in the South African Republic's Despatch of August 19th, for the 7 years' Franchise Bill as passed by the Volksraad, inasmuch as they were insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial representation which Her Majesty's Government always had in view, and which as it gathers from the reply of the South African Republic, the latter admit to be reasonable.

Her Majesty's Government, anxious to arrive at a satisfactory settlement, and to give the South African Republic an opportunity to recover its last position in the negotiations, magnanimously offered to accept the proposals 1, 2, 3 in the Despatch of August 19th, provided that the Scheme is submitted to a Joint Commission of Enquiry and that the proposals for representation in the Volksraad "not be encumbered by conditions which will nullify the intention to give substantial and immediate representation to the Uitlanders, and that the new Members of the Raad will be permitted to use their own language."

Her Majesty's Government, however, absolutely repudiated the claim to the Republic to enjoy the *status* of a Sovereign International



for no Government could declare otherwise, since the paramountcy of Great Britain in South Africa is both the keystone of British policy and the guarantec of peace, because that position alone can unite and consolidate the Dutch and British races into one people, under the Paramount Flag.

---

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE FOURTH DESPATCHES

AFTER THE BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE,  
FROM THE 16TH TO THE 22ND SEPTEMBER, 1899.

---

### FATAL DESPATCH FROM PRETORIA.

On the 16th September the Government of the South African Republic addressed to Sir Alfred Milner a reply to the Despatch of Mr. Chamberlain of September 8th, which amounted to a rejection of the proposals of Great Britain. After expressing regret that Her Majesty's Government refused to accept its proposals for a 5 years' retrospective Franchise, subject to certain specified conditions, and explaining the reasons why they could not accept this proposal except on the conditions therein included, it declared as follows :—

However earnestly this Government also desires to find an immediate and satisfactory course by which existing tension should be brought to an end, it feels itself quite unable, as desired, to recommend or propose to South African Republic Volksraad and people the part of its proposal contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of its Note, 19th August, omitting the conditions on the acceptance of which alone the offer was based, but declares itself always still prepared to abide by its acceptance of the invitation of Her Majesty's Government to get a Joint Commission, composed as intimated in its Note of 2nd September.

This declaration that the South African Republic accepted the proposal of Her Majesty's Government for a Joint Commission of Enquiry is remarkable, because by the Despatch of the South African Republic of September 2nd it was rejected, and for it was substituted a 5 years' retrospective Franchise, on certain specified conditions, which implied the surrender by Great Britain of her Sovereignty over the South African Republic.

Further, this Despatch refused to concede to the new members, to be chosen for the Volksraad, leave to speak in their own language; and it concludes with this remarkable declaration:—

Inasmuch as the proposal for any further Conference has been made specially dependent on the acceptance of a proposal which this Government does not feel at liberty to recommend to Volksraad, it would perhaps be premature to deal with it further at the present time. It merely wishes, however, to remark that it has not yet been made clear to it which are the definite questions which would be discussed [at] proposed Conference, and which could not be subjected to Arbitration, but it is pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government thinks that they could readily be settled by means of friendly discussions, while it further welcomes with much pleasure prospect disclosed by Her Majesty's Government of the introduction of a Court of Arbitration for the decision of all points of difference and points to be discussed at the Conference, and is ready and willing to co-operate towards the composition of such a Court, and that the more as it is its firm intention to abide entirely by the Convention of London, 1884, as its efforts have been continuously to do. Finally, this Government continues to cherish hope that Her Majesty's Government, on further consideration, will feel itself free to abandon idea of making new proposals more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions, and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal for a Joint Commission as first proposed by Secretary of State for Colonies in Imperial Parliament, and subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by it. If Her Majesty's Government is willing, and feels able to make this decision, it would put an end to the present state of tension; race hatred would decrease and die out, the prosperity and welfare of South African Republic and the whole of South Africa would be developed and furthered, and fraternisation between the different nationalities would increase. I have, &c. (Signed) F. W. REITZ, State Secretary.

### THE DOOR CLOSED.

This Despatch completely closed the door against the continuance of any further negotiations, on not only the Franchise Question, but also Arbitration on the other questions in dispute. The language of the Despatch is emphatic in support of this conclusion. First, on the Franchise, the Transvaal Government declared:—

It feels itself quite unable, as desired, to recommend or propose to the South African Republic Volksraad and people the part of its proposal contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of its [Her Majesty's Government] Note of the 19th August, omitting the conditions on the acceptance of which alone the offer was based;

It is trifling, nay, evasive, for the Transvaal Government to declare further,

but declares itself always still prepared to abide by its acceptance of the invitation of Her Majesty's Government to get a Joint Commission composed, as intimated in its Note of September 2nd,

inasmuch as the Transvaal Government not only had not accepted, but had absolutely ignored the invitation, as its Despatch of the 22nd August declares:—

With reference to your proposal for a Joint Enquiry, contained in your Despatches of August 2nd and 3rd, the Government of South African Republic have the honour to suggest the following alternative proposal for consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

Secondly, on the proposal for a Conference, it was well known to the Transvaal Government that the settlement of the Franchise Question was the condition precedent to the settlement of the other questions in dispute by Arbitration; in fact, the language of this last Despatch, 2nd September, admits this, viz.:—

Inasmuch as the proposal for any further Conference has been made specially dependent on the acceptance of a proposal which this Government [South African Republic] does not feel at liberty to recommend to the Volksraad, it would, perhaps, be premature to deal with it further at the present time.

Under such circumstances, to press Her Majesty's Government to carry out its proposal for a "Court of Arbitration for the decision of all points of difference," when the proposal for the settlement of the Franchise Question was rejected by the South African Republic, was not only unpractical, but absurd, and it is no wonder that the patience and forbearance of Her Majesty's Government were exhausted, and that all hope was abandoned of arriving at a peaceful settlement.

#### LAST DESPATCH OF MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

On the 22nd September, the last Despatch of Her Majesty's Government was sent to Sir Alfred Milner immediately after the Cabinet Council had met, and the following is the full text of this important State document:—

I have to acknowledge receipt of your telegram, 6th September, conveying reply of the Government of the South African Republic to Note of British Agent conveying communication of her Majesty's Government contained in my telegram to you of 8th September. The offer therein made by Her Majesty's Government was moderate and conciliatory, and they have to express their

profound regret that reply of Government of the South African Republic is a refusal to accept it.

Her Majesty's Government have on more than one occasion repeated their assurances that they have no desire to interfere in any way with Independence of South African Republic, provided that the conditions on which it was granted are honourably observed in the spirit and in the letter, and they have offered as part of a general settlement to give a complete guarantee against any attack upon that Independence either from within any part of the British dominions or from the territory of a Foreign State.

They have not asserted any rights of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic other than those which are derived from the Conventions between the two countries or which belong to every neighbouring Government (and especially to one which has a largely predominant interest in the adjacent territories) for the protection of its subjects and of its adjoining possessions. But they have been compelled by the action of Government of the South African Republic, who have in their Note of 9th May, 1899, asserted the right of the Republic to be a Sovereign International State, absolutely to deny and repudiate this claim.

The object which Her Majesty's Government have had in view in the recent negotiations has been stated in a manner which cannot admit of misapprehension—viz., to obtain such a substantial and immediate representation for the Uitlanders in the South African Republic as Her Majesty's Government hoped would relieve them from any necessity for further interference on their behalf, and would enable the Uitlanders to secure for themselves that fair and just treatment which was formally promised to them in 1881, and which Her Majesty intended to secure for them when she granted the privilege of Self-Government to the inhabitants of the Transvaal.

As was stated in my telegram of 8th September, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that no conditions less comprehensive than those contained in their offer of that date can be relied upon to effect this object.

The refusal of the Government of the South African Republic to entertain the offer thus made, coming as it does at the end of nearly four months of protracted negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation extending over a period of more than five years, make it useless to further pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and Her Majesty's Government are now compelled to consider the situation afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement of the issues which have been created in South Africa by the policy constantly followed for many years by the Government of the South African Republic. They will communicate to you the result of their deliberations in a later Despatch.

## BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS.

It must be admitted that this final Despatch is a statesmanlike reply to the extraordinary Despatch of the South African Republic of September 16th, worthy of the dignity of a Great Empire



towards a Vassal State, such as the South African Republic. The Government of the South African Republic having refused the proposals of Her Majesty's Government, and these proposals having been rejected after prolonged negotiations, beginning with the Conference at Bloemfontein of May 28th, down to September 23rd, a period of four months (preceded by an incessant and disturbing agitation in South Africa of 5 years), it was natural, nay, inevitable for Her Majesty's Government to resolve to terminate this diplomatic wrangling, because it was not only barren of any practical results, but inconsistent with the respect and consideration due to Great Britain, as it was also dangerous to her position as the Paramount Power in South Africa, and to the confidence and loyalty of the Uitlander population, whose cause she was bound to safeguard.

In every capital of Europe the terms of this Despatch of 22nd September was considered to open a door for peace, for it placed before the Government of the South African Republic a golden bridge to retreat from an untenable position; but, alas! its dogged obstinacy prevailed, and, as the sequel proved, it sullenly refused the proffered hand of reconciliation and peace.

### SPEECH OF THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

It was during this interval that Her Majesty's Government, by the mouth of one of its most distinguished members, distinguished equally for his common-sense, for his loyalty to peace, and for his unimpassioned patriotism, the Duke of Devonshire, on 30th September, spoke as follows:—

The obstacle which seems to stand in the way of a peaceful settlement of our difficulties with the South African Republic appears to be in the rooted conviction they have, that in the demands which we have made, we cherish some designs hostile to their Independence and Self-Government. That any such apprehension on their part is absolutely unfounded, has been asserted as strongly as it can be asserted, both officially in our Despatches, and unofficially, by Members of the Government, and nothing which I can say can add to the force of these assertions.

\* \* \* \* \*

I can only trust—although at this time there is nothing which leads us to take a very hopeful or very sanguine view—that wiser and more moderate counsels may prevail in the Transvaal Republic, and that some means may be found by their friends in this country, or elsewhere, to disabuse them of the idea, absolutely without foundation, that we nourish any designs intended to interfere with their Independence or Self-Government, or that we require any—



thing for our people but the barest rights and barest measure of Justice. If they should so frame their policy, there is no need that the existence of their State should be a continual source of anxiety and trouble in that portion of Africa.

Again, too, on the 9th October, the Duke of Devonshire voiced the mind and desire of the Government and Nation when he said:—

That the present interval for reflection might possibly conduce to the pacific settlement, which all our arguments and persuasions have hitherto been unable to produce.

### RUMOURS OF WAR.

These sincere and friendly overtures were unavailing, for the stern silence of the responsible Government at Pretoria was too ominous, it was but the calm that precedes the storm, for on every hand, instead of the "soft answer that turneth away wrath," came from the South African Republic sinister rumours of war, and preparations for war, of movements of armed forces hurrying to the frontiers of the adjacent Colonies of Great Britain.

Alas! the Duke of Devonshire's pacific utterances on the 26th September and 10th October, which did infinite credit to his head and heart, were not realised, for the "interval for reflection" from 22nd September to 10th October was irretrievably lost, a period for calm consideration of 18 days was not availed of by the headstrong Government of the South African Republic.

On the 10th October it determined on a warlike, instead of a pacific policy, and infatuated by its determination to crush the Uitlanders, and to secure the Sovereignty of the Transvaal by violating and tearing in pieces the Treaty of London of 1884, it flung defiance at Great Britain, and hurled at the head of the unoffending Sovereign Power an insolent Ultimatum.

Such a challenge, even if hurled against Great Britain by the most autocratic Ruler of a mighty Empire, must inevitably have led to war; but, when hurled at Great Britain, the Protector and Suzerain of the South African Republic by a Vassal and comparatively impotent State, it was a cruel blunder, since it practically declared War against the British Empire, and whilst upon the responsible Government at Pretoria must fall this heavy responsibility, unfortunately upon the people that they rule, Britons, Boers, and Colonists alike, will fall, nay, now has fallen, the awful curse of War!

"With its deep, long rivers of blood,  
And its sad, silent shedding of tears!"

## CHAPTER VII.

THE FIFTH DESPATCHES  
AFTER THE BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE,  
OF THE 9TH AND 10TH OCTOBER, 1899.

---

THE ULTIMATUM.

This Ultimatum, dated October the 9th, addressed by the Government at Pretoria to Her Majesty's Government, was in the following terms:—

The Government of the South African Republic feels itself compelled to refer the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland once more to the Convention of London, 1884, concluded between this Republic and the United Kingdom, and which [? in] its XIVth Article secures certain specified rights to the white population of this Republic, namely, that (here follows Article XIV. of Convention of London, 1884).

This Government wishes further to observe that the above are only rights which Her Majesty's Government have reserved in the above Conventions with regard to the Uitlander population of this Republic, and that the violation only of those rights could give that Government a right to diplomatic representations or intervention while, moreover, the regulation of all other questions affecting the position or the rights of Uitlander population under the above-mentioned Convention is handed over to the Government and the Representatives of the people of the South African Republic.

Amongst the questions the regulation of which falls exclusively within the competence of the Government and of the Volksraad, are included those of the Franchise and Representation of the people in this Republic, and although thus the exclusive right of this Government and of the Volksraad for the regulation of that Franchise and Representation is indisputable, yet this Government has found occasion to discuss in a friendly fashion the Franchise and the Representation of the people with Her Majesty's Government without however recognising any right thereto on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

This Government has also, by the formulation of the now existing Franchise Law and the Resolution with regard to Representation, constantly held these friendly discussions before its eyes.

On the part of Her Majesty's Government, however, the friendly nature of these discussions has assumed a more and more threatening tone, and the minds of the people in this Republic and in the whole of South Africa have been excited, and a condition of extreme tension has been created, while Her Majesty's Government could no longer agree to the Legislation respecting Franchise and the Resolution respecting Representation in this Republic, and finally, by your Note of 25th September, 1899, broke off all friendly Corre-

spondence on the subject, and intimated that they must now proceed to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement, and this Government can only see in the above intimation from Her Majesty's Government a new violation of the Convention of London, 1884, which does not reserve to Her Majesty's Government the right to a unilateral settlement of a Question which is exclusively a domestic one for this Government, and has already been regulated by it. *a challenge to the Government's position*

On account of the strained situation and the consequent serious loss in and interruption of trade in general which the correspondence respecting the Franchise and Representation in this Republic carried in its train, Her Majesty's Government have recently pressed for an early settlement and finally pressed, by your intervention, for an answer within 48 hours (subsequently somewhat modified) to your Note of the 12th September, replied to by the Note of this Government of the 15th September, and your Note of the 25th September, 1899, and thereafter further friendly negotiations broke off and this Government received the intimation that the proposal for a final settlement would shortly be made, but although this promise was once more repeated no proposal has up to now reached this Government.

Even while friendly correspondence was still going on an increase of troops on a large scale was introduced by Her Majesty's Government and stationed in the neighbourhood of the borders of this Republic.

Having regard to occurrences in the history of this Republic which it is unnecessary here to call to mind this Government felt obliged to regard this military force in the neighbourhood of its borders as a threat against the Independence of the South African Republic, since it was aware of no circumstances which could justify the presence of such military force in South Africa and in the neighbourhood of its borders.

In answer to an inquiry with respect thereto addressed to His Excellency the High Commissioner, this Government received, to its great astonishment, in answer a veiled insinuation that from the side of the Republic (van Republikeinsche zeyde) an attack was being made on Her Majesty's Colonies and at the same time a mysterious reference to possibilities whereby it was strengthened in its suspicion that the Independence of this Republic was being threatened.

As a defensive measure it was therefore obliged to send a portion of the Burghers of this Republic in order to offer the requisite resistance to similar possibilities.

✓ Her Majesty's unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of this Republic in conflict with the Convention of London, 1884, caused by the extraordinary strengthening of troops in the neighbourhood of the borders of this Republic has thus caused an intolerable condition of things to arise whereto this Government feels itself obliged, in the interest not only of this Republic but also [?] of all South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and feels itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the assurance :

(a.) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by the

friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's Government.

(b.) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be instantly withdrawn.

(c.) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities against any portion of the Possessions of the British Government shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the Governments, and this Government will, on compliance, therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed Burghers of this Republic from the borders.

(d.) That Her Majesty's troops, which are now on the high seas, shall not be landed in any port of South Africa.

This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon Wednesday the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock P.M., and it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval [it] will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that in the event of any further movement troops taking place within the above-mentioned time in the nearer direction of our borders this Government will be compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war.

(Signed) F. W. REITZ,  
State Secretary.

October 9th, 1899.

#### ARTICLE XIV.

The following is the text of Article XIV of the London Convention referred to in the foregoing Despatch :—

"All persons, other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic (a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel, or reside, in any part of the South African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops, and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents whom they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be subject, in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said Republic."



## THE DIE CAST.

The die was now irrevocably cast. The "interval for reflection," as the Duke of Devonshire said, was followed by an arrogant Ultimatum, which struck a blow at the paramountcy of Great Britain in South Africa, and proved that the Transvaal Government never intended peace, but war.

At the very time that Presidents Steyn and Krüger were preparing their Ultimatum to make peace impossible and war inevitable, Sir Alfred Milner was urging upon these two men the desire of Her Majesty's Government for peace, as shown by the interim Despatch of October 7th. The door was opened wide, the golden bridge was built stronger, at this eleventh hour, for securing a pacific solution, for Sir Alfred Milner used these words:—

The Imperial Government would even now be prepared to consider a definite suggestion for the termination of the present crisis.

And later he said:—

My object in all my communications since the 2nd October has been to leave nothing undone to prevent such action on the part of the Transvaal as might be calculated to make a pacific solution impossible.

Well might the Right Hon. Herbert Asquith, M.P., ask:

Is Great Britain the Paramount Power of South Africa? Has Great Britain the right to secure for her subjects in the Transvaal the same equality of treatment as is given to Dutch and English alike, in every other part of South Africa?

The true friends of peace, and of the South African Republic, were those who supported the policy proclaimed in the Marquis of Ripon's Despatch of 1894, and who warned President Krüger that there would be no peace, or order, or prosperity in the Transvaal until his oppressive and corrupt government at Pretoria was reformed.

This warning Note was also repeated in 1899 by the Consul-General of the South African Republic in this country, Mr. Montagu White, when he telegraphed to President Krüger not to be misled into a false hope of an overwhelming opposition in this country to the policy maintained alike by the Marquis of Ripon in 1894, and by Mr. Chamberlain in 1899.



## REPLY TO THE ULTIMATUM.

Her Majesty's Government, on the receipt of the Ultimatum of the Government of the South African Republic, lost no time in replying thereto, and this reply was as follows:—

(Sent, 10.45 P.M., 10th October, 1899.)

Her Majesty's Government has received with great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the South African Republic conveyed in your telegram of 9th October, No. 3. You will inform the Government of the South African Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South African Republic are such as Her Majesty's Government deem it impossible to discuss.

## THE DECLARATION OF WAR.

This Ultimatum of the South African Republic was *ipso facto* a declaration of war against Great Britain, for it demanded that, by Wednesday, the 15th October, at 5 P.M.—

Failing the settlement of all points of difference by Arbitration, which they know full well Great Britain had before refused, the British troops on the border of the South African Republic shall be instantly withdrawn, all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since the 1st June shall be removed, and lastly that Her Majesty's troops, now on the high seas, shall not be landed in any port in South Africa.

These threats of war were not to be carried out, provided Great Britain renounced her Sovereignty, provided Great Britain did not enforce its Treaty rights, and obligations to obtain redress for the Uitlanders, provided Great Britain withdrew its troops from British territory, and provided Great Britain recalled its fleet of troopships, and did not disembark its armed forces at any port within its dominions in South Africa.

This defiant Despatch of October 9th, the Government of the South African Republic must have penned on purpose to exasperate, not to conciliate Great Britain; it had not the ring of the diplomatist but of the Council of War; and to it the Boers could not have expected any reply, but a refusal, because, knowing Great Britain would be unable to meet their demands, their warning to Great Britain was unnecessary, "that in the event of no satisfactory answer being received their Government will be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a declaration of war."

Laying, forsooth! on Great Britain the responsibility of the declaration of war, because she refused to recall her troopships,

or evacuate her own territory! Could defiance and threats go further than this?

But there is another conclusion which this Ultimatum irresistibly forced on any reasonable mind, and it is this, that the Government at Pretoria never intended to grant full and free political or civil freedom to the Uitlanders in the Transvaal, and further, at practically repudiated the prerogative of Great Britain, as the Sovereign Power, to raise its voice on behalf of the unenfranchised portion of the loyal population inhabiting the South African Republic, and, finally, it violated its Treaty obligations of 1881 and 1884, nay, it trampled under foot these Conventions, and boldly proclaimed its determination never to carry out those provisions, which constitute, not only the Charter of its own Independence, but the Charter of the political and civil liberties of the people beneath its rule, of whatever nationality, who claim citizenship in the Republic.

The chief opponents of the South African Republic never could have believed that its responsible Ministers would ever have ventured upon so rash and perilous a policy, which inevitably hastened their own downfall, sentencing to death many thousands, and involving the expenditure of millions of treasure. The Government at Pretoria by its last action in this now historical drama, sacrificed the moral and political support which it once possessed, not only in this country but in every country in the world, it being universally considered that the cause of the Uitlanders is the cause of civilisation, that it is a just cause, that it is the cause of political, civil and religious liberty, and of Equality before the Law, for the citizens and subjects of every nation in the world.

Though many statesmen and writers have declared that this is a war for the Suzerainty, Sovereignty, Paramountcy, or Supremacy of Great Britain, in reality it is a great struggle for Righteousness, Truth, and Justice.

These eternal principles flourish everywhere under the British flag.

It is that the peoples of South Africa shall govern themselves, not that Great Britain should act the Despot or the Autocrat.

*In the last interview Kitchener had with the President Kruger on the subject of giving the Uitlanders the franchise Kruger said in a serious and dignified manner: "To give them the franchise would be to give them the right to vote."*

## CHAPTER VIII.

## CAUSES OF THE DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE.

It will be observed by a careful perusal and study of the preceding historic record, and especially of the proceedings of the Conference at Bloemfontein, May 31st to June 5th, 1899, and of the subsequent Despatches of the 14th June to the 10th October, 1899, from the respective Governments, that the questions which led to the breakdown of the negotiations between the Governments of Great Britain and of the South African Republic were, the demand put forward by the Government at Pretoria for the surrender by Great Britain—first of the Sovereignty over the South African Republic, guaranteed her by Article IV of the Convention of London, 1884, as well as of her right of intervention in its internal affairs, in so far as such intervention was authorised by Article XIV of the same Convention; and, second, the determination of the Government at Pretoria to secure unlimited Arbitration, not only for the right interpretation of the Conventions of 1881 and 1884, but also for the settlement of all questions in dispute, whether territorial, political, commercial, civil, or religious.

It was proposed by the Government at Pretoria, at the beginning of this controversy, that the reference should be to the Arbitration of the President of the Swiss Republic, and when that proposal was rejected by Great Britain, it was proposed that the reference should be to a Court of Arbitration consisting of the respective Governments of Great Britain and of the South African Republic, presided over by, or whose Umpire should be, a representative of a Foreign Power. When that proposal was rejected by Great Britain, it was finally proposed by the Government at Pretoria, that the reference should be to a Tribunal of Arbitration, *ad hoc*, consisting of representatives of Great Britain, of the South African Republic, and of the Orange Free State; but unfortunately this latter proposal proved to be impracticable, in consequence of the divergence of view of the respective Governments in regard to what questions should, and should not, be submitted to the Tribunal for consideration, and especially because the Government at Pretoria was resolved that the settlement of the Franchise Question should not take precedence of the arbitral procedure, but should proceed *pari passu* with the latter.

In consideration therefore of the importance, in this great con-

trovery, of these questions, and with a view to fix the responsibility for the breakdown of the prolonged negotiations, and of the failure to arrive at a *modus vivendi* on the various questions at issue between the two Governments, it is necessary, in justice to the Government of Great Britain, which has been unfairly charged as being responsible for the diplomatic rupture, that a full and impartial record should be given of the negotiations that took place upon these vexed questions, viz., the Sovereignty of Great Britain over the South African Republic, and the proposed Tribunal of Arbitration. We will first refer to

### THE PROPOSAL FOR A TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION.

This question appears first to have dawned upon the minds of the South African Republic, and was earnestly pressed upon the attention of Great Britain for acceptance, as early as May, 1897, and it arose in this way:—

On March 6th, 1897, Mr. Chamberlain addressed a Despatch to the Government of the South African Republic, in which he complained of the frequent infringements of the Convention of 1884, in spite of the repeated assurances of President Krüger of his desire to respect it; and in support of this complaint he instanced the following cases of infringement:—(1) The Extradition Treaties with the Netherlands, signed at the Hague 14th November, 1895; with Portugal, signed at Lisbon 3rd November, 1893; and a Convention with Switzerland, signed 30th September, 1896; not one of these having been submitted to Her Majesty's Government for approval in accordance with Article IV of the Convention; (2) the Aliens Immigration Law, the Aliens Expulsion Law, the Press Law, all of which had passed the Volksraad, and which involved infractions or breaches of the Convention as by Article XIV.

In a Despatch dated 7th May, 1897, addressed to Her Majesty's Government by the Secretary of State of the South African Republic, C. Van Boeschoten, he proposed that the various questions referred to in Mr. Chamberlain's two Despatches, dated 6th March, 1897, (1) dealing with the various infractions of the Convention of 1884 (as therein stated), and (2) dealing with the Aliens Immigration Law, the Press Law, and other matters should be referred to the Arbitration of the Government of Switzerland.

The following is the paragraph in the Despatch referring to this subject:—



While it respects the opinion of Her Majesty's Government it takes the liberty, with full confidence in the correctness of its views, to propose to Her Majesty's Government the principle of Arbitration with which the Honourable and First Volksraad agrees, in the hope that it will be taken in a conciliatory spirit in which it is made.

It then suggested, in view of the conflicting elements, interests, and aspirations, that the President of Switzerland be requested to select a Jurist, and strongly urges in conclusion the acceptance of this proposal.

On October 16th, 1897, Mr. Chamberlain replied in an exhaustive manner, in which he declared as follows :—

The Government of the South African Republic propose that all points in dispute between Her Majesty's Government and themselves relating to the Convention should be referred to Arbitration, the Arbitrator to be nominated by the President of the Swiss Republic.

In making this proposal the Government of the South African Republic appear to have overlooked the distinction between the Conventions of 1881 and 1884 and an ordinary Treaty between two Independent Powers, questions arising upon which may properly be the subject of Arbitration.

By the Pretoria Convention of 1881 Her Majesty, as Sovereign of the Transvaal territory, accorded to the inhabitants of that territory complete Self-Government subject to the Suzerainty of Her Majesty, Her Heirs, and Successors, upon certain terms and conditions and subject to certain reservations and limitations set forth in 33 Articles, and by the London Convention of 1884 Her Majesty, while maintaining the Preamble of the earlier instrument, directed and declared that certain other Articles embodied therein should be substituted for the Articles embodied in the Convention of 1881. The Articles of the Convention of 1881 were accepted by the Volksraad of the Transvaal State, and those of the Convention of 1884 by the Volksraad of the South African Republic.

Under these Conventions, therefore, Her Majesty holds towards the South African Republic the relation of a Suzerain who has accorded to the people of that Republic Self-Government upon certain conditions, and it would be incompatible with that position to submit to Arbitration the construction of the conditions on which she accorded Self-Government to the Republic.

As an explanation, and at the same time in confirmation, of the above, Mr. Chamberlain adds :—

One of the main objects which Her Majesty's Government had in view was the prevention of the interference of any Foreign Power between Her Majesty and the South African Republic, a matter which they then held, and which Her Majesty's present Government hold, to be essential to British interests.

. . . Her Majesty's Government, therefore, for the foregoing reasons, cannot consent to submit questions as to the infringements of the Convention to the Arbitration of any Foreign State, or of the nominee of any Foreign State.

*X The relations of a Suzerain are not those of a sovereign. The whole of the Convention of 1881 is of no effect as a 1884 was altered. The Convention says that the articles of the Convention*

*but no, but C. such in 1881 Convention - the.*



On April 16th, 1898, Dr. Leyds, Secretary of State of the South African Republic urged an appeal to Arbitration,

As the Tribunal under International Law, peculiarly adapted for the decision of a difference relating to the meaning and the extent of the rights and the obligations of the South African Republic towards the British Government.

On December 15th, 1898, Mr. Chamberlain, in answer to the above Despatch contended, that the South African Republic being prepared to abide by the London Convention of 1884, there could not be any controversy between the two Governments; and that having regard to the determination of Great Britain not to permit any interference of any Foreign Power between Great Britain and the South African Republic, he could not submit to the Arbitration of a Foreign Power questions relating to the interpretation or infringement of the Conventions between the two Governments.

#### DISCUSSED AT BLOEMFONTEIN.

At the Bloemfontein Conference of June, 1899, the subject of Arbitration was repeatedly referred to. On the afternoon of the second day of the Conference, June 1st, President Krüger said:—

I would like to get disputes, such as exist at the present moment between us, decided by Arbitration. No war or quarrel could then arise between us, for the unfortunate Convention which we have made we can in no wise understand in the same manner. A little Coolie law, which is worthless, we could just as little understand in the same manner. This was also the case with the Swaziland Convention, and it is better to solve such differences by Arbitration.

On the third day of the Conference June 2nd, Sir Alfred Milner said:—

I shall take notice of them, and now I would like to take into consideration the three points mentioned by you yesterday, namely, the Jameson Invasion and the Indemnity, the Question of Swaziland, and the Suggestion with reference to Arbitration.

In reply to this President Krüger said:—

If Swaziland is made a part of my Republic, and that we agree with regard to the Indemnity, and that Her Britannic Majesty will no longer interfere with our internal Government, and that future questions shall be decided by Arbitration, and that we then get a good plan regarding the Franchise questions—those matters relating to British subjects who do not want to become burghers, who would still complain about illegal actions on our side, can be decided by Arbitration.

And he also observed :—

I know that it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to get a good ground, according to the Convention, to touch my internal Government, and although I am also in favour of removing the questions, it would be of no use to me if these questions could not be decided by Arbitration.

Sir Alfred Milner replied :—

There are questions which cannot be decided by Arbitration—questions of fairness, of justice in certain laws, and of the administration, whether the administration continues on a good basis. These are not questions which could be subject to Arbitration, such as legal questions could be subject to.

President Krüger replied :—

I believe the matter to which we may agree will cause no trouble in getting it through if we come to an Agreement regarding Swaziland, the Jameson Indemnity, and especially as regards Arbitration. For then I could satisfy the public on that point, because Her Majesty's Government would then no longer interfere with our internal affairs, as all disputes would be settled by Arbitration.

Sir Alfred Milner replied :—

As regards the Question of Arbitration in general, which matter appears to me to be most interesting to His Honour, I am so far altogether at one with you, and if it is possible I would like in future to discuss as few questions as possible with the Government of the South African Republic, as with the Government of the Free State at the present moment. I feel that if His Honour adopts his scheme or any other such proposal regarding the Franchise, he would require a certain guarantee that there would not be continual differences between him and England, and that if differences do arise a plan must be devised to deal with such disputes. His Honour once proposed to submit a number of questions to the decision of the President of Switzerland, which Her Britannic Majesty's Government, however, refused to accede to on the general principle, from which it will not depart, that it would not allow a Foreign Power, or any Foreign influence, to come between itself and the South African Republic; but if another method could be found to appoint an impartial Court to decide questions which may perhaps in the future arise, and even questions which exist at the present moment; but in any case, with a view to the future, if such a scheme could be proposed and submitted to me, I shall lay it before Her Majesty's Government and do what I personally can to assist in promoting a satisfactory outcome of this matter, His Honour must understand that I cannot bind Her Majesty's Government in any way on that subject. This question has come upon me unexpectedly, and I did not foresee the question would be discussed here; but I must say that if this matter can be accomplished in a satisfactory manner, excluding the interference of the stranger, it also appears to me a way would be open to get out of many difficulties. But, nevertheless,

I adhere to my proposal, that we should first endeavour to arrive at an understanding regarding the Scheme which the President considers acceptable; and, if we can come to an understanding thereon, let us come to consider what we can do to see that a final means is provided for the settlement of matters between the two Governments, and that future disputes which might arise would regulate themselves.

President Krüger replied:—

Your Excellency knows what I have said with regard to Swaziland, and which I propose should become a portion of my country, and with regard to the Indemnity and Arbitration, and these are all the points of trouble on my side; but, if you do not want to meet me on these points, then I would have nothing if we agree on the Franchise Question. These points must be taken together.

Sir Alfred Milner replied:—

In the same manner, if you desire to make any proposal regarding Arbitration, such proposal would have to be considered on its own merits, but not as any portion of the present negotiations. This Conference is altogether at an end, and there is no obligation on either side as the outcome thereof. I have, however, something to add regarding Arbitration. This matter has been mentioned during this discussion, together with other matters, but there is no definite proposal with respect thereto at this moment with regard to the mode of Arbitration. I have already said that there are subjects about which Her Majesty's Government most clearly cannot arbitrate; there is also a manner—by means of friendly Governments—which Her Majesty's Government could not admit. At the same time there is a class of question regarding which Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to arbitrate, if an appropriate method can be found, and if a proposal regarding that subject shall be at any time made, then this can be taken into consideration, independently of any proceedings of this Conference.

President Krüger replied:—

Regarding disputes with reference to the manner of interpreting documents, such as the Convention, there can be Arbitration in such a manner that it is not necessary that another Government should be called in—we can find impartial lawyers enough.

Sir Alfred Milner replied:—

We cannot go into all the particulars. I only wanted to say that there are some cases in which Her Majesty's Government will not arbitrate, and some in which it will, as has been said. This is a matter about which I have no authority to speak, but what I can say is that if any definite proposal should be made by you it could be submitted to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. I have at present no matters which I can with any benefit bring forward. Has your Honour any more?

President Krüger in closing the discussion on Arbitration said :—

I have no others [questions] than those I have already submitted. I shall lay the matter regarding the Franchise before the Volksraad as soon as I get a reply regarding the question of Arbitration that Her Majesty's Government agrees with my proposal.

Sir Alfred Milner replied :—

I have nothing in front of me to propose to Her Majesty's Government regarding Arbitration.

And with this observation the discussion on Arbitration at the Conference closed.

### DESPATCH OF SIR ALFRED MILNER.

After the Conference at Bloemfontein the subject of Arbitration was frequently referred to in the Despatches of the two Governments.

On June 14th, 1899, the Despatch of Sir Alfred Milner was devoted entirely to the subject, and, therefore, it is necessary to give the full text.

I have the honour to transmit a Despatch from Her Majesty's Agent, enclosing a Note from the State Secretary, in which he puts forward on behalf of the South African Republic a proposal "for Arbitration on differences arising out of the varying interpretation, approved by the parties, of the terms of the London Convention."

In introducing this proposal the State Secretary remarks that "it was apparent at the recent Conference at Bloemfontein that His Excellency the High Commissioner was personally in favour of removing differences between this Government and Her Majesty's Government by Arbitration."

This statement is far too absolute, though it is certainly less wholly incorrect than President Krüger's remark at the close of the Conference, that I "had acknowledged the President's request for Arbitration by other than Foreign Powers on all points of future difference under the Convention to be reasonable." As a matter of fact, when the President said this, he had made no request for "Arbitration by other than Foreign Powers." The principle of excluding Foreign Powers was for the first time admitted by him in that remark. In the next place, in the very general observations which I had made about Arbitration, I never spoke of "all differences under the Convention," or of the Convention at all.

As regards Mr. Reitz's present observation, I can only say that whatever personal opinion I may have expressed favourable to the principle of Arbitration—and I adhere to all that I said—in no way constrains me to look with



favour on the present proposal. On the contrary, if I were to advocate its acceptance now I should be acting in a manner entirely inconsistent with the position which I took up at Bloemfontein. The whole point and gist of my contention there was that, if there were ever to be better relations, and an amicable settlement of present and future differences between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic, redress of Uitlander grievances must come first, that I could not consent to bargain for the adoption of an adequate enfranchisement by Arbitration or any other concession that President Krüger wanted to get out of us. On the other hand, I repeatedly expressed the belief that if the Franchise Question, involving as it did the gradual removal of Uitlander grievances, could be satisfactorily settled, I thought it would be much easier to arrive at an understanding on all other matters, that I was most anxious to have no more controversies, and that, personally, I was quite prepared to advocate the settlement of differences between the two Governments—or some of them—by an impartial Tribunal, if such could be devised, involving no Foreign interference whatever between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic.

My proposals for a settlement of Uitlander grievances on the basis of a moderate measure of enfranchisement having been rejected by the President, and a totally inadequate scheme put forward in their place, he now comes forward with an Arbitration proposal. My contention is that the atmosphere in which that or any other concession to the Government of the South African Republic can be considered has yet to be created. Redress of the grievances of Her Majesty's subjects in the South African Republic stands at the head of the programme, and nothing else can be considered till that matter is out of the way.

Apart from that, I consider the particular scheme an absolutely unacceptable one on its merits. It is a mere skeleton of a scheme, and leaves so much undefined, that I believe it would raise more questions than it solved. Thus it is provided that "no matters or differences of trifling importance shall be referred to Arbitration." Who is to say what is trifling and what is important? According to President Krüger, no doubt all our complaints are trifling—like "the little Coolie matter" to which he referred at the Conference, meaning thereby the grievances of Her Majesty's Indian subjects, which has been a burning controversy for ten years. Again, Section 3 provides that "each Government shall have the right to preserve and exclude points which appear to it too important to be submitted to Arbitration, provided that thereby the principle itself of Arbitration be not frustrated." I find it difficult to attach a precise meaning to these words, but it is easy to see that they must be fruitful of endless disagreement.

I cannot see the smallest reason why Her Majesty's Government should not at once reject this particular proposal, and I advise that this course should be adopted. The scheme is, as I have shown, unworkable, but more than this, it does not exclude that "Foreign interference between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic" which Her Majesty's Government have always declared, and which I repeatedly declared at Bloemfontein that they would never admit.



By Clause 2, the two Arbitrators, who are vaguely defined apparently to be South African Judges, nominated by the two Governments respectively, "shall agree respecting a third person, who shall act as President of the Arbitration Tribunal," which is to decide in every case by a majority of votes.

It is evident that this third person will virtually decide everything, and it is provided that he shall "not be a subject of one of the arbitrating parties," *i.e.*, a Foreigner.

On this ground alone I feel sure that Her Majesty's Government will not accept the proposal. For every reason I think it is desirable that it should promptly intimate its total inability to entertain it.

### MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S REPLY.

On July 27th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain in a Despatch to Sir Alfred Milner replies on the subject of Arbitration as follows :—

The settlement of this most important subject will greatly facilitate an understanding in other matters which have been the source of continuous and ever-increasing correspondence between your predecessors and yourself and Her Majesty's Government. There have been, during the last few years, a number of instances in which Her Majesty's Government contend that the Conventions between this country and the South African Republic have been broken by the latter in the letter as well as in the spirit. There are other cases again in which there may have been no actual infraction of the letter of the Conventions, but in which injury has been inflicted on British subjects for which redress is required on their behalf.

With a view to the settlement of some, at least, of these questions the Government of the South African Republic has met the representations of Her Majesty's Government with an offer to submit them to the Arbitration of some Foreign Power. In view of the relations established by the Conventions of Pretoria and London, Her Majesty's Government have felt themselves compelled to declare emphatically that under no circumstances whatever will they admit the intervention of any Foreign Power in regard to their interpretation of the Conventions.

Her Majesty's Government note, however, with satisfaction that, in the course of the discussion at Bloemfontein, President Krüger withdrew the proposal for the intervention of a Foreign Power. In the Memorandum put in by him at the afternoon meeting on June 5 he spoke of his request for Arbitration by other than Foreign Powers, and the Government of the South African Republic, in a communication addressed to the British Agent on June 9, to which I have already referred, has modified its former proposal as to the formation of a Tribunal of Arbitration, so as to substitute for a Foreign Power a Foreigner as President, and, therefore, as Supreme Arbiter, in a Court to be otherwise composed of two Members nominated respectively by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of the South African Republic. This proposal, although in a different form to those previously made, is equally objectionable, inasmuch as it involves the admission of a Foreign element in the

settlement of controversies between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African Republic; and for this reason it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to accept it.

Her Majesty's Government recognise, however, that the interpretation of the Conventions in matters of detail is not free from difficulty. While on the one hand there can be no question of the interpretation of the Preamble of the Convention of 1881, which governs the Articles substituted in the Convention of 1884, on the other hand there may be fair differences of opinion as to the interpretation of the details of those Articles, and it is unsatisfactory that in cases of divergence of opinion between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African Republic there should be no authority to which to refer the points at issue for final decision.

If, therefore, the President is prepared to agree to the exclusion of any Foreign element in the settlement of such disputes, Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider how far and by what methods such questions of interpretation as have been above alluded to could be decided by some judicial authority whose independence, impartiality, and capacity would be beyond and above all suspicion.

After the discussion by Delegates, as already proposed, of the details and the technical matters involved in the points which Her Majesty's Government desire to urge for the consideration of the Government of the South African Republic in relation to the political representation of the Uitlanders, it may be desirable that you should endeavour to come to an agreement with President Krüger as to the action to be taken upon their reports by means of another personal conference.

In this case, the occasion would be a suitable one for you to discuss with His Honour the matter of the proposed Tribunal of Arbitration and those other questions which were not brought forward at the Bloemfontein Conference because of the failure to arrive at an understanding on the question of the political representation of the Uitlanders, but which, in the event of agreement upon that question, it is most desirable to settle at an early date.

In this exhaustive Despatch on the subject of Arbitration *in re* the London Convention of 1884, Mr. Chamberlain declared that "under no circumstances whatever, will Her Majesty's Government admit the intervention of any Foreign Power in regard to the interpretation of the Conventions," and this declaration was in accordance with President Krüger's at the Bloemfontein Conference when he said:—"Regarding disputes with reference to the manner of interpreting documents, such as the Convention, there can be Arbitration in such a manner that it is not necessary that another Government should be called in," and, therefore, Mr. Chamberlain observed that:—

If President Krüger is prepared to agree to the exclusion of any Foreign element in the settlement of such disputes, Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider how far, and by what methods, such questions and

interpretation, as have been above alluded to, could be decided by some judicial authority whose independence, impartiality, and capacity would be beyond and above all suspicion.

This was practically the acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of the proposed Tribunal of Arbitration, and the High Commissioner was authorised to come to an agreement with President Krüger in regard to the details and procedure for the carrying out of this Arbitral process.

### DESPATCHES ON THE QUESTION.

In the Despatch of Mr. Chamberlain of August 28th, 1899, he declared :—

Her Majesty's Government agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a Tribunal of Arbitration from which Foreigners and Foreign Influence are excluded. Such a discussion, which will be of the highest importance to the future relations of the two countries, should be carried on between the President and yourself, and for this purpose it appears to be necessary that a further Conference, which Her Majesty's Government suggest should be held at Cape Town, should be at once arranged.

Her Majesty's Government also desire to remind the Government of the South African Republic that there are other matters of difference between the two Governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to Arbitration. It is necessary that these should be settled concurrently with the questions now under discussion, and they will form, with the question of Arbitration, proper subjects for consideration at the proposed Conference.

On September 2nd, 1899, the Government of the South African Republic sent a Despatch to Her Majesty's Government which referred to Arbitration as follows :—

With reference to a Court of Arbitration this Government is pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government is ready to enter on Negotiations touching the scope and form of such, though it is not clear to it (a) whether Her Majesty's Government is willing that burghers of Orange Free State should be eligible for appointment as Members of such a Court. (b) What subjects should be referred for the decision of such Court. (c) What subjects Her Majesty's Government consider should not be submitted to such Court—Her Majesty's Government state that there are such points without specifying them. The object [? aimed] at by the Government—namely, the assurance of a final settlement of all points, whether now in dispute or arising hereafter—might, it considers, be altogether frustrated by these limitations.

On September 8th, 1899, a Despatch was received by Her

Majesty's Government from Sir Alfred Milner, in which he referred at considerable length to the Question of Arbitration, as follows:—

With regard to other questions—not directly connected with the grievances of the Uitlanders—my strong conviction is that all of them, to which any real importance attaches, should be disposed of now, so as to leave us with a clear slate. Nothing could be more deplorable than that, after the terrible strain of the last few months, a number of unsettled issues should remain between us and the Government of the South African Republic, and the diplomatic relations between us be liable to slip back into their old unsatisfactory condition. Assuming that an arrangement is come to with regard to Arbitration, some of these Questions—like the War Tax and the differences as to the interpretation of the Swaziland Convention—might be left to be decided in that way. But there are others which are not capable of being submitted to Arbitration, and these, so far as they are important, should be dealt with now, or else be now, as part of a general settlement, definitely abandoned. Of the matters which we cannot refer to Arbitration, and cannot, in my view, without discredit or risk of a speedy revival of difficulties, abandon, I would specially refer to:—(1) The position of British Indians; (2) the position of other coloured British subjects; and (3) our claim that all British subjects should be entitled to treatment at least equally favourable with that of the subjects of any other nation. The latter claim has been put forward by us on many occasions, as, for instance, with regard to commandeering, but it has never been formally admitted by the South African Republic, and unless it is so admitted now, I feel certain that we shall have grave difficulties in the future. We must not lose sight of the fact, that even in case of a satisfactory settlement of the question of citizenship, resulting in many of our subjects becoming citizens of the Republic, the number of those remaining British subjects will still be large. We have no most-favoured-nation Treaty with the South African Republic, nor does any clause of the Convention give our subjects expressly all the rights which are possessed by subjects of some other Powers under Treaties. Yet it is absolutely inconsistent with the special relationship which we have always asserted to exist between Great Britain and the South African Republic that a British subject should be, in any respect, at a disadvantage in the Transvaal compared with the subject of any other Power. The Government of the South African Republic deny that special relationship, therefore, in the absence of a Treaty or of a distinct understanding equally binding, it will remain possible for such an anomaly to occur.

The settlement of other questions of difference, concurrently with that of the political rights of the Uitlanders, is of great importance in its bearing on the probable success of the measures for admitting Uitlanders to citizenship. As long as grave differences exist, which are calculated to embroil Her Majesty's Government with the South African Republic, British Uitlanders will hesitate to become citizens of the latter State, for fear of finding themselves shortly in the painful position of having to take up arms against their old country.

It is, to my mind, one of the most objectionable features of the reply of the South African Republic to the latest proposal of Her Majesty's Govern-



ment that it absolutely makes no reference to the existence of any questions other than those of citizenship and arbitration. The Government of the South African Republic can certainly not claim that this position is in harmony with the line taken up by me during the conference at Bloemfontein, even if no regard were paid to the words used by me at the close of it:—"There are subjects with regard to which Her Majesty's Government clearly cannot arbitrate"—this conference is absolutely at an end, and there is no obligation on either side arising out of it." The fact of our arriving at an agreement, if we should arrive at one, with regard to the one question discussed at Bloemfontein, cannot possibly be held to preclude the discussion of other questions, to the existence of which I repeatedly referred, or to justify a demand for the submission of all of them to Arbitration.

Moreover, Her Majesty's Government, in its latest proposal, clearly indicated that, assuming the matter of political representation to be out of the way, other questions, including Arbitration, would remain to be considered. It may appear to the Government of the South African Republic to be in their interest, though I do not believe it is, to rush through another hastily-framed Franchise Scheme, and claim, on account of its superficial conformity with my Bloemfontein suggestions, that it should be regarded as completely and finally disposing of all the demands of Her Majesty's Government, exclusive of such as may be referred to Arbitration. But I do not think that, if the matter is seriously considered, this claim will be regarded as tenable.

On September the 8th, 1889, Mr. Chamberlain sent a Despatch to Sir Alfred Milner, and referring to Arbitration he said:—

Her Majesty's Government are increasingly impressed with the danger of further delay in relieving the strain which has already caused so much injury to the interests of South Africa, and they earnestly press for an immediate and definite reply to their present proposal.

If it is acceded to, they will be ready to make immediate arrangements for a further Conference between the President of the South African Republic and the High Commissioner to settle all the details of the proposed Tribunal of Arbitration, and the questions referred to in the Note of the 30th August (see No. 43), which are neither Uitlander grievances nor questions of interpretation, but which might be readily settled by friendly communications between the representatives of the two Governments.

If, however, as they most anxiously hope will not be the case, the reply of the South African Republic Government is negative or inconclusive, Her Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the situation *de novo*, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement.

On the 16th September, 1899, the Government of the South African Republic replied to the Despatch of Her Majesty's Government, and in reference to Arbitration declared as follows:—

Inasmuch as the proposal for any further Conference has been made specially dependent on the acceptance of a proposal which this Government



does not feel at liberty to recommend to the Volksraad, it would perhaps be premature to deal with it further at the present time. It merely wishes however to remark that it has not yet been made clear to it which are the definite questions which would be discussed [at] proposed Conference, and which could not be subjected to Arbitration, but it is pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government thinks that they could readily be settled by means of friendly discussions, while it further welcomes with much pleasure prospect disclosed by Her Majesty's Government of the introduction of a Court of Arbitration for the decision of all points of difference and points to be discussed at the Conference, and is ready and willing to co-operate towards the composition of such a Court, and that the more as it is its firm intention to abide entirely by the Convention of London, 1884, as its efforts have been continuously to do.

### REVIEW OF THE CORRESPONDENCE.

This Despatch (as previously stated) completely closed the door against the continuance of any further negotiations on the subject of Arbitration, in consequence of the refusal of the Government of the South African Republic to accept the proposals for the settlement of the Franchise Question, as a condition precedent to the settlement of the other questions in dispute by Arbitration; and under such circumstances, to press Her Majesty's Government to carry out its proposal for a "Court of Arbitration for the decision of all points of difference," when the proposal for the settlement of the Franchise Question had been rejected by the Government at Pretoria, was not only unpractical but absurd; and thereby, the patience and forbearance of Her Majesty's Government were exhausted, and all hope abandoned of arriving at a peaceful settlement.

It would appear, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government were willing to consider and discuss the character and scope of an Arbitration Tribunal, "from which Foreigners and Foreign element were excluded," and suggested that to obtain this end a new Conference should be summoned, by arrangement with the High Commissioner and President Krüger. In the concluding paragraph of his Despatch of August 28th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain declared that there were questions of controversy between the two Governments, exclusive of the Franchise Question, which were not proper subjects for Arbitration. On the contrary, President Krüger pleaded strongly for Arbitration, on *all* questions in controversy with Great Britain, but for an Arbitration which implied the intervention of a Foreign Power between Great Britain and the South

African Republic. Moreover, President Krüger wished to make the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders dependent upon the acceptance of Arbitration on the above-mentioned terms.

On the other hand, Sir Alfred Milner cordially supported Arbitration by a Court established *ad hoc*, exclusive of the Foreign element, for the settlement of many questions in dispute, but on the condition, that the enfranchisement of the Uitlander was first secured. This was in accordance with the firm position taken up by Sir Alfred Milner at the Bloemfontein Conference, when he said :—

“I do not intend to buy the Franchise with any other questions,” though he was equally explicit “that the settlement of the Franchise Question would greatly facilitate an understanding on the other questions in dispute.”

The Government of the South African Republic appeared to have welcomed the proposal, provided that it applied to all questions of dispute, *unlimited Arbitration* to include the Swaziland Protectorate of 1894, the London Convention of 1884, *et omni a ejus generis*; whilst the Government of Great Britain desired Arbitration, *limited* to such questions as the Raid Indemnity, Frontier Disputes, the Dynamite Monopoly, &c., and yet it is said, that Great Britain opposed Arbitration, and made peace impossible by refusing Arbitration.

No! Great Britain agreed to Arbitration, but on certain conditions, subject to specified limitations, and excluding Foreign interference. These limitations excluding the Uitlanders grievances and their treatment by the Transvaal Government, and the questions of Sovereignty, and the interpretation of the Treaties of 1881 and 1884, as in Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch of July 27th, 1899. Great Britain was willing to refer to an impartial Tribunal of Arbitration upon broad questions of policy, but on any other basis she refused Arbitration, as it meant an unconditional surrender.

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE SUZERAINTY\* QUESTION.

This question of Suzerainty was unwisely and dangerously raised, in the first instance, by the Government of the South African Republic, as will be proved presently; unwisely, because it brought into prominence an irreconcilability of views between the two Governments; dangerously, because, being the basis of the relations between Great Britain and the South African Republic, and of the cardinal rights secured by Great Britain under the Treaties of 1881 and 1884, it not only barred the way for harmonious action and for any successful negotiations on the many vexed questions in dispute, but also shattered at one blow the hope and prospect of an enduring peace between Great Britain and the South African Republic.

Lord Kimberley has acknowledged, that he as Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1881, in the Government of Mr. Gladstone, was responsible for the introduction of the word Suzerainty into the Pretoria Convention; and according to his interpretation of the term, it declared "Superiority over a State, possessing independent rights of Government, subject to reservations with reference to certain specified matters," which implied that the Sovereignty of the South African Republic was limited, and by such limitation Great Britain was its Suzerain Power. *non sequitur.*

For a long period of years, even before the Pretoria Convention of 1881, President Krüger's chief aim had been to get rid of the word Suzerainty and its application, and with that object in view he promoted the Delegation to London in 1883, and negotiated with Lord Derby the Convention of 1884. Since then the aim of all his negotiations with Great Britain has been to secure absolute Independence for the South African Republic, based upon the inherent right of the Republic to be an International Sovereign State. President Krüger indeed went further than this, for he organised the diplomatic mission of Dr. Leyds to Europe, in order to intrigue in the Capitals of Foreign Powers against British Supremacy; and, lastly, encouraged and supported by the Orange Free State and by the Afrikander Bond, he has endeavoured to undermine the Paramountcy of Great Britain, and to substitute by this Alliance a Dutch for the British Supremacy in South Africa. *This was the real cause of the war. viz only one Master in S. Africa.*

This vision and ambition of President Krüger has not been

\* SUZERAINTY. (From *Suzerain*, Lord Paramount.) The office or dignity of a Suzerain. Paramount Authority, or Command.—OGILVIE.

realised, "it was too high for him, he could not attain unto it;" and he therefore abandoned his first untenable position for a safer and stronger defence of the rights and privileges secured to the South African Republic under the London Convention of 1884, in declaring that the Suzerainty of Great Britain provided in the Convention of 1881 had been swept away by the latter one, and that by the London Convention of 1884 he would take his last stand.

*So it had.*  
This question of how far the Convention of 1884 affected the Convention of 1881 in reference to the Suzerainty, as to whether its omission in the Convention of 1884 cancelled its existence in 1881, is considered by many persons to be an academic problem too difficult for a layman to solve, and which a jurist only can decide.

It is contended that the substitution of the XX Articles of the 1884 Convention for the XXXIII Articles of the 1881 Convention does not affect the Preamble of the 1881 Convention, and for this reason, that the Preamble gave Self-Government to the Transvaal, and therefore, if the Convention of 1881 was cancelled, then not only was the Suzerainty of Great Britain over the Transvaal was surrendered, but the Independence of the Transvaal also, and in consequence the South African Republic is not a self-governing State.

The omission of the term Suzerainty in the Convention of 1884 is conclusive that its declaration in the Preamble of the Convention of 1881 was untouched; and the strongest proof in support of this position is, that when Lord Derby was asked in 1883 by the Transvaal Delegation to introduce a Clause in the Convention of 1884 to abolish the Suzerainty of Great Britain, he refused. Hence its omission in the Convention of 1884 is no evidence that the Suzerainty in the Convention of 1881 has been abrogated; and the contention of the South African Republic that its omission meant a surrender by Great Britain of her Sovereignty, is by no means proved.

Moreover, the declaration of Lord Derby in 1884 was, that the condition of affairs implied in the term Suzerainty in the Convention of 1881 still remained, and that although the word was not actually employed in the Convention of 1884, the substance remained.

The Preamble of the Convention of 1881 was the Charter of the limited Independence of the South African Republic, and if the Preamble was abrogated, there was no legal or constitutional basis for that Independence.

The London Conference in 1884 was convened at the request of



the Government of the South African Republic to consider *not the abolition of the Suzerainty, but its restriction*, and Clause IV of the Convention of 1884 is the strongest proof of the determination of Lord Derby not to abolish the Suzerainty, for that Clause declared, in substance, the Suzerainty and the recognition of the Supremacy of Great Britain.

By the Despatch of 7th May, 1897, the South African Republic renewed that demand, which was rejected by Lord Derby in 1884, and Her Majesty's Government were compelled to take action and to put its foot down, and, therefore, the South African Republic dropped the controversy, and they did not renew it until 19th August, 1899, when they proposed the 5 years' Franchise Scheme, subject to the surrender by Great Britain of the Suzerainty and the right of intervention.

This view of Her Majesty's Government was in accordance with the policy of the previous Governments of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Rosebery, that the Suzerainty was not abolished in 1884, and that although the *word* Suzerainty was not used in the Convention of 1884, the cardinal and essential *fact* of British supremacy, or as Mr. Chamberlain terms it, "predominance, preponderance, and paramountcy" was recognised and asserted, as this was based upon the position of Great Britain in South Africa, and on the fact that the interests of the British Empire and of South Africa alike required, that Great Britain must remain the Paramount Power.

## HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY.

This question was brought to the front, and became a burning question of controversy, by the introduction into the Volksraad, July 24th, 1896, of the Immigrant Aliens Act, by which the Government of the South African Republic, under the pretence of protecting the State from the rush of destitute or dangerous persons, attempted to expel, or to keep out of its territory, all persons who might be objectionable, from the political point of view, to the Government at Pretoria.

An influential French journal, *Le Temps*, on September 14th, 1899, made a most serious charge against Mr. Chamberlain, that he had endeavoured to embarrass President Krüger by raising the Question of the Suzerainty, and thus precipitating war. The charge is unfounded, as, on the contrary, it was the Government of the South



African Republic that first raised the question, and made a pacific settlement impossible; and in proof of this, it will be necessary to state the genesis of the controversy, with extracts of Despatches in chronological order; nor can the importance of this examination be underrated, considering that this Question of Suzerainty, and the impossibility of arriving at its solution, has been one, if not the main, cause of the rupture between the two Governments, which has led to this deplorable war.

On the 24th July, 1896, a measure called the Alien Immigration Act, was introduced into the Volksraad, which provided that power be given to the President of the South African Republic, acting upon the advice of the Executive, to give any Foreigner whom the Government considered dangerous to peace and order, 14 days' notice to quit the State. On August 22nd, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, telegraphed to Lord Rosmead, Her Majesty's High Commissioner, that the Bill was inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Convention of 1884, and instructed him to inform President Krüger of that fact. No notice was taken of this instruction by the Government at Pretoria, and on October 24th the measure became law, and came into operation on the 1st January, 1897, bearing the signatures of the President (Krüger) and of the Secretary of State (C. Van Boeschoten).

On the 15th December, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed to Lord Rosmead, to inform the Government at Pretoria that Great Britain cannot admit their right to expel aliens and foreigners from their territory, as it openly violated the Convention of 1884, and on the 17th January, 1897, a reply was received from the Government at Pretoria, that they saw no objection to the Bill, that it did not infringe the Convention, and that they intended to enforce it, whereupon Mr. Chamberlain advised that the British Agent at Pretoria (Mr. Conyngham Greene) should watch its effect, and report thereon.

On January 8th, 1897, Dr. Leyds, the Secretary of State, addressed a Despatch to Her Majesty's Government, in which he reiterated the opinion of the Government at Pretoria, that the tendency of the Act was not inconsistent with Article XIV of the Convention, and, further, that they considered it necessary against those persons who do not submit themselves to the Law of the Republic, or who are dangerous to peace and order.

On the same date, another Despatch was addressed by Dr. Leyds in reply to Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch of 15th December,

1896, in which he declared his unwillingness to modify or repeal the said Act, and refused to express any opinion, whether the Government of Pretoria should, or should not, have approached Her Majesty's Government before the introduction, or the passing, of the Law.

On March 6th, 1897, Mr. Chamberlain sent a Despatch to Lord Rosmead, and suggested that the British Agent at Pretoria should confer with the Government and see if a *modus vivendi* could be arrived at.

On the same date, March 6th, Mr. Chamberlain follows up the last Despatch by another, calling attention of the Government of the South African Republic to recent infractions of Article IV of the Convention of 1884, for instance, the Netherlands Treaty, the Portuguese Treaty, the Switzerland Treaty, and affirming that the Aliens Immigration Law and the Press Law infringe Article XIV of the Convention; and adding that Her Majesty's Government considered that the South African Republic had failed to carry out the provisions of the London Convention of 1884.

On May 7th, 1897, a Despatch was received by Her Majesty's Government from Pretoria, signed by the Secretary of State, C. Van Boeschoten, in reply to the British Despatches of March 6th, referred to above.

The South African Republic defended at considerable length the Aliens Immigration Law. It entered upon an elaborate argument, based on the Law of Nations. It quoted Professor Hall on "International Law," and stated that Article XIV applied to all who conform themselves to the laws of the South African Republic, and must take precedence of "rights." That the right of entrance into the South African Republic should not include all "criminals, lepers, &c.," and referred to the action of the United States on alien emigration, and quoted David Dudley Field on "Outlines of International Code," against promiscuous foreigners to right of entrance. As regards the proposal in the Despatch of March 6th of a Conference on the subject, and that the South African Republic should have approached Her Majesty's Government before legislation, the South African Republic quotes Lord Derby "that this country, South African Republic, will be left free to govern the country without intervention." Upon the second letter, March 6th, dealing with the infractions of the London Convention of 1884, the Extradition Treaties with the Netherlands and Portugal, the Convention of Geneva, the Aliens Immigration Law, and the Press

Law, it quotes from Hall "On International Law," "that no Treaty can be taken to restrict by implication the exercise of rights of Sovereignty," and refers, by way of illustration, to the Newfoundland Fishery Question, and in conclusion, it urges Arbitration.

On October 16th, 1897, Mr Chamberlain replied to the last-mentioned Despatch of the South African Republic of May 7th, and expressed his satisfaction by the repeal of the Aliens Immigration Law by the Volksraad; but he refuses to withdraw the claim of Great Britain to be consulted in any legislation that is affected by the London Convention of 1884, and, in an important passage, he deals with the arguments of C. Van Boeschoten, contained in his Despatch, that the Boer policy "is based on the general principles of International Law as applied to ordinary Treaties between Independent Powers," declaring that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the arguments

"do not apply to the case under consideration, which is not that of a Treaty between two States on an equal footing, but a declaration by the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland of the conditions upon which she accorded Self-Government to the South African Republic, subject to her Suzerainty, these conditions having been accepted by the Delegates of the South African Republic, and subsequently ratified by the Volksraad."

The Despatch then replied to the other questions:—The Extradition Treaties with the Netherlands, and with Portugal, the Geneva Convention, also the Aliens Immigration Law, the Press Law, &c., and it then proceeds to reciprocate the desire for the fulfilment of mutual obligations under the London Convention, as one of the best guarantees for a mutual understanding, it concludes on the subject of Suzerainty and Arbitration in the following language:—

By the Pretoria Convention of 1881 Her Majesty, as Sovereign of the Transvaal Territory, accorded to the inhabitants of that territory complete Self-Government subject to the Suzerainty of Her Majesty, Her Heirs, and Successors, upon certain terms and conditions, and subject to certain reservations and limitations set forth in thirty-three articles, and by the London Convention of 1884 Her Majesty, while maintaining the preamble of the earlier instrument, directed and declared that certain other articles embodied therein should be substituted for the articles embodied in the Convention of 1881. The articles of the Convention of 1881 were accepted by the Volksraad of the Transvaal State, and those of the Convention of 1884 by the Volksraad of the South African Republic.

Under these Conventions, therefore, Her Majesty holds towards the South African Republic the relation of a Suzerain who has accorded to the people of that Republic Self-Government upon certain conditions, and it would be

incompatible with that position to submit to Arbitration the construction of the conditions on which she accorded Self-Government to the Republic.

On March 23rd, 1898, Sir Alfred Milner addressed a Despatch to Her Majesty's Government, referring to the repudiation by the South African Republic of the Suzerainty of Great Britain, and to the testimony of D. P. Faure (the interpreter to the Transvaal Deputation of Messrs. Krüger, Joubert, and Pretorius to London in 1883), in support of that contention, to the effect that "it was clearly understood and agreed by both contracting parties, that Her Majesty's Suzerainty should be abolished, except to the extent defined in Article IV of the Convention of London." Sir Alfred Milner's Despatch was a travesty of this contention of D. P. Faure, and asserts that it does not bear out his conclusions.

Sir Robert Herbert, however, who in 1883 was Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, supported the view of Sir Alfred Milner, and considered that the statement of Mr. Faure is opposed to the attitude and action of Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for the Colonies at that time, and in reference thereto he has said:—

My recollection of the transactions to which Mr. Faure refers, and more particularly of the conditions under which the Earl of Derby and Her Majesty's Government advised the Queen to modify the Convention of Pretoria, is in some material respects not in accordance with that of Mr. Faure. In his third paragraph Mr. Faure says:—"The object of the Deputation was, as is well known, to secure the removal of certain grievances. One of these grievances was the Suzerainty." Now it is beyond question that, when the Transvaal Government in 1883 requested a reconsideration of the Convention of Pretoria, it did not venture to propose the abolition of the Queen's Suzerainty, nor would Her Majesty's Government have been prepared to receive a Deputation for the discussion of that matter. What the Transvaal Government represented was that "the revision of the Convention was urgent, specially with regard to Western Frontier affairs." When, however, they had arrived in London in November, 1883, the Transvaal Delegates, in their letter to Lord Derby of November 14, 1883, after suggesting that there were objections "to the extent of the Suzerain rights reserved to Her Majesty by Articles II and XVIII" of the Convention of Pretoria, for the first time requested "that the relation of a dependency, *publici juris*, in which our country now stands to the British Crown may be replaced by that of two contracting Powers." Mr. Faure says that "Lord Derby and Sir Hercules Robinson treated this question of the Suzerainty throughout as a small matter." He first quotes his recollection of conversations with Sir Hercules Robinson on this subject. I do not question the general accuracy of Mr. Faure's recollection of those conversations. Sir Hercules Robinson's own personal view was, indeed, that the



determination of Great Britain to be the Paramount Power in South Africa was so strong and so manifest that the Suzerainty was not needed to prevent the Transvaal from applying for or accepting the intervention or protection of any Foreign State, while as regards the ordinary internal affairs of the Transvaal it would be better not to retain the semblance of a disposition to interfere. But this was not the view of Lord Derby and Her Majesty's Government. *X.* Lord Derby was aware that the formal withdrawal of the Queen's Suzerainty would be liable to be interpreted as the surrender of the claim of this country to control the Foreign relations of the Transvaal; and accordingly, in his Letter to the Delegates dated November 29, 1883, he informed them that a Draft Treaty which they had submitted for adoption as between two equal contracting Powers was "neither in form nor in substance such as Her Majesty's Government could adopt." I am therefore constrained to believe that Mr. Faure's recollection of what he supposes Lord Derby to have stated to the Conference at one of its meetings is based upon some misunderstanding of his Lordship's words. And, indeed, it would not be in accordance with official usage for a Minister to assign, as a reason for not taking so important a step as the specific revocation of the Queen's Suzerainty, the anticipation of opposition in Parliament.

Then follows the famous Despatch from Dr. Leyds, Secretary of Foreign Affairs at Pretoria, dated 16th April, 1898, the object of which was to obtain the abolition of the Suzerainty, and to assert that the Transvaal Deputation in 1883, by the Convention of 1884 secured its abolition; in proof of which it refers to the Statements of the Delegation on their return to Pretoria, and to the ratification of the Treaty by the Volksraad on the assurance that the Suzerainty was abolished.

According to Dr. Leyds, the conditions contained in the Convention of 1881 under the head of Suzerainty were:—(1) The incompetence of the Transvaal to negotiate directly with Foreign Powers; (2) The control by the British Residents of external and of certain internal affairs; (3) The right of conducting British troops through the Transvaal territory was cancelled by the Convention of 1884, and that the only right reserved for Great Britain by the latter was the vetoing, within 6 months ratification, of any Treaty with any Foreign Power.

Dr. Leyds is here in error, for he studiously omits other rights secured to Great Britain by the Treaty, viz., the suppression of Slavery, the granting of Religious Liberty, Free Trade for British Imports, Liberty of Residence, Possession of Land, and Equality of Taxation, by Clause VII, both secured to the subjects of Great Britain and to the subjects of every Foreign Power by the Treaty of 1884.

*X.  
If Derby  
was so well  
aware of all  
this why did  
he not see  
that the  
Suzerainty  
was retained  
in the Convention  
of 1884?*



He also claims that the question of the right interpretation of the Convention should be referred to Arbitration, and thus concludes :—

The Government have already in the respective portion of this Despatch set forth their reasons for their contention that Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies is not justified in his contention regarding the existence of a Suzerainty.

If such Suzerainty, as this Government maintains, does not exist, Her Britannic Majesty's Government is not justified in their refusal to submit questions of difference to Arbitration on the ground that such would not be compatible with a Suzerainty. But, in the opinion of this Government, it is also clear that even if the Suzerainty established by the Convention of 1881 existed, the South African Republic would be just as justified as they are now in appealing to Arbitration as the Tribunal under International Law peculiarly adapted for the decision of a difference relating to the meaning and the extent of the rights and the obligations of the South African Republic towards the British Government. . . . A right to constitute itself the sole judge of a document between two parties, and affecting two parties, to which it is one of the parties, has not been reserved to the British Government, either in the Pretoria Convention of 1881, or in that of London of 1884. The British Government can therefore have no such power even under Suzerainty.

This Despatch of Dr. Leyds was a strong protest against the claim of Great Britain for Sovereignty over the South African Republic, a protest based upon the negotiations in London in 1883, and on the result of those negotiations, i.e., the Convention of London of 1884. Had the Government of the South African Republic succeeded in inducing Great Britain to renounce her Sovereignty, she would have entered into the full possession of the Sovereign rights of an International State, and in virtue of that Sovereignty the next step she would have taken, would have been to compel Great Britain to submit all controversies in regard to the interpretation or execution of the Treaties of 1881 and 1884 to the Arbitral decision of some Foreign Power, or Powers.

On the 15th December, 1898, Mr. Chamberlain replied to this Despatch of Dr. Leyds, asserting that Her Majesty's Government could admit his conclusions, or that the Preamble of the Treaty of 1881 was cancelled by the 1884 Convention, and on this subject he wrote as follows :—

The Articles of the Convention of 1884 substituted a fresh definition for the former one. The Preamble of the Convention of 1881, the basis on which these definitions rested, remained unchanged. If that Preamble had been repealed, not only would the reservation of Suzerainty on the part of Her

*See title  
Kewicapi  
and a full  
and complete*

Majesty have been repealed, but also the grant of Internal Independence to the inhabitants of the South African Republic. Her Majesty's Government observe that Dr. Leyds asserts that that Internal Independence in no sense derived its real origin from the Preamble of the Convention of 1881. In this, however, he is in error. The grant of Internal Independence and the reservation of Suzerainty alike have their sole constitutional origin in that Preamble. Her Majesty's Government have taken note of the assurance, once more repeated at the commencement of Dr. Leyd's Note, that the Government of the South African Republic are prepared in every respect to abide by the stipulations of the Convention of 1884. These stipulations undoubtedly include "reservations with reference to certain specified matters." There is thus no controversy as to the essential point in the relations between the two Governments, which gives to Great Britain a "position of superiority;" and, having regard to this position and to their determination not to permit the interference of any Foreign Power between Great Britain and the South African Republic, Her Majesty's Government are unable to alter their decision not to submit to the Arbitration of a Foreign Power questions relating to the interpretation or infringement of the Conventions between them.

On May 9th, 1899, Mr. Reitz, who had succeeded Dr. Leyds as Secretary of State, replied to Mr. Chamberlain's Despatch of 15th December, in which he supported the view of his predecessor. He said:—

If this Government rightly understands the reasoning followed in paragraph 5 of the Despatch from Mr. Chamberlain, then they would be in a position to agree with it. By similar reasoning, says Mr. Chamberlain, it would have to be accepted that not only the Suzerainty but also the right of Self-Government was abolished. That is perfectly true, in so far that the right of Self-Government was abolished, such as it was defined in 1881, but only in order to make way instantaneously for a much wider absolute right to Self-Government, in which there was no more mention of Suzerainty. Inasmuch as the Convention of 1881 was entirely abrogated and superseded by that of 1884, in which alone certain limited and specified rights were guaranteed to Great Britain without there being further mention of any Self-Government belonging to this Republic, it follows of itself that the now existing right of absolute Self-Government of this Republic is not derived from either the Convention of 1881 or that of 1884, but simply and solely follows from the inherent right of this Republic as a Sovereign International State.

This reply of Mr. Reitz introduced a new and serious element into the controversy, for it put forth, for the first time, a dangerous proposition, viz.: the inherent right of the South African Republic to be a *Sovereign International State*, an untenable position which presaged an acute conflict with Great Britain, and was one, if not the most active, cause of the break-down of all the subsequent negotiations, and of the eventual rupture between the two Governments.

The following extract of the Despatch of Sir Alfred Milner of the 14th June, 1899, confirms this view :

Mr. Reitz's contention is that the Convention of 1881 is completely gone, and that on its disappearance the Transvaal emerged as a Sovereign International State, not, however, by virtue of the New Convention, which, according to him, absolutely abrogated that of 1881, but by its inherent right to be something which as a matter of fact it had ceased to be seven years previously. The way in which the State Secretary juggles with the Convention of 1884 is rather irritating to a plain man. But the importance of the matter does not consist in his arguments. It consists in the assertion that the South African Republic is a "Sovereign International State." This appears to be contradictory of the position consistently maintained by us, and in fact in the nature of a defiance of Her Majesty's Government.

On July 13th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain replied on this question to Sir Alfred Milner, as follows:—

Her Majesty's Government concur generally in the views expressed in your Despatch, and have no intention of continuing to discuss this question with the Government of the Republic, whose contention that the South African Republic is a Sovereign International State is not, in their opinion, warranted either by law or history, and is wholly inadmissible. They therefore confine themselves to a very brief review of historical facts and of the opinions and intentions of their predecessors, on whose advice Her Majesty was pleased to grant, first, the Pretoria Convention, and later the London Convention, as shown in their official statements at the time. The *status* of the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal was governed from 1852 to 1877 by the Sand River Convention, prior to which they were British subjects. Lord Derby stated in his Letter to the Transvaal Deputation of November 20, 1883, that "that Convention, like the Convention of Pretoria, was not a Treaty between two contracting Powers but was a Declaration, made by the Queen, and accepted by certain persons, at that time her subjects, of the conditions under which, and the extent to which, Her Majesty could permit them to manage their own affairs without interference. It did not create a South African Republic with a political organisation and defined boundaries." If, therefore, it could be held, as suggested by the Deputation in 1883, that the Sand River Convention still had binding force, it would not in any help the argument of the Government of the South African Republic.

But, as Lord Derby pointed out in the Letter already quoted, it was "not possible to entertain the suggestion that the Convention has now any vitality" and the Transvaal Volksraad themselves, in confirming the Convention of Pretoria, had declared the annexation in 1877 had brought the Sand River Convention to an end. With regard to the Convention of 1881, Lord Kimberley, in giving instructions to Sir Hercules Robinson, with regard to the Royal Commission which was to consider and advise upon the final agreements for the settlement of the affairs of the Transvaal, stated that "entire freedom of action will be accorded to the Transvaal Government so far as is not inconsistent with

the rights expressly reserved to the Suzerain Power. The term Suzerainty has been chosen as most conveniently describing superiority over a State possessing independent rights of government subject to reservations with reference to certain specified matters." When the Transvaal Deputation visited this country in 1883 they asked "that the relation of a dependency, *publici juris*, in which our country now stands to the British Crown, may be replaced by that of two contracting Powers," and they submitted a Draft Treaty to give effect to their views. This Draft Treaty Lord Derby entirely rejected, observing that it was "neither in form nor in substance such as Her Majesty's Government could adopt." Lastly as the Government of the Republic appeal to Lord Derby's personal views, they may be referred to a statement made by him in the House of Lords on the 17th of March, 1884—that is immediately after the conclusion of the London Convention, which is reported in "Hansard" as follows:—"Then the noble Earl (Earl Cadogan) said that the object of the Convention had been to abolish the Suzerainty of the British Crown. The word 'Suzerainty' is a very vague word, and I do not think it is capable of any precise legal definition. Whatever we may understand by it, I think it is not very easy to define. But I apprehend, whether you call it a Protectorate, or a Suzerainty, or the recognition of England as a Paramount Power, the fact is that a certain controlling power is retained when the State which exercises this Suzerainty has a right to veto any negotiations into which the dependent State may enter with Foreign Powers. Whatever Suzerainty meant in the Convention of Pretoria, the conditions of things which it implied still remains; although the word is not actually employed, we have kept the substance. We have abstained from using the word because it was not capable of legal definition, and because it seemed to be a word which was likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding."

The question of Arbitration must be dealt with in connection with the general questions now pending between the two Governments.

It must be observed, that this question of Sovereignty, *i.e.*, of the rights of Great Britain, under the Convention of 1884, to exercise Sovereignty over the South African Republic, first became a controversial question in 1897, in consequence of the two Despatches of the Secretary of State, C. Van Boeschoten, dated respectively 8th April and 7th May, 1897. The former Despatch begins by stating:

There appears to be a difference of opinion between Her Majesty's Government and this Government with regard to the "natural," as so described in the Despatch, interpretation of Article IV of the Convention,

The latter Despatch set forth this "difference of opinion" with considerable force, referring to the execution of Clauses IV and XIV of the Convention of 1884, and in justification of the position taken up by the South African Republic, the Secretary of State gives a quotation from an authority on International Law as follows:—



Thus, for example, no Treaty can be taken to restrict by implication the exercise of rights of Sovereignty, or property, or self-preservation.

His successor in that office, Dr. Leyds, in his Despatch dated 18th April, 1898, renewed the controversy, and even went further than his predecessor, for he challenged British supremacy in South Africa, and claimed for the South African Republic the right and position of a Sovereign International State.

Mr. Chamberlain, in the position he occupied as Secretary of the State for the Colonies, was compelled to take notice of this assumption, and in his replies to take a firm stand, and repudiated such an unwarrantable claim, by proving incontestably the baselessness of the claim, and the unassailable right of Great Britain, by the Treaties of 1881 and 1884, to intervene on behalf of the aliens of British extraction in the Transvaal, in virtue of Treaty obligations, and of her undoubted Sovereignty secured by the Conventions.

During the deliberations at the Bloemfontein Conference in June, 1899, the question of the Suzerainty was not brought forward, in fact it was not even mentioned; and this is somewhat remarkable, when it is remembered, that this question was the chief burden of the many Despatches between the two Governments preceding and up to the assembling of the Conference, and that President Krüger was repeatedly invited by Sir Alfred Milner to place before the Conference all, and every question in dispute, or which the Government at Pretoria considered necessary for discussion and solution. Therefore, his silence upon this burning question of the Suzerainty was more than significant, it was a tacit admission that the Government of the South African Republic had abandoned it.

Lord Selborne, recently declared in the House of Lords, that Her Majesty's Government never raised the question of the Suzerainty during the Bloemfontein Conference, nor subsequently in the discussion of the Franchise Question, and that it was President Krüger who dragged the subject into the August 19th Despatch. In fact, the discussion on the subject of the Suzerainty was closed long before the Bloemfontein Conference, and was considered to have been settled as by the Despatch of 13th July, 1899, in which Her Majesty's Government declared, "That they had no intention of continuing to discuss this question with the Government of the Republic."

Her Majesty's Government determined to convince the South African Republic that this Suzerainty of Great Britain over the



South African Republic, as it had been declared in Despatches and by declarations in Parliament, had a real and effective existence, and of their conviction that at all costs it must be maintained.

The Government of the South African Republic, on the contrary, denied its existence, and contended that it was abolished by the Convention of 1884, and it was therefore, more necessary for Her Majesty's Government to press its view of the question home to President Krüger and the Executive at Pretoria.

On August 19th the Government at Pretoria offered the 5 years' retrospective Franchise, provided Great Britain renounced her Suzerainty, and acknowledged the South African Republic as a Sovereign International State, as though Great Britain was prepared to barter away her Imperial rights as the Paramount Power in South Africa, in exchange for political rights promised and guaranteed by Treaties, and by oft-repeated declarations by the Government at Pretoria, on behalf of the subjects of Great Britain and of the subjects of many of the great civilised Powers of the world.

This bold pretension, that the claims of Great Britain for the political rights of her subjects in the Transvaal should be conceded as a *quid pro quo*, for a declaration of Transvaal Independence, was an unjustifiable demand, for it bid defiance to the supremacy of Great Britain, not only over the South African Republic, but also over the whole of South Africa, and one which no Government, responsible for the security and development of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain, could entertain.

In reply to the Despatch of the South African Republic of August 19th, Mr. Chamberlain politely refused to discuss the question, as in his Despatch of July 27th, he had absolutely repudiated the claims of the Republic to be considered a Sovereign International State, on the ground that the Paramount position of the British Empire is not only the key-stone of her policy, but the guarantee of peace in South Africa, the influence upon which Great Britain relies to weld the two races into a united people, and that to renounce it, would be to fail in an Imperial duty that Great Britain owes to her Colonists, as well as to the Empire. It was impossible to concede this request, and the demand was preposterous, and ought never to have been made. As was to be expected, the proposal was like "a bolt from the blue"; it sent a thrill of great astonishment, nay, it gave a shock to the body politic throughout the Empire, and beyond the bounds of the British Empire, and which

no Parliament, or Minister, or Government could hesitate to give thereto a firm and determined refusal.

On 5th September, 1899, a debate took place in the Volksraad, on the Motion of Mr. Coester, on the subject of the concentration of British troops on the frontiers, and in the course of his speech he boldly declared, with the approval of the Volksraad, that the South African Republic would *never accept the supremacy of Great Britain*, and based this declaration upon the Convention of 1884, which, he said, declared its Independence.

Such an assumption, supported as it was by the majority of the Volksraad, revealed the actual position of affairs, and the obstinate determination, at all hazards, to shake the stability of the Republic, and to plunge South Africa into the throes of an armed conflict, that must inevitably result in the Transvaal's effacement as an Independent and Autonomous State.

The Government of the South African Republic raised a wide issue, in challenging British supremacy in South Africa and one that admitted of no compromise, since the foundation of British policy rests on its undisputed Paramountcy in South Africa, and to acknowledge the South African Republic as a Sovereign International State, an *Imperium in Imperio*, would be an abdication of the position of Great Britain, and fraught with great peril to the Empire at large.

Herein were the germs of a foregone determination for a declaration of war against the Suzerain Power, for as it was in the nature of a defiance to the supremacy of Great Britain, as it was vital to her national existence as a great Colonial Power, and vital to her Colonies in South Africa, she was bound to repudiate it. This was not a supremacy which claimed the lordship of one nation over all nations, whether of Dutch, or German, or French descent, but a supremacy of all combined, of whatever nationality, for the assertion and the security of the great principles of political, civil, and religious freedom, of equality before the law, of Fraternity, Equality, and Liberty for all men. To deny this inheritance of freedom to the sons of Great Britain, or to the sons of any nation in the world, was, *ipso facto*, a negation of the principles and practice of freedom, and a negation of the acknowledged and hitherto undisputed supremacy of Great Britain, as the predominant or Paramount Power on the South African Continent.

The Government of the South African Republic has openly and defiantly repudiated this Equality before the Law for every man,

woman, and child who has made, or who may hereafter make that country their home, under the protection of the flag of Great Britain, because it was firmly resolved that the Boers of the Transvaal, allied with the Boers of the Orange Free State and the Afrikander Bond of Cape Colony should be the dominant race, an oligarchy of political and military supremacy over the men of every other nationality, a result which would be fatal to the great principles and inheritance of universal Equality, and fatal, too, to the peace, progress and prosperity of the whole of the South African Commonwealth.



# DECLARATIONS OF EMINENT PUBLIC MEN

FROM OCTOBER 11TH TO DECEMBER 1ST, 1899,

ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR IN  
SOUTH AFRICA.

---

THE MOST NOBLE  
THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, K.G.,  
PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

.. What was the cause of the war and of the Ultimatum? It was not caused by any demand that we made. It so happened that at the moment the Ultimatum was issued we had withdrawn our demands, and there was none before the Transvaal Government. It was because we had taken measures to increase the amount of our forces in that part of Her Majesty's dominions. But if that had been done a month or two months sooner exactly the same result would have taken place. The moment that you showed signs of raising your forces in that part of Her Majesty's dominions to an equality with the forces opposed to them the Ultimatum would have been issued, and the war would have been begun. It is idle, therefore, to say that from that cause or from any delay there was a want in the requisite military preparations. The evil dates further back. It dates from those unfortunate arrangements of 1881 and 1884. Under those arrangements, by which we deliberately permitted a community that was obviously hostile to enjoy an unbounded and unlimited right of accumulating the munitions of war to be used against ourselves, year after year that accumulation of munitions of war was made.

\*

\*

\*

\*

"I would go further, and say that England as a whole would have no advantage from the possession of gold mines, except so far as her Government conferred the blessings of good government

upon those who had the prosecution of that industry. Every industry that is prosecuted successfully breeds commerce. All commerce that is produced is to the advantage of England, and all industries and all commerce flourish better under that good government which she furnishes than under any regimen in the world. But that is the limit of our interest. We seek no gold fields. We seek no territory. What we desire is equal rights for all men of all races and security for our fellow-subjects and for the Empire. I will not ask by what means those results are to be obtained. The hour for asking that has not yet come. But those are the objects, those are the only objects, that we seek, and we do not allow any other considerations to cross our path.

\*

\*

\*

\*

Whenever we are victorious we shall consult the vast interests which are committed to our care. We shall consult the vast duties which it lies upon us to perform, and, taking counsel of the uniform traditions of our Colonial Government, and of the moderation and equal justice to all races of men which it has been our uniform practice to observe. I have no doubt that we shall so arrange that the issue of this conflict will confer good government upon the area where it rages, and will give a security that is sorely needed for the future from the recurrence of such dangers, from the necessity of any such exertions, and the restoration of peace and civilisation to that portion of the world."

HIS GRACE  
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G.,  
LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

(October 8, 1899.)

"The obstacle which seems to stand in the way of a peaceful settlement of our difficulties with the South African Republic appears to be in the rooted conviction they have, that in the demands which we have made, we cherish some designs hostile to their independence and self-government. That any such apprehensions on their part are absolutely unfounded has been asserted as strongly as it can be asserted, both officially in our despatches, and unofficially by members of the Government, and nothing which I can say can add to the force of those assertions. President Krüger and his Government are entitled, if they think fit, to disbelieve those assertions—though I do not believe that a single soul

*forwards  
the great  
wanting  
who as  
of C  
not  
for  
no  
we  
se*  
*Lawrence's 'The Transvaal and the Boers'*



in this country disbelieves those assertions—they are entitled, if they think fit, to refuse to believe in our sincerity, and to take those measures which they may think necessary for the protection of their own interests. The susceptibility of their leaders, their unfounded suspicions, cannot relieve us from the duty of taking those measures which we feel bound to take for the protection of our fellow-subjects and in the interests of peace, order, and good government.

\*

\*

\*

\*

“I can only trust—although at this time there is nothing which leads us to take a very hopeful or very sanguine view—that wiser and more moderate counsels may prevail in the Transvaal Republic, and that some means may be found by their friends in this country, or elsewhere, to disabuse them of the idea, absolutely without foundation, that we nourish any designs intended to interfere with their independence or self-government, or that we require anything for our people but the barest rights and barest measure of justice. If they should so frame their policy, there is no need that the existence of their State should be a continual source of anxiety and trouble in that portion of Africa.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
THE EARL OF SELBORNE,

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

“Now, I would only go back very briefly to the Convention of 1881, under which internal independence was restored to the Transvaal. Whatever your opinion now may be of that policy, or whatever your opinion may have been at that time, there is no doubt that it was an action of extraordinary generosity; and how has that been met? It is simply the fact that that Convention, and the Convention which followed it, have been broken over and over again in the spirit, and, whenever a safe opportunity has occurred, broken also in the letter. The independence that we gave to the Dutchmen of the Transvaal was based on the hope, on the policy, on the intense desire, that all differences of the past would be buried between the Dutch and the English peoples, and that relations in the future would be relations of warm friendship and mutual trust. But it is simply a fact that as that State has grown more powerful, as it has emerged from its condition in which we gave it back its independence, the prevailing aim of the statesmen who have

guided its destinies has been to intrigue against the paramountcy of the British in South Africa. The whole of its influence in the world at large has been used constantly, on every opportunity, against our interests, and it is no fault of the statesmen of the Transvaal that they have not succeeded before now in embroiling us with some European Power."

### HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

"He believed the great majority of our countrymen recognised the great efforts of the Cabinet to preserve peace in South Africa, but the treatment of English colonists by the Boer Government was more than could be tolerated. The British Government had a right to intervene. We had never yielded our paramount power in South Africa, and never would. President Krüger greatly mistook the character of this country if he thought we would give up all right to interfere in future, in return for the concession of a five years' franchise. President Krüger knew that if he could get such a promise he could give a five years' franchise and still have a majority, and so continue the abuses, while Great Britain would have bartered away her right to future interference.

\* \* \* \*

"Throughout the negotiations the country had had perfect confidence in Lord Salisbury's Cabinet, knowing full well that the Ministers who composed it were determined not to consent to a conflict of arms unless they felt fully assured that they had exhausted all diplomatic methods by which they could gain for our countrymen in South Africa their political rights and liberties. By the 1884 Convention President Krüger was already morally bound to treat the Uitlanders equitably, but now he endeavoured to persuade the British Government to purchase this equal treatment by a promise never to interfere in the affairs of the Transvaal again. In other words, we were to barter our right to protect our own citizens in order to gain some temporary relief for the Uitlanders, which we should have small guarantee would be carried into effect."

### THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

"The Boers at that time—perhaps we did not manage them properly—certainly set their faces against us, and things have gone

on from bad to worse until the aspiration now moving them is that they should rule, not only the Transvaal, but that they should rule the whole of South Africa; that is a point which, I think, the English people must keep before them. There is no question about ruling the Transvaal or the Orange Free State; the one great question that has to be fought out between the Dutch in South Africa and the English race is which is to be the predominant Power—whether it is to be the Boer Republic or the English Monarchy. Well, if I at all understand and know the people of this nation I can see but one end to it, and it will be the end that we hope for and have looked for.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
LORD KIMBERLEY, K.G.,  
EX-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

“He thought the state of affairs in the Transvaal was intolerable. The Government was exceedingly bad. Look at the tone and spirit of the Ultimatum of the Transvaal Government. Look at the preparations they had been making for the war. If we had been in difficulty in Europe or in Asia, with great calls upon our resources, did anybody suppose that the Transvaal and Orange Free State would have been friendly or even neutral neighbours to us in South Africa? The position was a precarious one in South Africa because these people were bad neighbours to us, and were armed. There were two remedies possible. One was that the Uitlanders should have been given Home Rule, control of their own police, education, and municipal matters. Sir Alfred Milner proposed that as an alternative, but President Krüger refused to hear of that remedy, or to discuss it at all. There was one other alternative, and that was the admission of a considerable number of the Uitlanders to the Franchise. That, too, was an unsuccessful alternative.

\*

\*

\*

\*

“Those were the great causes which had been at work, and if they wanted to find the real cause of the war, it was in that way they must view this question. The issues about the Franchise and about a joint inquiry were only apparent issues. The Transvaal had been a great military Power not well disposed towards us. There had been a race struggle in South Africa in which we

*The Earl of Rosebery's Ultimatum R*

secured fair play for the Dutch at the Cape, and we expected to secure fair play for the British at the Transvaal.

\* \* \* \*

“Every independent Power, like ourselves, had a right to see that justice was done to their subjects wherever they were, and we had that duty imposed upon us in South Africa. The members of the Liberal Party should do their very utmost to see that their countrymen enjoyed equal rights. Equal justice to all men had ever been the watchword of the Liberal Party, and he maintained that they were fully justified in making demands on the Transvaal Republic to secure justice and equal rights to our fellow countrymen.”

THE MOST NOBLE  
THE MARQUIS OF RIPON, K.G.,  
EX-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

“As an old Colonial Secretary, he felt constrained to express his high appreciation of the spirit the Colonies, and especially the self-governing Colonies, had shown of attachment to the mother country and their desire to help in the present crisis. And the Government was entitled to every support. Speaking broadly, there had been no hesitation in any quarter in this country as to the necessity of repelling the invasion of Natal, and the impossibility of submitting to the Ultimatum of the South African Republic.

\* \* \* \*

“The honour of the Empire was concerned in the maintenance of self-government in South Africa, and they were bound to reject from any other quarter, however influential or wealthy, any proposition to withdraw from that policy.”

HIS GRACE  
THE DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.G.,  
EX-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

“What the Boers have insisted upon is a tyrannical power over others, and I suspect it was a Government as jobbing as it was tyrannical.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
LORD TWEEDMOUTH,  
EX-LORD PRIVY SEAL.

“There were, after all, serious complaints against Mr. Krüger and his Government. For his part he would wipe away all details of which so much was heard—questions of Suzerainty, Franchise, and so forth. He would put our position rather on the ground that we were from the natural situation of affairs in South Africa the predominant Power in that country; that, rightly or wrongly, in 1878 we annexed that country; that, rightly or wrongly, in 1881 we restored to the Transvaal Republic their independence, but we restored that independence on conditions which, briefly summed up, were—first, that Great Britain should have a veto on any transactions between the Boer Republic and any foreign nation; secondly, that within the Boer Republic white men of all nations should have that same favoured treatment that the Boers themselves receive in our South African Colonies; and, thirdly, that, at any rate, some measure of fair treatment should be extended to the native subjects of Africa within the country.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
VISCOUNT CROSS,  
EX-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

“In 1881, annexation was given up and the Transvaal was rendered a quasi-independent State; but as to what took place in 1881 he had not the smallest hesitation in saying that the conduct of the Government of that day had brought upon us evils which they at that time never could possibly have contemplated.

\* \* \* \*

“The result of the policy of 1881 was that the Boers had an exalted notion of their own power, and no notion at all of the power of Britain. I hope sincerely that, before this war is over, they may change their opinion on those two subjects. Mr. Krüger never meant to perform his part of the promises he made under the Conventions of 1881 and 1884. He took the Convention of 1884 as a stepping-stone to something else. What he thought was that, under his presidency, the Transvaal would become an independent Sovereign State. That is exactly what he will never get. Equal rights, equal representation were promises made by President



Krüger, but it never entered into Mr. Krüger's mind to fulfil them. The British Government actually guaranteed the independence of the Transvaal against foes within and foes without; but they wanted British subjects to possess the liberties to which they were entitled under the Convention, and those liberties they should have. The Uitlanders had had no representation, but a great deal of taxation, though our English view was 'representation and taxation go together.' From the beginning to the end the Government were absolutely and unanimously determined that, if it were possible, they would live peaceably with all men."

THE RIGHT REVEREND  
THE LORD BISHOP OF LICHFIELD, D.D.

"Her Majesty's Government believe the war to be necessary in the cause of justice and equity, and the Nation believes it. Nations, like persons, are strengthened by discipline. Our hope and prayer will be that the conflict may not be prolonged, and that when it is over we may be able to insist on terms of peace which shall assure to our own people and to the native races of South Africa the freedom and the rights which are due to all God's children. Our claim to paramountcy must rest on the belief that God, who has laid on us the responsibility of so vast an Empire, and to whom we must give account for our National Policy, has also bestowed on us gifts of Government equal to our task, and it must be maintained by the conscious justice of our rule."

THE RIGHT REVEREND  
THE LORD BISHOP OF ST. ALBAN'S, D.D.

"One subject is prominent in our thoughts at this time—the war in South Africa. It is a war which, in my opinion, has been forced upon us; we would gladly have remained at peace. We trust, we pray that its issues may be such that justice for all—for the Native races as well as for the white men—may be established in a way which it has not yet been established in the Transvaal, and that a righteous peace may soon be an established fact."

THE RIGHT REVEREND  
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER, D.D.

"But a corrupt and tyrannous oligarchy, that had for long been secretly preparing for war with money wrung from the

Utlanders, can no longer be permitted to treat our fellow-countrymen with cruel injustice, in spite of all that patient diplomacy in the present could achieve or former Treaties could secure; and, in the sacred names of justice, liberty, and humanity England had been compelled, though with much reluctance, to submit the questions in dispute to the stern Arbitrament of war. Beside us fought men of our race and blood from the other Englands beyond the seas, and ties would be cemented now between us and those who worked and bled with us which nothing would hereafter break. The English-speaking race was to-day being welded into an indissoluble whole. And, at whatever cost in blood and treasure, England would now see that justice was done."

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M.P.,  
H.M. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

"During the negotiations I was one of those who hoped, almost, I think, even to the end, for peace. But now, after that insolent Ultimatum, every line of which breathes the most arrogant pride, after the attack upon Natal, evidently planned and devised for months, and probably years beforehand, the annexation of British territory, and the terms in which that annexation has been announced, the incitements to rebellion, which immediately after, and even for some weeks before, the declaration of war, were scattered broadcast among our colonists in Natal and Cape Colony—when I think of all these things, when I remember what has been the result of the secret conferences between President Steyn and President Krüger, and how the former, who had no cause of quarrel against us—no more than we had any cause of quarrel against him—when I see how he has been drawn from the very first into the conflict, then I confess I do not doubt that war was always inevitable—although it is possible President Krüger might himself have been glad enough to postpone it to what would have been for him a more favourable time, when we should have been engaged in some serious complication with another Power. If we are to blame, the whole Opposition shares it with us. They had all the opinion—the public opinion—bearing upon this point that we had, and so had the Nation, and neither the Opposition nor the Nation, nor, as far as I know, any responsible person in the Cape Colony or in Natal itself, had any idea that the Boers would not.

only resist our demands, but would take the matter into their own hands, and would send a defiant Ultimatum to the Queen of the United Kingdom, and challenge us to battle before the negotiations had come to a conclusion.

\* \* \* \*

“The Boers, by their own acts and not by ours, have created an entirely new situation. They, and not we, have brought us out of the region of conferences and compromises. They have made for us a clean sheet, upon which we can write what we please. They have torn up the Conventions to which they owed their independence, they have scattered them to the winds. We look back upon the past 18 years—those troubled years in which we have always been on the verge of a crisis—we see what terrible sacrifices we have to bear now that the crisis has actually come. We see that the favoured position which they owe to our grace has been made, and has proved capable of becoming a serious danger to the Empire and to our position in South Africa, and has been made a means of oppressing our fellow subjects; and a Government which, in view of this experience, ignored these facts, and placed it once more in the power of the two Republics, who have so abused their opportunities, to renew their intrigues against the paramount Power, to threaten again the peace of South Africa, to continue the attempt to place one white race in subjection under the heels of the other—any Government which did this would betray the interests of the Empire, and would deserve the condemnation of every right-thinking man.

\* \* \* \*

“But the condition of things had become intolerable when the Conference at Bloemfontein was held. Then we made propositions, moderate, as I have told you, and from that moment the issues of peace and war were in the hands of President Krüger, and President Krüger alone. The proposals we made were a test of the spirit in which he was prepared to meet his engagements. If he had been ready to recognise, however inadequately, his promises for equal rights and privileges to the two white races in the Transvaal, he might have had peace on easy terms. Nothing would have been done to lessen his just authority, and nothing was proposed which could, by any possibility, threaten the independence of his country. But to do

this, to make some advance towards just and honest government, that was precisely what he was determined not to do. Independence to him meant liberty to govern others ill, and, accordingly, although he was ready to offer illusory reforms, in which he took back with one hand what he gave with the other."

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
ARTHUR J. BALFOUR, M.P.,  
FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY.

"It would have been in the power of the South African Republic at any moment, up to that fatal Wednesday when they declared war—it would have been in their power undoubtedly to checkmate English diplomacy, if English diplomacy had for its object to provoke a war, by any measure which gave immediate and substantial representation to the Uitlanders; and they could at the same time have claimed, if they had liked, that we should guarantee their independence. I say that, because it will be in your recollection that we offered to guarantee their independence in, I think it was, the year 1896 or 1897, and the offer made was scornfully rejected. Now, it is folly to say that people who could have avoided war by this simple procedure were driven into war itself by the wiles of unscrupulous diplomatists, or by the follies of foolish diplomatists. They had their fate in their own hands. They could have chosen peace and permanent independence had they preferred to do so, but they elected for the opposite policy. They plunged themselves and their neighbours of the Orange Free State and us into a war of which the end is not yet, and which, whatever blessings it may ultimately produce for South Africa, will certainly not tend to carry out the policy which these Transvaal Statesmen most desire to see carried out.

\*

\*

\*

\*

"The declaration of war by the Transvaal Government and the Orange Free State was not any despairing struggle for liberty, but a bold bid for Empire. I now believe that it was not to preserve what they had; but to get what they had not, that they went to war. I now believe that nothing less than to make themselves—these two Republics as a nucleus and what additions they could obtain to them—the centre of a Dutch-speaking paramount Power



in South Africa, and to exclude for ever the hated Britisher from any dominating influence in the future of that part of the world.

\* \* \* \*

"These people have risked their all upon the stake of war, and I say that it is incredible that that risk should be run merely to prevent the Uitlanders getting the vote, and that you have to regard this transaction as part of a larger policy, a deeper and darker design, which aimed at nothing less than substitute a Boer for British rule. But you will ask me, "How is such madness possible? How could the responsible Statesmen of these two Republics ever have entertained the dream that they could oust the power of Britain from South Africa?" Well, I agree with the objector into whose mouth I have put these words. I agree it was madness, but if you will go over all the circumstances of the case it was a very intelligible madness. To begin with, you must not measure the relative strength of the two Powers in South Africa, or the wealth of the two alone—that is ours and that of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State taken together—and balance one against the other.

The leaders of the two Republics knew the military difficulties which would necessarily beset us in carrying out a campaign in South Africa. They knew, in the first place, that it would involve a military expedition without parallel in the history of the world. There has never been in the whole history of the world such a spectacle as the transport of our army 7,000 miles across to the sea, to a country which is incapable of supporting an army, where fodder for the horses, food for the soldiers, ammunition, weapons, everything down, I believe, to horseshoes, has to be taken from a base 7,000 miles away by sea, and 300 by rail. They knew also that they had an immense advantage in strategical position—I will not go into the technicalities, but every soldier will tell you how great that is—they knew they had an immense advantage in a strategical position from which they could strike in any direction they pleased, while we had to scatter our forces round a large circumference for the purpose of resisting aggression or making an attack. They knew also that they possessed in the irregular militia which makes up their army a military force admirably suited to the country in which the warfare had to be carried on. a military force in which every man by his training was individually qualified for the species of warfare in which he is engaged. They knew, therefore, that we



had a very serious job on hand, a difficult military operation to carry through. They also knew what we did not know at the time—what I certainly did not realise until a very short period before the breaking out of the war—that the Orange Free State would throw all their forces into line with the Transvaal Republic.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON, M.P.,  
H.M. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

“He was speaking for every single member of the Cabinet when he declared that they had earnestly striven for peace. Not many months back the allegation made against the Government was that they made too many Concessions to Foreign Nations, and were too patient and conciliatory in their Foreign Policy. They pushed to the very utmost extent conciliation and patience in their dealings with President Krüger.

\* \* \* \*

“It was related of President Krüger, what seemed to be true, that in reply, three or four years ago, to a memorial in which the Uitlanders implored him to grant them the same rights as white men enjoyed in every civilised community in the world, the President exclaimed. ‘Your rights; yes, you will get them over my dead body.’ It was in that spirit of unreasonable obstinacy that all our overtures were met. When at last President Krüger found that we were determined not to be baffled by subterfuge or illusory proposals, and that our Government were determined to push through the work we had undertaken, he declared war against this country and issued the most insulting Ultimatum ever issued against a great Nation.

\* \* \* \*

“Mr. Krüger was elected President of the Transvaal almost immediately after the Convention (1881), and from that time till now he and the men working around him had done their best to defeat the whole spirit and intention of the Convention which was ratified between them and the Gladstone Government. They had passed measure after measure by which they had restricted the Franchise of the Uitlanders, until now practically the whole of the Uitlanders were disfranchised, though they constituted the majority of the white people. They had shifted the municipal taxation until

the Uitlanders paid something like 90 per cent. of the taxation. The Uitlanders had not one iota of control over the taxation they contributed. They were deprived of any voice in the management of their own municipal or local affairs. They were not allowed to have their children educated in their own tongue. Press laws had been passed by which men who wrote against the Government were liable to be arrested and tried by persons not unprejudiced or impartial. Lastly, they had abolished the laws by which the Judges of the land were independent, so that they were now nothing more nor less than a part of the executive over which Mr. Krüger had control. He ventured to say that there was not in the civilised world any body of white men held in such bondage as the Uitlanders in the Transvaal.

\*

\*

\*

\*

“It was quite clear from the beginning of the negotiations that President Krüger was not prepared to make any substantial concessions. Could any one deny, or doubt that the enormous military armaments which, for many years past, had been accumulating in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were for the purpose of seizing the earliest opportunity of driving British supremacy out of South Africa?”

REAR ADMIRAL  
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD, C.B., M.P.

“More than nine-tenths of the people of this country were thoroughly convinced that the present war was a just war waged for a just cause. If trouble had arisen for us in any other part of the world there was now no doubt that the Boer Republic and its armed forces would have taken advantage of that trouble in order to try and turn us out of South Africa. The question of maintaining our Suzerainty in the Transvaal and British paramountcy in South Africa was in more danger than we knew before the war. Why were we fighting the Boers? Because they interfered with the education of children of British subjects in the Transvaal; because they did not allow the Uitlanders freedom of speech, or personal liberty, or even a share in the Administration of the Territory, although they paid the whole of the Transvaal Taxes. Let it be always remembered that we did not ask for the Uitlanders one single privilege beyond those which Dutch settlers enjoyed in the Cape Colony.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH, BART., M.P.,  
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

“The Transvaal Boers received back their Independence from this country. Were they grateful? Not a bit of it. Since then, year by year, they had dealt out harder measures to men of English blood and English birth. During many months of this year we were in friendly and difficult negotiation with the Transvaal Government in the hope of securing by peaceable means such an immediate and substantial representation of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal Legislature as might enable them to redress their grievances for themselves. At last they obtained from the Transvaal Government an offer which appeared to contain a basis for settlement, but that offer was coupled with an impossible condition that we should pledge ourselves never again under any circumstances to intervene on behalf of those whom they had been misgoverning and oppressing for years. When that condition was refused, what happened? Without any provocation from us, the Transvaal Government sent us the most impudent message that was ever sent to any country, requiring Her Majesty to withdraw her troops. When they met with the inevitable refusal they at once proceeded to invade our Colonies. He did not call that gratitude for what we had done for the Transvaal Boers.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
HENRY CHAPLIN, M.P.,  
H.M. PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE.

“Although we are at the moment unhappily engaged in war, I honestly believe there would have been peace, even in South Africa, if the Government of President Krüger had ever really desired or intended it. Little did I think, when at the close of the Session in August I accepted your kind hospitality, that we should actually be engaged in war at the moment I was to address you, and not only so, but that we should be fighting for our lives to defend the possessions of the Queen against the invading hosts of the Republic. For almost to the last—and I acknowledge with contrition the error that I made—I gave credit to the Government of the South African Republic for the same desire—which without a single exception

animated the minds of every member of the English Cabinet—that a friendly and peaceful settlement of the difficulties between the two countries could be found. That up to almost the last moment was my absolute conviction; but all our hopes and expectations were shattered by the Ultimatum from Pretoria which suddenly burst upon a startled and astonished world. To that Ultimatum there was no alternative whatever for a nation like our own.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
CHARLES T. RITCHIE, M.P.,  
H.M. PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE.

“The Government hoped, almost against hope, even to the last, that the reasonable proposals they had made would not, after all, be refused by the Boer Government, and that as the Government only asked for the same rights and privileges for British subjects in the Transvaal as were possessed by the Boers themselves, the Boer Government would hardly undertake so gigantic a conflict in order to avoid doing what, after all, was the merest common justice. But whatever might have been the views of some as to the disposition of the Boer Government at one time or another, he thought what we had seen now of their strength, of their organisation, of their preparation, showed quite clearly that they were the whole time bent upon war. The Boers hoped to take us at a disadvantage, and these negotiations were prolonged to an extent which would have tried the patience of most Governments, the patience of most countries. All this time the Boers were perfecting their organisation and completing their preparations with the view to establishing in South Africa the domination of the Boer Government instead of the domination of the British. Well, there had been some critics who had accused the Government of desiring war—of so conducting negotiations with the Boers as to force them into war. That accusation had been made again and again, but no more monstrous crime could have been charged to any Government than such a crime as that. To suppose that men of honour, of humanity, of uprightness, such as composed the Cabinet of the Queen, would have deliberately endeavoured to bring upon this country the great calamity of an unjust war, was to charge them with a crime, the punishment of which could not possibly be sufficiently severe if that crime could be brought home to them.”

## THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR MATTHEW WHITE-RIDLEY, BART., M.P.,  
H.M. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT.

“It was apparent that from the beginning there was a determination on the part of the Boers to force an issue which could hardly be settled without war. that issue being whether the Dutch should be masters of South Africa or the Queen’s supremacy should be maintained. Upon this question depended this other, whether, as we held, there should be equality for white men in the Transvaal as in the Cape Colony, or whether there should be an oligarchy in the Transvaal, falsely called the South African Republic. That was the issue which Her Majesty’s Government had taken up, and were prepared to see through.”

## THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

ARETAS AKERS-DOUGLAS, BART., M.P.,  
H.M. FIRST COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WORKS.

“This was not, he said, a war of our own seeking, but was forced upon us by the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, which sent us an insolent Ultimatum. Beyond that, they had invaded our territory, and had also issued Proclamations annexing country which had for many years belonged to Britain. There could have been only one answer to this, from whatever Government might have been in power.

\*

\*

\*

\*

“For four months the Government endeavoured to obtain their ends by diplomatic and peaceful ends. They had no desire to interfere with the Independence of the South African Republic so long as it maintained the conditions under which its Independence was granted—but at the same time they were determined that Boer Independence should not mean Dutch ascendancy in South Africa. They were bound to obtain for our fellow-subjects that fair play which was the birthright of every Englishman. They believed this to be a just war. There had been no hesitation in the policy which had guided the Government. There had been rumours of divisions in the Cabinet, but they could take it from him there had been no division at all. The Cabinet tried, and some people thought they tried too much, to obtain their ends peacefully, but they had



been absolutely determined that they would obtain those ends, and there had never for one moment been a difference of any sort between the nineteen gentlemen who had the privilege of advising Her Majesty upon the policy of the country. Their desire was to vindicate the Paramountcy of the Queen in South Africa, and to establish equality amongst all the white races. They did not ask for any privilege which was not readily given to the Dutchmen in Cape Colony. They thought, and every day tended to confirm that thought, that war, sooner or later, was inevitable, and had President Krüger not declared war now, the war might have come at a time when this country was in the midst of greater dangers or complications with other countries, which, he was glad to say, at the present moment, were entirely absent."

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
JESSE COLLINGS, M.P.,  
UNDER SECRETARY HOME DEPARTMENT.

"Great Britain was engaged, at great sacrifice and with unparalleled determination and bravery on the part of her people, not in an enterprise to acquire lands, not to conquer fresh territories, but simply in obedience to her traditions, to carry out the ideas of Liberty and Civilization. The National Forces were engaged not in oppression, not in striving to put a particular class over another, but in giving all classes freedom. Their mission was to guard and perpetuate and to still further develop that great enterprise which our forefathers had handed down to us, and which we thought it our paramount duty, above every other consideration, to carry down to those who came after us unimpaired in its glory and in its power."

THOMAS W. RUSSELL, M.P.,  
PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD.

"He said that, having visited South Africa some years ago, and studied the problems now being worked out, he had come to the conclusion that there was absolutely no truth in the statement that the present war was unjust, or that it was being engineered by capitalists. War was inevitable from the very first, and must now

be fought out to a successful issue. Defeat would mean the ruin of British supremacy in South Africa. The war would strengthen the national fibre, and it would teach our enemies that the British race had not deteriorated."

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE.

SIR HENRY CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, G.C.B., M.P.,  
EX-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

"What is the attitude of patriotic citizens like ourselves who are anxious to support that which is becoming the cause of our country, who, indeed, have no other course and no other desire but to support it after the receipt of an Ultimatum which was an affront, after an armed invasion of two of our Colonies? And when these events have been followed by a Proclamation—which may be accounted for as being a fictitious document, issued for the purposes of the war, but which is none the less audacious and insolent—of a Proclamation of annexation of a large slice of Her Majesty's Dominions—we could not have any hesitancy in support of the Government of the Queen in such instances, and we will continue to do so in all the steps which may be thought necessary in order to bring the war to a successful termination."

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR HENRY FOWLER, BART., M.P.,  
EX-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

"Speaking for himself alone, he felt bound to tell them that he had arrived at a strong, a clear, and conscientious conviction that the war in which this country was at present engaged was a wholly necessary war. He therefore felt it to be his duty to support all measures which the Government of the country might propose for carrying on that war vigorously, and for bringing it to an end as speedily as possible. In the next place he regarded the war as a war of defence. While negotiations between our own Government and the South African Republic were pending, and while there was the possibility of an amicable settlement, war was declared against the British Crown in an Ultimatum which he felt bound to say was unparalleled in the annals of diplomacy. Within a few hours of the delivery of that Ultimatum the President of the South African

Republic and the President of the Orange Free State—a State with which we had always had the most friendly relations and no dispute—joined together, and those two States invaded our territory, attacking our forces, and plunging the subjects of the British Crown into all the horrors of war. Our first duty was to defend the dominions and the subjects of the Queen from foreign attack; but the war was also one for the defence of the white races of South Africa, and for placing them upon that equality which was at present enjoyed in Cape Colony and other colonies under the control of the Queen. That was the basis, the one unaltered and unalterable condition, on which Parliament sanctioned the grant to all the inhabitants—he emphasised the word “all”—of the Transvaal of self-government.

\*

\*

\*

\*

“We were defending not only those conditions, but also the supremacy, the paramountcy, the predominance—let them call it by what term they liked—of the British power in South Africa. Upon the maintenance of that supremacy depended, in his opinion, not only the civil and political freedom of the people of South Africa and the stability and existence of the British Empire in that country, but the honour and the integrity of the British Empire throughout the world. There could be no permanent peace in South Africa until this question of supremacy and the equality of the different people residing there was finally settled. This was the underlying controversy which was the key to the whole situation.”

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
HERBERT H. ASQUITH, M.P.,  
EX-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT.

*see p. 45  
enforce*

“He was not one of those who held that the ultimate responsibility of the war rested upon the shoulders of the Government, or, through them, on the people of Great Britain. On the day when the Ultimatum of the Boers was announced to the world he had the opportunity of publicly expressing his own opinion as to the cause and origin of the war, and from the views which he then stated nothing that had since happened or been disclosed had caused him in any way to recede. His opinion was then and now this—that war was neither intended nor desired by the Government and people

of Great Britain. That, on the contrary, the vast majority among them, without distinction of party, regarded the possibility of war not only with aversion, but with incredulity. But while the door of negotiation was still open a challenge to arms was thrown upon the floor which no statesman, however peace-loving, and no Power, however insignificant, without inflicting a mortal wound on its self-respect and security, could decline to take up.

\* \* \* \*

“When we gave back in 1881 its independence to the South African Republic the gift was made not for a section but for the whole of the inhabitants.

\* \* \* \*

“What was the condition of our fellow-subjects in the Transvaal? They were taxed without representation, subject to laws in the working and administering of which they had no effective voice, deprived at one and the same time of the two alternative remedies—votes and arms. There were authorities of great weight for whom he personally felt the greatest respect who contended that, grave and intolerable as the situation had become, the time for intervention was not yet ripe. He himself was unable to take that view. It was true President Krüger was an old man, and, whatever might have been the case some years ago, his personality had ceased to be the main obstacle to reform. There had grown up a network of vested interests, including an ambitious and intelligent official caste imported from abroad, whose power and privileges were bound up with the maintenance of the existing system. The almost ostentatious impotence of the British majority had begun to react in an unfavourable way on the racial relations throughout the whole of South Africa. It was all-important in that part of the world that the two white races upon which the future of South Africa depended should live on peaceful and friendly terms. That was a state of things which could only be permanently brought about by the giving and receiving of equal rights and by reciprocal self-respect.

\* \* \* \*

“No man ever went to Cape Town with a more unbiased mind than did Sir Alfred Milner, and if he had come to the conclusion, as it was clear he had, that the continuance of the existing state of things in the Transvaal was a great and growing danger to the peace and development of South Africa as a whole, we might at least be



sure that that opinion, slowly arrived at, was the result of first-hand observation and impartial reflection.

\*

\*

\*

\*

"He would not say, as some people did, that the Boers from the first intended no concessions. The evidence did not appear to warrant such a charge. He thought, however, that, whatever their original intentions might have been, it was clear as time went on that they begun to distrust our sincerity. They credited us with ulterior motives. They suspected us of design on the internal independence of their Republic. The apprehension he believed, was baseless. He did not think any responsible statesman in this country had any such design, and so the Boers were over and over again assured. But diplomacy was poisoned, and perished in an atmosphere of suspicion. As soon as the support of the Orange Free State had been secured the Transvaal Government issued its Ultimatum. That Ultimatum, to his mind, bore all the signs of remarkable and elaborate preparation. It was the act, not of an individual, but of the Government of Pretoria, and it was intended as a formal statement to the world of what lawyers call a *casus belli*."

SIR EDWARD GREY, BART., M.P.,  
EX-UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"Let us spread the whole history of the Transvaal question out fairly before us, let us read it plainly, let us get at the whole truth and make up our minds as to what the truth really is. If you have been through the Blue Books—I have been—the question you would have asked yourself again and again in going through them would be:—Does President Krüger mean a real reform or does he not? I have looked at the whole of these negotiations by the light thrown upon them by what went before in the history of the Transvaal, by the light thrown upon them by the negotiations, and it is clear to my mind that all through the whole question there was to be only a sham reform granted. Sir Alfred Milner pressed for a real reform, and President Krüger tried to put him off with something that was not a real reform. From beginning to end I believe that the Transvaal Government have never intended that a real reform would be the outcome of these negotiations.

\*

\*

\*

\*

\* A year before Krüger's Ultimatum, the  
authorities at Bloemfontein were <sup>already</sup> contem-  
-plating an invasion of the Orange Colony, should  
the Boers refuse to accept the terms of the ultimatum.



"Negotiations failed to secure the protection of rights for them; negotiations failed, and we are at war now because these negotiations have failed. In the second place, we are at war because the question which is the Paramount Power in the whole of South Africa has been raised. In my opinion the British Government was not the first to raise the question. In my mind the Boers have been the first to raise the question as to who was to be the Paramount Power.

\*

\*

\*

\*

"Since the Convention of 1881 the whole history of the Transvaal shows that they have not been a good neighbour to us. They have been in one way or another intriguing, arming themselves, doing everything they could, not with the object of keeping the Conventions, but with the object, when a favourable opportunity occurred, of getting rid of the Conventions altogether. What they have done is this: they have violated the spirit of the Conventions, and, though they may have kept the letter of the Conventions, they have strained the letter of the Conventions. The whole spirit of friendship, the spirit of conciliation in which the Conventions were given by this country, has not been kept by the Boer Government; but the Independence and Free Government given them by the Conventions have been continually used to extort more and more, and to undermine British authority in South Africa.

\*

\*

\*

\*

"I tell you frankly, it seems to me, reading the history of the negotiations, there can be no doubt that the reason why they failed was because the Transvaal Government was not prepared to grant real reforms, and the blame for the failure of the negotiations and the blame for the war rests upon the Boer Oligarchy and the Hollander clique which has influenced them so much, which has misled them, with the deplorable consequences which we see. This war is, in my opinion, a war against an Oligarchical and Oppressive Government, but do not let us forget it is a war for Freedom also.

"Never for a moment, however great the heat when war is going on, let us lose sight of this, that, though it be a war for Freedom, the result of the war is to be not race inequality, but race equality throughout South Africa. Equality between the two White Races in South Africa, Freedom and Democratic Government, that is the object for which we shall strive, that is what will be established as the result of the war; equality between the two

*He also in the famous speech of the 18th of Sept. 1898.*

White Races, Free and Democratic Government, and the humane treatment for the Native coloured population, which is the pride and the glory of every other part of the Queen's Dominions."

SIR FORTESCUE FLANNERY, BART., M.P.,

"The speeches of Sir William Harcourt and Mr. Morley had done more than anything else to bring about the war, by deluding President Krüger into the belief that there was a difference of opinion on the matter in this country. The policy of the Colonial Secretary had been full publication of Blue Books and a conciliatory attitude. Patience and self-control had shown a magnificent example of dignity and resolve, and he believed that policy would lead to a union of English and Boer races."

WILLIAM G. E. MACARTNEY, M.P.,  
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

"They were told that the Government should never have abandoned the course of Diplomatic action. But they had never abandoned the course of Diplomatic action. It was the South African Republic which had put an end to Diplomatic action. It had been further said that the responsibility for the action of the South African Republic rested upon Her Majesty's Government, because they had needlessly, and without just cause, revived what their critics were pleased to call the dead rights of the Suzerainty. The convincing proof that the question of Suzerainty had nothing to do with the final difficulties was to be found in the fact that when, nineteen months after their Despatch of October 16, 1897, President Krüger went to the Bloemfontein Conference, and was invited to state by Sir Alfred Milner his grievances, he never once mentioned that one of his grievances was that we had re-inserted in the Despatch the word Suzerainty."

SIR ELLIS ASHMEAD-BARTLETT, BART., M.P.

"The Colonial Secretary, in two recent speeches, had admitted 'that, looking at the history of South Africa for the past 18 years, it had now become convinced that war had always been inevitable, and that the capitulation after Majuba had been a mistake.' He agreed with Mr. Chamberlain that war had become inevitable.

\*

\*

\*

\*

\* the mistake was the annexation  
of the Transvaal, Majuba & the retrocession  
of the same to the Boers & the mistake

"No one could deny that the British Government, and especially the Colonial Secretary, showed the utmost patience in the negotiations which came to an end with the monstrous Ultimatum which President Krüger had the audacity to address to Her Majesty's Government on October 9. It had been perfectly plain during the whole of the past three years and a half that President Krüger and his advisers, the dominant oligarchy of the Transvaal, had never intended to give equal justice, or rights in any form, to the Uitlander population. To accuse Mr. Chamberlain of breach of faith, of want of consideration, of deliberate desire for war, was as baseless as it was contemptible. The Boer Government had deliberately forced on this war, first by their wanton and persistent denial of all justice to the Uitlanders; and, secondly, by their perfidious and insolent defiance of the Suzerain Power."

### W. RAYMOND GREENE, M.P.

"As to the point that we have been rushed into this war, if ever there was a Government in the history of the British nation that had tried friendly negotiations to excess, almost to the point of weakness, it was the Government which was now using the forces of war. The accusation that it was merely a war of greed was absurd. It was not a war for gain; it was a war for justice and truth."

### THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JAMES BRYCE, M.P., EX-PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE.

"All were, however, agreed that the war, for the sake of humanity, should be vigorously prosecuted. He condemned the diplomacy which led to it, but he would have voted for twice as much money had the Ministry proposed it. British subjects in the Transvaal suffered grievances, but these had been exaggerated in some quarters. Britain was entitled to demand redress, and the Government's aim in raising the question was legitimate. The conduct of the Boer Government both in administration and negotiation was not to be defended. No doubt it made concessions, but it made them grudgingly and slowly."

SIR B. WALTER FOSTER, KNT., M.P., M.D.,  
EX-SECRETARY TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD.

"Patience had been exercised on the British side. Not sufficient, perhaps, but still patience had been exercised. The Ultimatum, however, was of such a character that no nation with any self-respect could refrain from taking it up, and they in England must now fight the Boers if necessary unto death. They were bound to go through with the business now that they had begun, and his only hope was that the war might come to a speedy end. When it came to the question whether the Transvaal Government or the British Government should be supreme in South Africa, he had no hesitation in saying he was on the British side."

SIR AUGUSTUS FREDERICK GODSON, M.P., KNT.,  
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

"The Boers had been plotting for years against English supremacy in South Africa, and no less a personage than Cetewayo told his brother years ago in what way the English would be treated as a consequence of the policy we were then pursuing. His brother at the time had Cetewayo in charge—in fact, it was he who captured him—and he had many interesting conversations with Cetewayo through an interpreter."

THE HON. ALFRED LYTTTELTON, M.P.,  
RECORDER OF OXFORD.

"Englishmen had the great consolation of knowing that the war was not of our seeking, but was undertaken on behalf of the honour and interests of the country. He contrasted the position of the Transvaal, where 30,000 Boers ruled 180,000 Uitlanders, without their having a single voice in the matter, with Cape Colony, where the Dutch had equal rights and votes to such an extent that at the present moment a Dutch Government was in power."

J. FLETCHER MOULTON, Q.C., M.P.,  
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

"The British Empire could only be held together by peace, and they must regard every war not only as a burden and disaster, but as a failure. If, however, there was a nation to whose aims and methods he thoroughly objected, it was the South African Republic.

He would not say the Boers had no virtues, but their avowed object, persistently and skilfully carried out, was to secure supremacy for the Dutch, and to reduce all other nationalities in the country to a condition of inferiority. The Government in Pretoria was based on corruption, and he was convinced that the Boers there had for years intended that the dispute should come to war."

SIR CUTHBERT QUILTER, BART., M.P.,

"He claimed for Mr. Chamberlain the greatest credit for his courage and patience in the conduct of long and difficult negotiations, and said the policy that had been pursued was the policy of all, and not of one alone, of Her Majesty's Ministers."

EDMUND ROBERTSON, M.P.,  
EX-CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

"Far more was involved in the present war than any question between Great Britain and the Transvaal or the peace of South Africa. There was involved the whole existence of the British Empire. He could not contemplate the dreadful consequences of a possible reverse in the South African war. It would be the beginning of the end, not only of the British Empire in South Africa, but as a whole."

SIR LEWIS McIVER, BART., M.P.,  
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

"In this war we were fighting to repel an invasion of British territory, to resist the plundering of British subjects on British soil, to maintain the Queen's supremacy in South Africa, for equal rights for the white races, and for fairness and justice to the black races in South Africa, for British as opposed to Dutch methods of government, and for modern democratic Anglo-Saxon ideals as opposed to the medieval oligarchy of Dutch conceptions."

FRANCIS W. LOWE, M.P.

"Mr. Chamberlain and the Government had been most patient. All right-minded people must long ago have come to the conclusion that President Krüger and the South African Republic were determined to make war upon this country, and nothing whatever that Mr. Chamberlain or the Government could have done would have had any effect."



WILLIAM S. ROBSON, M.P., Q.C.,  
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

"They could not ignore the fact that negotiations had been broken off by the Transvaal Government. The Boers had struck the first blow, and a very effective blow it had been. No one could doubt that it was a blow for which they had been long preparing, and one for which they knew we were not ready. He passed to the more important question with which history would concern itself—had England drawn the sword in a just or unjust cause?"

SIXTY YEARS AGO.

"One must begin at the beginning. The Transvaal, a country as large as England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland put together, was inhabited by two classes of people. One of them, the Boer population, numbered about 67,000 persons. The other class, not very fairly called Uitlanders, numbered some 150,000 persons. By what right was either of these classes there? The Boers were there originally by right of conquest over the natives. The fundamental fact was that the Uitlanders were there by a right as good—no better and no worse—than that of the Boers themselves. The Boers first entered the country about sixty years ago. They left Cape Colony and Natal because of difficulties with the English Government in reference to the natives. We were for the emancipation of the slaves, the Boers were not. Therefore they established that little Government of theirs. We recognised them as an independent Government in 1852. In 1877 the Boer Government was bankrupt, and was in serious danger of attack from surrounding natives. Having a great objection to pay taxes the Boers had not provided the means to defend themselves against the Zulus. The British Government sent out a man, who was instructed to ascertain whether the Boers desired annexation to this country. He did not trouble to make inquiries; he went out with a mind already made up. \* Unfortunately and injudiciously, this country, on his advice, decided to annex the Transvaal. *no see future*

\*

\*

\*

\*

"Her Majesty handed back the Transvaal on the express condition, to which the Boers themselves assented, that Englishmen of all ranks, that people of all nations and races, should be at full and free liberty to enter that country, reside in it, travel in it, and labour and live in it. Those were the conditions on which the Boers got back their land. That was an essential fact to remember

\* The truth is Carnarvon had made up his mind to annex the Transvaal and the shortest & the surest way to carrying out

because a great many persons spoke as though the Uitlanders, were like Foreigners, with no right whatever on the soil where they were living. That was a complete delusion. The English had as much right in the Transvaal as the Boers. Every Uitlander who by his industry and capital helped to develop the resources of the land, was there by a right as good as was Mr. Krüger.

\*

\*

\*

\*

“ But Mr. Krüger promised civil rights, and on the faith of that promise the Convention was entered into. Let them now consider how the promise had been kept. At the time of the Convention any English subject could become a citizen of the Transvaal, with a right to vote there on a two years’ qualification at the utmost. No sooner had the Boers attained their freedom and independence from the English than they proceeded to alter the law in that respect. They did not, as was sometimes alleged, wait for the discovery of the goldfields; they did not wait until, as a result of that discovery, they feared an invasion of Foreigners. Beginning in 1882, they altered the Franchise step by step, until at last no Englishman—though he was living there, though he had married there, though he had children born and growing up there—could get the Franchise except after fifteen years’ qualification, and then only with the consent of two-thirds of the Boers living in his own district. That was not keeping faith.

\*

\*

\*

\*

“ The present issue was whether the nation that was yet to grow up in that part of the world should develop on English lines of freedom and equality, or on Boer lines of oppression and corruption. In 1897 the income of the Boer Government was £1,480,000. The Civil Service Salaries Fund alone came to about £2,400,000, enough to pay every man, woman, and child in the Transvaal £40 per head per annum. Where did that money go? The Uitlanders had no voice in disposing of that money, almost all of which they provided. Their judicial independence had also been taken from them; they were denied education for their children, and when they protested against their municipal misgovernment their meeting was broken up. President Krüger had declared war because he wished to maintain race government, than which there was no worse system of tyranny. We did well to protest against that state of things. Our protest had been met with a blow, and in resisting that blow could any one deny that our cause was just?”

## AMERICAN OPINION ON THE WAR.


The *Utica Morning Herald*, of November 8, 1899, publishes a lecture delivered by the Rev. Dr. W. A. Bartlett, in which the origin of the present war in South Africa is explained thus:—

“What are the things in controversy? What was demanded? Why was it commenced? The complaints of the Uitlanders or Foreigners are:—1. Taxation without representation. In 1884 Oom Paul invited, through the London papers, all the world to settle in the Transvaal on equal terms with the Boers. As they began to come in and the diamond and gold mines were discovered they raised the conditions of the Franchise from being simply a white 21 years old to a residence of 15 years and paying 125 dollars, and if a man met these conditions he could be prevented from voting by some matter of detail. 2. Then the trial by jury. The Uitlander demanded to be tried by his Peers and not by a Boer Jury. 3. Education. While there were 20 English pupils at Johannesburg to one Boer, they taught the Dutch language in the schools. As to the municipal taxation it is practically taken from foreigners, and they have no voice as to how it is to be expended. In Johannesburg, where there are from 60,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, the largest city in the Transvaal, there were 23,000 Uitlanders to 1,000 Boers, and yet their only right of citizenship was to pay taxes and obey any law that a Boer Government in which they had no representative right might impose. 4. Slavery. The system of apprenticeship has already been referred to. The first exodus of Boers from Cape Colony was in 1834, when Great Britain abolished slavery in all her Colonies, and the Boers resented this infringement of their rights and moved out towards the Transvaal.

“Underlying these expressed reasons for the war is the fact that all Boers have been educated into a hatred of the British. Race prejudice has been encouraged. On top of this the Boers sent their Ultimatum. On October 10 they informed the British Officer at Pretoria that the British must arbitrate under certain conditions and restrictions which they demanded; that they must remove all the troops from the borders of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, which were stationed there to keep the savage tribes away, and remove all troops from the country that had arrived since June 1, and that all troops on their way must be turned back without being permitted to land. This Ultimatum must be replied to by October 11

at 5 p.m., or it would be regarded as a declaration of war on the part of the British. Great Britain replied by telegram that it could not consider in any way the Ultimatum. The fact is the Boers had been preparing for war since Jameson's raid two years previous, <sup>4 1/2</sup> filling the country with all munitions of war, including artillery and ammunition. The war was sprung on the British when they were least prepared for it. The question simply resolves itself into this, whether an unprogressive, ignorant, religious people have the right to block the progress of civilisation. That they are honest and feel themselves aggrieved and carry their conscience and religion into this war we believe; that in many points they are technically right in their diplomatic positions we have no doubt; but the larger question presses, whether a people, even so good and worthy in many respects, have a right to block the highway which leads to a free, a just, and a noble Government by the 17th Century ignorance."

*Another American Journalist - wrote at the time "Paul Kruger has put himself in the path of civilization and civilization will blow him out of the way."*





# Books & Pamphlets for Politicians, Lecturers, & Essayists, BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

**FIFTY YEARS OF FOREIGN POLICY.** 1849 to 1899, with Portrait. Demy 8vo. Cloth, Gilt. 438 pages. Price 5s.

**HENRY RICHARD, THE APOSTLE OF PEACE.** Crown 8vo, with Eight Portraits, viz.: Henry Richard, Richard Cobden, Joseph Sturge, Edmund Fry, William Stokes, Arthur G. O'Neill, Elihu Burritt. 224 pages. In Cloth, 2s. 6l.

**AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR EUROPE.** A History of International Law, Arbitration, and Tribunals for the past three centuries; also a *précis* of the proceedings and results of the International Conference at the Hague, 1899. 54 pages. Price 6d.

**GRADUAL PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.** In chronological order, instances of its successful application, from 1794 to 1899; Pending Cases of Arbitration; Amicable Reference; Mediation; the Declarations of Legislative Bodies; Resolutions of Congresses; Clauses in Treaties; 53 pages. Price 6d.

**MILITARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF EUROPE.** The strength of the Armies and Navies, with their annual cost; also the amount and interest of the National Debts of each Nation in Europe. 24 pages. Price 6d.

## Price Sixpence Each.

- I. THE WARS OF QUEEN VICTORIA'S REIGN, 1837-1887.
- II. RUSSIA, BULGARIA, AND TURKEY, 1768-1887.
- III. ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND EGYPT, 1834-1884.
- IV. FRANCE, CHINA, AND ANNAM.
- V. SERBIA, AUSTRIA, TURKEY, AND RUSSIA.
- VI. THE NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERY QUESTION.
- VII. THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL.
- VIII. MARITIME INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- IX. THE BEHRINGS SEA FISHERY QUESTION, 24 pp., 1893.
- X. EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT, 1849-99.

LONDON:

LEWIS APPLETON, F.R.H.S.,

12, DARTMOUTH ST., QUEEN ANNE'S GATE, WESTMINSTER, S.W.


















Duke University Libraries



D00460216J

